Billings v. Albright

The plaintiff, in his complaint, alleges, in substance, that he was married to his wife on or about the 14th day of September, 1881, in the town of Webster, in this state; that the defendant, willfully intending to injure the plaintiff, and deprive him of the comfort, society, aid, and assistance of his said wife, on the 14th day of September, 1895, and on divers other days and times after that day and within two years of and before ttie commencement of this action, committed adultery with her, and all while she was living with the plaintiff as his wife; that by reason thereof her affection for the plaintiff was wholly and entirely alienated and destroyed, and on the 1st day of May, 1899, she ceased to live or cohabit with the plaintiff. The defendant, by his answer, admits the marriage, and denies all the other allegations of the complaint, and as a partial defense alleges, in substance, that the plaintiff was addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors and morphine, and was subject to hallucinations and delusions by reason thereof; that he had treated his wife in an unkind, harsh, and tyrannical manner, used personal violence toward her, charged her with being unchaste and intimate with other men, and that solely in consequence

The first point made by appellant’s counsel is that the verdict is not supported by, or at least is against the weight of, the evidence, and the first fifty-odd pages of his brief are devoted to a discussion of that proposition. We think it only necessary to say that the evidence of the first two witnesses called by the plaintiff,—who, so far as appears, were reputable people,—if believed, was sufficient to justify the jury in reaching the conclusion which' it did. They both testified that about the I4rh day of September, 1895, the defendant was at their house in Seneca Falls, with the plaintiff’s wife; that she was introduced to them by the defendant as his wife; and that she and the defendant occupied the same room, in which there was but one bed, for two successive nights. We deem it unnecessary to refer in detail to the great mass of evidence bearing upon this issue, but, after a careful examination of it all, and after giving due con-, sideration to the suggestions made by appellant’s counsel in respect to it, we are impelled to the conclusion that it was of such a character as to justify the jury in finding that the defendant had committed adultery with the plaintiff’s wife prior to the commencement of this action, and within the times specified in the complaint.

It is also urged by appellant’s counsel that the verdict of the jury— $6,000—was excessive, and for that reason that the motion for a new trial should have been granted. After an examination of all the evidence relating to that question, and considering all the circumstances, we are of the opinion that this court would not be justified in declaring that the damages as fixed by the jury were excessive, having in mind the rules which have been laid down as applicable to cases of this kind. 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 267, and cases cited; Smith v. Mastin, 15 Wend. 270 .

The learned counsel for the appellant calls attention to a large number of exceptions taken to the rulings of the learned trial court, which he contends present such error as to require a reversal of the judgment. We are of the opinion that only three, or at least only three classes, of such exceptions merit attention: First. Were the statements of the plaintiff’s wife, made to him, but not in the presence of the defendant, competent for the purpose of showing or bearing upon her state of feeling toward the plaintiff? Second. Were such statements, made to third parties, not in the presence of the defendant, competent for the same purpose? And, third, was the evidence properly excluded which was offered by the defendant tending to show immorality on the part of the plaintiff, and that he had committed adultery after his marriage and while living with his wife, and immediately before or during the time it is claimed her affections were alienated; the fact not having been pleaded by the defendant in mitigation of damages, and it not being claimed that such fact was known to the plaintiff’s wife while she continued to live and cohabit with him? It was only necessary for the plaintiff, in order to main-' tain his action, to prove his marriage, and the criminal intercourse between his wife and the defendant, and that it was without his con

The proposition that the conversations, declarations, and statements of the wife had with, made to, or in the presence of the husband are competent evidence in a case of this character when indicating the state of feeling of the wife toward her husband, and admitted solely for that purpose, is supported not only by reason but by authority as well. One of the earliest cases to which attention has been called in which this question was decided is Trelawney v. Colman, 2 Stark. 191. In that case it was held that a letter written by a wife to her husband while she was absent from him, and before the criminal intercourse took place, was competent evidence to show the wife’s state of feeling toward her husband. The same ruling was laid down in Willis v. Bernard, 8 Bing. 376. The cases of Edwards v. Crock, 4 Esp. 39, Preston v. Bowers. 13 Ohio St. 1 , 82 Am. Dec. 430 , and Jones v. Thompson, 6 Carr. & P. 415, are among the older cases which have laid down the rule that for the purpose of shoAving the affection, the domestic happiness,' the state of the wife’s feeling toward her husband, it is competent for the plaintiff to testify to any statements or declarations made to him by her which would throw light upon that issue. While, so far as we have been able to discover, the precise question has not been decided by the court of appeals of this state, it has been repeatedly passed upon by the lower courts.

