Majority
Headnote
1. Partnership—-Fraud—Authority op. Partner—False Representations— Liability of Partner.The questions of whether the representations claimed to have been made by Culbert were those of fact, or mere opinion or calculation, and the extent to which they were relied upon, it is. unnecessary to determine, in view of the conclusion at which we have arrived. Proceeding, therefore, to what we think upon this appeal is controlling, we find two phases of the testimony which are to be considered separately, as bearing upon the plaintiff’s right to maintain this action against Culbert’s co-partners for deceit. It will serve the purpose of clearness if we discuss first that which is later in point of time, but which it is necessary to dispose of before we take up the other, upon which the defendants’ liability was, in effect, placed by the charge of the court to the jury. The phase to which we have referred as being subsequent in time concerns what was said and done on or about the 4th of October, 1889, when the parties all assembled at the office of the defendants’ attorney for the purpose of completing the purchase and sale. Up to that day there is no claim that any of the defendants other than Culbert had made any express representations, directly or indirectly, or had authorized, assented to, or known of any of Culbert’s statements. The negotiations at that time were practically complete, and the
It was testified by Taylor and another witness that on October 4th, or at a previous interview,—there being a dispute as to whether the parties all came together once or twice,—something was said by the defendant John or Robert Thompson to the effect that the accounts receivable were good as gold, and if desired would be guarantied for 1 per cent.; that the business was a good one, and ought to be a paying business; and that Mr. Taylor was getting more than he was paying. The making of these statements is denied, but, in view of the conflict, the question of their having been made was, if they were material, clearly for the jury to determine. We doubt, however, that they were material; for apart from whether, in their nature, they were more than expression of opinion, it was not asserted by the plaintiff that any reliance was placed upon them, the insistence throughout the case being that the specific representations, which it is claimed were false and fraudulent, and upon which he relied entirely, were those made by Culbert in the course of the negotiations. We may therefore dismiss this phase of the testimony with the additional remark that we doubt, if that were all there was of the case, whether a judgment such as was here obtained for a large amount of money for alleged deceit could be supported. If supported at all, it must be upon the other phase of the testimony, namely, that at the beginning, and during the course of the negotiations, Culbert, who must be held to have been the agent of the defendants, made representations which were false, and upon which the plaintiff relied to his damage. It was not proven that the defendants expressly authorized Culbert to make the representations, nor does it appear that they had any knowledge of what he had done in that regard; but it is insisted that, by reason of his relationship as a partner, the other defendants were legally bound by his acts. This presents the most difficult question upon this appeal, which is to define accurately Culbert’s relation to the parties,—to both the plaintiff and his former co-partners. As a partner, he was undoubtedly, with respect to all matters within the scope of the partnership, the agent of, and could bind, his co-partners. But how far a partner who, upon a contemplated dissolution of the firm, undertakes to sell its entire business, can be held to be the agent of the other partners, has been a much mooted question. It has been held in this state that “a silent partner, who did not know, nor assume to know, as to the truth of a statement of the condition of the firm made by one of his co-partners to a person
This view has found expression in the reports of other states. Thus, in Summerlot v. Hamilton, 121 Ind. 87 , 22 N. E. 973 , it was-held that:
“Partners are not agents for each other in transactions which relate to the formation or dissolution of the firm, or concerning the disposition of the firm property to each other. The purchase by one partner of the interest of another in the firm property is not a partnership transaction.”
And the case of Love v. Payne, 73 Ind. 80 , 38 Am. Rep. 111 , is-thus summarized in the headnote:
“B., a member of a partnership and its business manager, contracted with A. that if he would buy a retiring partner’s interest, and pay the balance due upon such partner’s share of the capital stock, he should receive a certain interest in the partnership property free from all liens. Afterwards alt the partnership property was sold upon a prior mortgage. Suit by A. against the firm for breach of the contract. Held, that B. had no authority to make such a contract.”
A case more analogous to the one at bar is that of Schwabacker v. Riddle, 84 Ill. 517 , in which it was held that:
“Where one partner induces a stranger to purchase the interest of the other partners in a partnership business by fraudulent representations, the parties selling are not liable for such false representations, unless they instigate or approve of them, or the partner making such representations is acting as their agent in making the same. The mere fact of their relation as partners will not make them liable.”
And in the opinion the court said:
“The selling of the interest of a partner in the property and business of the firm is very different from conducting or operating the firm business. The sale necessarily works a dissolution of the firm, and what is sold is not what belongs to the firm, but to the individual selling.”
