Grossmeyer v. District No. 1, Independent Order B'nai Berith

The action is brought to recover from the defendant, a domestic corporation incorporated under the laws of this state (Laws 1878, c. 188), the sum of $1,000, out of the endowment fund established by the defendant under its constitution and laws. The question involved is purely one of law, and the undisputed facts, so far as essential to the point presented, are as follows: The plaintiff’s son, Emanuel Grossmeyer, became a member of the Mt. Sinai Lodge, No. 270, one of the subordinate bodies of the defendant, on the 6th day of January, 1891. At that time the defendant maintained a fund known as the “Endowment Beserve Fund,” in which all members of the order were entitled to participate on the payment of designated premiums or dues. It was further provided by the laws of the defendant that, upon the death of a member so participating, the sum of $1,000 should be paid as follows: First, to his widow; second, to his children, if he left no widow; third, to his father, if he left neither widow nor child; fourth, to his mother, if he left neither widow, child, nor father; and, fifth, to such beneficiaries as he might designate, provided he left neither widow, child, father, nor mother. While the rules just quoted as to beneficiaries were in existence, and in January, 1892, Emanuel Grossmeyer became insane, and was committed to Bloomingdale Asylum on the 28th day of July, 1892, suffering from general paresis, which disease was progressive, and resulted in his death on the 17th day of September, 1896. His membership in the lodge was, however, continued, and his dues were regularly paid up to the date of his death, at which time it is undisputed that he was a member in good standing. In January, 1896, while Emanuel Grossmeyer was thus insane and confined in the asylum, the laws relating to beneficiaries were amended so as to provide as follows:

“Upon the decease of a participant in this fund there shall be paid the amount secured by him, respectively: First, to his widow; second, to his children, if there be no widow. But the brother may, by a designation in the book provided for that purpose, declare that the endowment, or a part thereof, shall be paid to such beneficiary or beneficiaries as he may designate, to the exclusion of his children, provided he leaves no widow. In such case a designation to the executors or administrators of the brother is a valid and sufficient designation. * * * A member having neither wife nor child must designate in writing, in such book, in the manner hereinbefore provided, to whom the sum secured shall be paid. In the event of a failure of a member to make such designation, such sum shall not be paid.”

Upon the death of Emanuel Grossmeyer, his mother, the plaintiff, made application for payment of the $1,000 now sued for; and in

“The claim that a further designation after the death of his mother was excused by the testator’s insanity for a portion of the interval preceding his death is not well founded. A designation was the condition precedent of defendant’s liability. The death of Lowenstein without fulfilling it, however sudden or unexpected, in no manner excused its prior necessity, nor could his insanity.”

From this it is obvious that the member in that -case was not, as-here, insane during the entire interval succeeding the amendment

“The whole contention in the trial was as to whether the alleged insanity of the accused at the time the charges were preferred against him was an answer to the 'defense founded upon his expulsion for neglecting to appear and answer such charges. It is claimed that Pfeiffer, being apparently and actually of unsound mind, could not be duly summoned or convicted of neglect to appear, and punished by expulsion and the loss of all rights in the society. There is no force in this point. A person who has even been adjudged a lunatic, and of whom a committee both of person and estate, has been appointed, may be sued at law, and the judgment recovered against him is not void. Sternbergh v. Schoolcraft, 2 Barb. 153 . It would be a contempt of,the court which appointed the committee to sue without leave, but the judgment ig valid. See authorities cited in report of above case. There was no reason why the lodge should not proceed against a person not adjudged a lunatic. He could have been defended, and his rights protected. If they were not, the lodge might regularly proceed according to its laws. His alleged insanity did not excuse his failure to appear. Hellenberg v. District No. 1, 94 N. Y. 580 .”

It is apparent that all that was held in the above case was that the insanity of a member is no reason why the trial of charges made against such member should not be proceeded with, the same as the trial of an ordinary action against an insane person. Insanity does not furnish immunity against any cause of action that may exist against the insane person, nor does it furnish immunity against any charges that may exist against the member of an organization. In either case the work of his defense is not of a purely personal kind, and can be undertaken and performed by others as well as by himself. The law does not, however, permit an insane person to make a will; nor does it-allow any one else to make a will for him. There is no force in the suggestion that the appointment of a committee might have been procured, and that such committee might have made the required designation of the beneficiary. The deceased died* unmarried, and left, him surviving, his mother, his nearest relative, in whom the fund in question vested under the laws of the defendant as they existed at the time that the insanity intervened, subject, it may be conceded, to being devested by any reasonable amendment of those laws. Up to the time of the deceased’s insanity the mother, therefore, remained the beneficiary; and, there being no change in his relations, there would be no possible ground for any committee or court to act other than in accordance with what might naturally be regarded as the incompetent’s last known wish. Obviously, it would be idle to require a court proceeding to again accomplish the very thing which had been accomplished during the incompetent’s days of sanity, and to deny the plaintiff’s rights because such a proceeding had not been taken would be wholly unjust. The dictates of common justice compel a conclusion in favor of the

Ordered accordingly.