In Buchanan v. Foster, 23 App. Div. 542 , 48 N. Y. Supp. 732 , the learned judge Avho wrote the opinion of the court used the following language, which states the rule and is the basis for the admission of evidence of the character received in the case at bar:

“While it is undoubtedly true that, Avhere an act is proper to he proven as part of the res gestee, the declarations accompanying that act may be

offered in evidence for the purpose of characterizing the act, even though made in the absence of the defendant; but such declaration is no proof of the fact declared as against the defendant, independent of competent evidence for its establishment.”

In Baker v. Baker, 16 Abb. N. C. 293 , the headnote is as follows:

“The plaintiff, testifying in her own behalf to the fact of their parting, may testify to the conversation that occurred between them at the time, to show their separation, and the ground assigned by the husband for it; for this declaration is part of the res gestae.”

In Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. 439 , which was an action for enticing away plaintiff’s wife, it was held that the declarations of the wife, made within a few days after her marriage, expressing her wishes in respect to living with the plaintiff as his wife, were competent. The court said:

“The main question in the case was whether the defendant prevented the return of the wife to her husband during that period; and, in connection with other circumstances, tending to prove that she was not then under constraint, her declarations were admissible as part of the res gestae.”

Remsen v. Hay, 14 Wkly. Dig. 443 , was also an action for enticing the wife of the plaintiff to leave her husband, and it was held that the conversation between the husband and wife in his house after she had left him, stating that she would not return, and which throws light upon the motives which induced her to leave, is admissible as part of the res gestae.

In Pollock v. Pollock, 9 Misc. Rep. 82 , 29 N. Y. Supp. 37 , the same doctrine was asserted, and a large number of cases decided by the courts of this and other states, and a large number of cases cited in support of the proposition, although it was held in that case that the evidence, which of itself was competent, was given the force and effect of evidence tending to* prove the subject-matter, to wit, defendant’s guilt, and, it being incompetent for such purpose, the judgment was reversed. The same rule has been laid down by the courts of many of the sister states. Fratina v. Caslini, 66 Vt. 273 , 29 Atl. 252 , 44 Am. St. Rep. 843 ; White v. Ross, 47 Mich. 172 , 10 N. W. 188 ; Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 , 51 Am. Rep. 791 ; Edgell v. Francis, 66 Mich. 303 , 33 N. W. 501 ; Glass v. Bennett, 89 Tenn. 478 , 14 S. W. 1085 ; Gilchrist v. Bale, 8 Watts, 355 , 34 Am. Dec. 469 ; Palmer v. Crook, 73 Mass. 418 .

In some cases cited by defendant’s counsel apparently a different doctrine has been held. This is especially so if the written statements or declarations of a wife to her husband be regarded the same, and as governed by the same rules, as her oral statements and declarations. In Whitman v. Egbert, 27 App. Div. 374 , 50 N. Y. Supp. 3 , it was held that a letter written by the husband to the wife, indicating his state of feeling toward her, was not competent evidence in an action brought by the wife for the alienation of her husband’s affections. An examination of that case, however, discloses the fact that the learned court was influenced to such conclusion by the fact that the letter was of such a character as to tend to prove the wrongful act of the defendant, for which purpose it was clearly not competent, as well as the state of the husband’s

Without further reviewing the cases bearing more or less directly upon the question, we conclude that the weight of authority supports the proposition contended for by the respondent that the oral declarations of the plaintiff’s wife, made to or in the presence of her husband, indicative of her state of feeling toward him, were competent solely upon that question, and that the rulings of the learned trial court were correct in admitting such evidence.