Our attention is directed, also, to the decision in Lindmeier v. Monahan, 64 Iowa, 24 , 19 N. W. 839 , where it appeared that defendants owned a half interest in the business of a firm, one S. owning the other half. Defendants, through the fraudulent representations-of S. as to the assets and liabilities of the firm, induced plaintiff to purchase théir half interest, paying a certain sum in cash, and
“The mere fact that Studman united in the purchase cannot change the case, if plaintiff was defrauded, and injured thereby, and defendants received the benefit from the fraud. Equity will not permit frauds to be effectuated by any such expedients; and, if it should appear that Studman had no authority from the defendants to make the fraudulent representations, the case is the same. It cannot be doubted that, with the knowledge and consent of the defendants, Studman took part in the negotiations leading to the purchase in the course of which the false representations were made. The object of the negotiations was the benefit of the defendants by securing a purchaser. Studman will be regarded as defendants’ agent, and they will be responsible for the fraud. This is all of principle there is in the case.”
It will be noticed that the two latter cases are seemingly opposed in principle, but, with respect to the facts here presented, we think that both of them are distinguishable. Here it clearly appears that the partners understood that Culbert was endeavoring to get some one to join with him in purchasing the business, and they assented to his doing so, and we think that for the purpose of procuring a joint purchaser, though he was to unite with him in the purchase, Culbert was their agent. But we are also as strong in the view that, having presented to Taylor the subject of the purchase, and the latter having agreed to join with him in it, with the understanding that they were to become co-partners and carry on the business as so purchased, Culbert was equally the agent of Taylor. The legal difficulty presented in reaching a conclusion in this case is due to this dual position which Culbert occupied, acting as he did not alone as one of the principals in buying and selling, but as the agent for both the seller and the purchaser. If ~we consider Culbert merely in his relation as a principal, then clearly he could not deceive, himself, and it is extremely doubtful if legally he could be held to have deceived the plaintiff, who was his co-principal. But we think we must also consider him in his double capacity as agent for each.
This latter dual position demanded of Culbert that he should act in good faith, and be held to fair dealing with respect to both his principals; and, so far as he was guilty of a breach of this duty which he owed to each acting as the agent of the other, a liability to the extent of the injury inflicted arose as against the one who benefited from his fraudulent acts in favor of the other. Applying this principle, we think that the appellants, having authorized Culbert to represent them on the sale, although with the understanding that he was to obtain a third person who was to join him in the purchase, cannot escape liability for his wrongful act upon the theory that it was a wrong done to himself and to another, who was a co-principal. We cannot ignore the fact that he was the agent of the defendants, because to do so would be to eliminate the position occupied by the plaintiff, as an innocent third party fur
Upon this branch of the case, therefore, we think that in the matter of the sale of the business Culbert was the agent of his co-partners, and that for his fraudulent representations they are liable, not because of any express authority given to him to make them, but because of the relation which they held to each other and the authority given to sell the business. As already said, Culbert’s partners made no representations, and, so far as the negotiations went, they appear to have acted in good faith, having parted with their business. It is a seeming hardship that they should be required to return any part of the consideration. Nevertheless we think that is the necessary result and force of the application of legal principles, provided the plaintiff can establish his right to damages in an action, such as this, for deceit. And in that connection, having elected not to disaffirm the sale, and recover back the consideration, but rather to affirm it, and, while holding the property received and the benefits of the business transferred, to seek damages, he must recover, if at all, not upon the theory of a rescission, as for money had and received, but for damages, after affirmance, upon the theory of deceit, which, as we view it, is the theory upon which the complaint is framed, but to which we briefly allude, because some slight confusion appears to have arisen upon the trial as to the exact nature of this action.
Passing, however, from the liability arising from Culbert’s legal relation to the appellants, it is certain in law that it was within their power to limit the extent that he could bind them by notice brought home to the plaintiff. In other words, it was entirely competent for the appellants to serve notice on the plaintiff at any stage of the negotiations, up to the time of the actual sale, that they would not be bound by any statements or representations as to value made by Culbert or anybody else. If the plaintiff, before the sale, had notice from them that he must examine for himself, and be governed by the rule of caveat emptor, then he could not, by after-wards claiming that misrepresentations had been made by Culbert, recover damages for his misstatements. If the testimony of the appellants be accepted, that is just what they did. One of them testified that at the interview, on the day when the sale was consummated, something was said as to the condition of the business, "and he said to the plaintiff:
“Mr. Taylor, I want you to understand that, so far as our side is concerned, we know nothing about the value of this business, the assets, or anything else. Our dealing has been with Mr. Oulbert. He has gone through the books, and examined the stock, and I presume he knows what he is buying. I want that distinctly understood.”
