or sale of real estate situate in the county of New York, and that the substance of the judgment demanded is that partition or a sale of such real estate be decreed, and the proceeds of sale be distributed among those entitled thereto; and he also states in his affidavit that the defendant Catherine McGuire has, in her answer, set up “that she is the sole owner of the premises to be partitioned herein.” It appears by the affidavits of the plaintiff and her attorney that the premises involved in this action at one time belonged to Philip and John McGuire, as tenants in common; that the plaintiff is a daughter of John McGuire, who died in October, 1897, leaving no widow, and that this plaintiff and James and Eleanor McGuire, his children, are his only heirs at law. It also appears that in November, 1887, a deed was made and recorded, by which John and Philip McGuire purported to convey to the defendant Catherine McGuire the premises affected by this action, and it is alleged that the conveyance thus made to Catherine McGuire was intended merely to constitute the grantee a nominal owner, and to put the property conveyed beyond the reach of those who might acquire enforceable causes of action against the grantors. In the moving affidavits there are various statements of fact relied upon by the plaintiff to show that the conveyance to the defendant Catherine McGuire was without consideration, and that, although holding the legal title, the plaintiff and her brother and sisters are the equitable owners of the premises. It is evident, upon the plaintiff’s own showing, that, if her action is such as she and her attorney have declared it to be, she is not entitled to the order of examination to enable her to prepare for trial. Apart from the question of her right to maintain the action at all,—which we do not now pass upon,—it is apparent that the plaintiff is well informed of those facts upon which she relies to invalidate the conveyance to Catherine McGuire and to establish her right to or interest in the premises. There is no reason assigned why an examination should be had now, instead of waiting to call the defendants as .witnesses at the trial, or that any necessity exists for taking their testimony at the present time. It is not stated in the plaintiff’s affidavit that she intends to use the testimony sought to be obtained upon the trial, but the whole application seems to be a mere effort to examine witnesses in anticipation of a trial as to facts in respect of which the plaintiff already has sufficient information to enable her to prepare for trial. As said before, not having before us the pleadings in the case, we refrain from passing upon the question of the right of the plaintiff to maintain an action of partition under the provisions of sections 1532, 1533, 1537, and 1543 of the Codé of Civil Procedure.
The order must be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the order of examination vacated, with $10 costs.
VAN BRUNT, P. J„ and INGRAHAM and HATCH, JJ., concur. LAUGHLIN, J., concurs in result, on the ground that partition actions will not lie.