Majority
Headnote
1. Principal and Agent—Undisclosed Principal—Agent’s Liability — Evidence.The appellant contends that James Henry Work could not, as against the creditors' of Grant & Ward generally, represented by Julien T. Davies as receiver, retain the moneys which had come to him from them; that these belonged to the creditors of Grant & Ward, and while in the possession of that firm could be recovered in the ordinary way, and the firm could not put such moneys beyond the reach of its creditors by turning them over to James Henry Work without valid consideration received therefor; that, passing the question whether Grant & Ward or their assignee could recover these moneys, it is manifest that they could not put
It is not contended that any proof was adduced of authority on the part of James Henry Work to act for or incur expenses in behalf of his father in any of the matters referred to, nor of any authority from the executors to do so, and we do not understand that a recovery is sought upon any such theory; the iSasis of the claim, as we take it, being that upon the discovery of the fact that the firm of Grant & Ward made no profits, had no contracts, and practically did no business, James Henry Work was entitled to recover back from his father the payments made to him. Such recovery, however, as already suggested, could only be upon the grounds either that the son could recover against the father, or that the son was under legal liability himself to restore these sums to the funds of that firm; and this latter, as we understand it, is recognized by the appellant; the contention being that, regarding James Henry Work as "an agent, he was an agent whose principal was not disclosed, and who, it is urged, was individually liable,—citing Newall v. Tomlinson, L. R. 6 C. P. 405; U. S. v. Pinover (D. C.) 3 Fed. 309 . In this argument the appellant concedes that the general rule is that an agent, known and treated as such, cannot be compelled to pay back moneys received by him under mutual mistake of fact, and paid over to his principal. The distinction thus sought to be made, and which is, no doubt, sound, is between a disclosed and an undisclosed agent; and, although it might be interesting to review the cases in which this subject is discussed, that is unnecessary here, for, again, there is absence of the proof requisite to support the assumption that James Henry Work was treated in the transaction as a principal, and not as an agent. As shown by the evidence, the system followed was for Grant & Ward on each investment to issue several vouchers for varying amounts, all payable to bearer; but the deduction does not follow from this that the vouchers which James Henry Work received were all intended for him individually, and there is no sufficient evidence that Grant & Ward were ignorant of his agency. This firm, moreover, did not, as a rule, deal directly with Work, but with his brother-in-law, Warner, who gave certain of the vouchers to Work; and there is nothing in the record which would justify passing Warner as principal, and placing such liability on James Henry Work. If, therefore, the case were to turn upon the want of knowledge on the part of Grant & Ward of the agency,' the answer is that there is no proof that the firm was ignorant of such agency. Furthermore, we doubt if the distinction sought to be made, in view of the other facts here appearing, would apply. It is conceded that James Henry Work, in good faith, and in ignorance of the fraudulent conduct of Grant & Ward, received the money, part of which, to the extent stated, he gave to his father; and we have been referred to no case which goes to the extent of holding that, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, one who, while acting oh behalf of another, pays over money he has received, is obliged to return the same be
When we come to the question of whether by the settlement a valid claim against the estate of John C. Work was satisfied, or inquire into the considerations or reasons that actuated the settlement by James Henry Work, we have no evidence that anything was paid on account of the money he had given to his father; but it does, appear that the payment was made in order to settle a judgment of $140,000 against Warner, to prevent both Warner and himself from being prosecuted criminally, and to compromise any and all claims which the firm of Grant & Ward or its creditors might have against them. There is nothing to show what, if anything, was paid on account of moneys given to the father. The result may have been to free the father’s estate from liability; but even this does not appear, except by inference so slight that no finding of fact or conclusion of law could be based upon it.
Although, therefore, the questions suggested on this appeal are important and interesting, we do not think it necessary to extend this discussion further than to show that many of those urged upon our attention are, owing to lack of proof, not sustainable, and that the failure, as urged, of the referee to state clearly every fact which led the appellant to think that he had inadvertently fallen into error, in no way militates against his able summary of the facts involved, or his sound legal conclusions; and, as in these we concur, it necessarily follows that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
Cases cited
- Kingston Bank v. Eltinge 40 N. Y. 391 p. 739