And his testimony on the first trial was that he said:
“Mr. Taylor, I want you to understand one thing, that I recite here we know nothing whatever about the assets of this concern we have made. Our negotiations have been with Mr. Culbert, and he has gone over the whole
affair, and I presume he knows what he is buying. We do not know whether there is §108,000 or §8,000 in the assets of this concern, nor does it make any difference to us. Our agreement is with Mr. Culbert. It is all understood, and we came here to settle it.”
After such a statement, the plaintiff, having, as it appears, had full opportunity to examine the books, and make himself personally familiar with the value of the assets, could not close the transaction, and thereafter seek redress for damages sustained, relying on the representations of Culbert; for here, if the testimony is to be credited, was a direct notice, which, in effect, brought home to plaintiff that the other defendants had not authorized Culbert nor any one else to make representations, and that they did not know nor were they concerned with what was the condition of the business or the value of its assets, and that they were treating Culbert, who more than any one else was familiar with the business, as a purchaser, and were dealing with him at arm’s length, being willing, regardless of the condition or value of the assets of the firm, to sell at the price to be agreed upon. The benefit of this testimony was entirely lost to the defendants by the refusal of the learned trial judge to charge the request which they made, and which was as follows:
“If you believe that the plaintiff was fully apprised by the defendants that they had no knowledge and took no responsibility as to the value of the interests sold, and that the plaintiff made no objection thereto, then your verdict must be for the defendants. In other words, if you believe that the testimony of Mr. Curtis and the other three witnesses as to the statement made by Robert H. Thompson is substantially correct, then your verdict must be for the defendants.”
Having pointed out the importance which, in our view, this testimony had as bearing upon the liability of the defendants, the error committed in refusing to charge the request is of such a substantial character, and so injurious to defendants, as to require the reversal of this judgment and a new trial. It is insisted, however, that the exception to the refusal to charge was not properly taken; and in this connection reliance is placed upon what was said in Henderson v. Bartlett, 32 App. Div. 441 , 53 N. Y. Supp. 149 , that:
“An exception to a charge requires that the alleged erroneous portions be specifically pointed out, and the exception thereto taken, in order that the appellate tribunal may fairly see what the point sought to be presented is. * * * If the court seeks to give an exception to a party, it must do it in language equally clear, and a mere statement by the court that T understand counsel to except to my failure to charge all the requests not charged, and to all modifications of requests,’ does not present any question, nor does it relieve a party from pointing out with reasonable certainty the particular wherein the ruling or the charge is excepted to. The court, upon appeal, is practically unable to spell out the point thus sought to be raised.”
In the case at bar the defendants presented certain requests in writing, which the court took up, and after stating that it declined to charge the first request, and then disposing of the second, third, and fourth requests, said, on coming to the fifth request: “I will here state—and it will save some little time, perhaps—that to each of the requests of the defendants which I refuse to charge an exception may be entered.” And at the end of the case, and after all
Concurrence
It follows that the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellants to abide the event.
HATCH, J., concurs. McLAUGHLIN and LA TIGHT JN, JJ., concur in result.
I concur with Mr. Justice O’BRIEN that it was error to refuse to charge that the defendants were entitled to a verdict if the plaintiff was fully apprised that the defendants had no knowledge and took no responsibility as to the value of the interest sold. I think, however, that the judgment should also be reversed upon the ground that Culbert was not the agent of his co-partners in this transaction, and that for his fraudulent representations the defendants were not liable. The transaction was a sale by these defendants to their co-partner Culbert. Culbert was the purchaser. The defendants were the sellers, and of this plaintiff had full knowledge. It was none of the defendants’ business where Culbert acquired the money to pay for the interest in the business that he purchased. There is no evidence to justify a finding that there was any collusion between the defendants and Culbert, or that Culbert was in fact the agent of the defendants in inducing the plaintiff to invest his money in this firm. On the contrary, it is clear from the whole evidence that all of the parties understood that Culbert was buying the business, and was making the best terms with the defendants that he could to carry out that transaction. The transaction as actually carried out was a sale to Culbert of the defendants’ interest in the business, and it is difficult to see how Culbert could be acting as the defendants’ agent in the purchase by himself from the defendants of the defendants’ interest in the property of the co-partnership. The relations that existed between the parties negatived any implied agency arising from the co-partnership relation, and, in" the absence of any proof of an express agency, I do not see how the representations of Culbert, made, not as a member of the firm, but as an individual purchaser, to induce others to join him in making the purchase, can be said to be representations for which those selling to Culbert can be responsible. I com cur, therefore, in the reversal of the judgment.
Cases cited
- Bender v. Hemstreet 12 Misc. Rep. 620 p. 1002