Appeal from trial term, Tioga coutity.
Orneldo Satchwell was convicted of selling spirituous liquors without a liquor tax certificate, and from the judgment on a verdict on a plea of former conviction, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.
At a trial term of the supreme court held in Tioga county in March, 1899, the grand jury found an indictment against the defendant, charging that on or about the 30th day of December, 1898, at the town of Candor, in that county, the defendant sold by retail “to Gardiner C. Hibbard, and to other and divers persons to this grand jury unknown, and did deliver, in pursuance of such sale, to the said Gardiner C. Hibbard and to the said other and divers persons strong and spirituous liquors,” in quantities of less than five gallons at a time, without having any liquor tax certificate granted to him. The' defendant was arraigned under this indictment, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of $200. At a June term of the county court of the county of Tioga the grand jury found an indictment against the defendant, charging that on or about the 30th day of December, 1898, at the town of Candor, in that county, the defendant sold by retail “to Frederick J. Bryant, and did deliver, in pursuance of such sale, to the said Frederick J. Bryant, and divers other persons to this jury unknown, strong and spirituous liquors,” in quantities of less than five gallons at a time, without having any liquor tax certificate granted to him. On arraignment under this indictment, the defendant entered a plea of a former conviction. The trial of this issue was had before a jury of that county, and a verdict was rendered for the people. On the trial it appeared by the testimony of the witnesses Bryant and Hibbard the special agents of the excise department who made the complaint against the defendant, that they had been at defendant’s hotel and bought liquor on but one occasion, and that was on December 30, 1898. Hibbard and Bryant each bought from the defendant, and paid for, intoxicating liquors, which were drunk by themselves and others, and Bryant bought liquor which was not drunk. Their testimony before the grand jury that found the first indictment was substantially the same as their testimony before the grand jury that found the second indictment. From the judgment entered on the verdict of the jury, and from the order of the court denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, this appeal was taken.’
-. Argued before PARKER, P. J., and KELLOGG, EDWARDS, SMITH, and CHASE, JJ.John P. Wheeler, for appellant.
O. B. Glezen, Dist. Atty., for the People.
On the undisputed facts in this case, the defendant, on his plea of a former conviction, was entitled to judgment. The burden was on him to show a conviction of an offense identical with the one with which he was charged in the second indictment. This he established, prima facie, by the production of the record showing a conviction under an indictment which could be sustained by the evidence necessary to support the second indictment; and it was then incumbent on the prosecution to show that the conviction was in fact for a different offense. 3 Greenl. Ev. § 37; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 597; People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386 ; Com. v. Robinson, 126 Mass. 259 . I think there can be no question that under the first indictment, charging the defendant with selling strong and spirituous liquors at the town of Candor on December 30, 1898, “to Gardiner C. Hibbard, and to other and divers persons to this grand jury unknown,” the prosecution could have proved the sale by the defendant on that day, in that town, of strong and spirituous liquors to Frederick J. Bryant,