We now come to a consideration of the second question raised by defendant’s exceptions, to wit: Is it competent for a third person,, upon the trial of an action brought by a husband for the alienation of his wife’s affections because of her adultery with the defendant, to testify as to a conversation had with her, and to statements and declarations made by her, not in the presence of the plaintiff or of the defendant, and in no way explanatory of any ■ act then done indicative of the state of her feelings toward the plaintiff? The question is raised in this case by the admission over defendant’s objection of the evidence of Louis J. Billings, the father of the plaintiff. He testified, in substance, that upon an occasion he observed conduct between the plaintiff’s wife and the defendant which led him to mistrust that improper relations existed between them. Subsequently, and several weeks after (and this is the evidence objected to), he testified that he and the plaintiff’s wife were' alone in the house of the witness, and that he had a conversation with her, in which he referred to what he had previously seen; advised the plaintiff’s wife to give up the defendant; and he was permitted to state her answers made in reply, which .were, in effect,, that the defendant had been kind to her, that he had always used her well, was very much of a gentleman, and that she could not see any good reason why she should not talk with him when she-met him. The objection was made to the conversation upon the-ground that it was incompetent as against the defendant, he not being present. The court said, “Received as against the plaintiff’s wife, as bearing upon the alienation of the affections.” In "the course of the examination the witness was asked: “Q. Did she [the plaintiff’s wife] on that occasion say anything about Mr. Albright,— what kind of a man he was?” The question was objected to as incompetent as against the defendant, it not being in 'his presence. - The court then said, “What she said also about Mr. Albright I will receive, as showing her relationship with him and friendship for him.” Even if we assume that the entire evidence objected to was-

Some of the English cases to which attention has been called would seem to support the contention of respondent’s counsel that the evidence of the witness Billings was properly received: In Willis v. Bernard, supra, it was held that in an action of this character the letters of the wife to her husband and others were admissible in evidence to show the state of the wife’s feelings. See, also, Jones v. Thompson, supra. Some of the text writers seem to lay down the same rule, citing the above cases and others as authority. In Abb. Tr. Ev. p. 685, it is said:

“It is competent to prove * * * the wife’s manner of speaking and writing of her husband, even when absent from him.”

Phillips, in his work on Evidence, at page 212, says:

“And a witness will be allowed to state the opinion which he formed of the wife’s affection for her husband from the anxiety which she has expressed concerning him; and from her mode of speaking of him during his absence;” and the’author cites Trelawney v. Colman, supra.

So far as we have been able to discover, there is no case decided by the courts of this state which support’s the respondent’s contention, and holds in words or in principle that in an action of this kind it is competent to prove the declarations or statements of the wife, made to third persons in the absence of both parties to the action, .expressive of her state of-feelings toward her husband, when such statements or declarations are in no manner explanatory of an act done at the time which is a part of the res gestae; and therefore can find no sufficient authority to justify this court in making an exception to the general rule which excludes hearsay evidence, and holding such evidence competent.

The ruling of the learned trial court was also erroneous because by it the jury were permitted to consider the evidence upon the question of defendant’s guilt, “as showing her relationship with and friendship for him.” It is unnecessary to cite authorities in support of the proposition that statements of a person, not made in the presence of the defendant or with his knowledge, were not competent, to prove his guilt; were not competent in this case to prove “her [the wife’s] relationship with him,”—whether adulterous or otherwise. We cannot say that the error in receiving the evidence of the witness Billings, which was objected to, was not prejudicial to the defendant. Indeed, it is apparent that its character was such that it probably influenced the jury to believe that the relations which existed between the defendant and the plaintiff’s wife were

The evidence offered by the defendant for the purpose of proving that the plaintiff had been guilt}' of adultery or other immoral practices was properly excluded by the learned trial court for the reason that the fact was not pleaded by the defendant. Section 536 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in an action of this character “the defendant may prove at the trial facts not amounting to a total defense tending to mitigate or otherwise reduce the plaintiff’s damages, if they are set forth in the answer.” In the case at bar, as we have seen, the plaintiff’s cause of action was made out by proving his marriage and the criminal intercourse of the defendant with his w'ife, and therefore the only legitimate purpose of the evidence offered was to reduce the plaintiff’s damages, and, the facts not having been pleaded, proof of the facts was properly, excluded. Willover v. Hill, 72 N. Y. 63 ; Bradner v. Faulkner, 93 N. Y. 515 .

The defendant was permitted to give evidence of any and all facts set up in his answer reflecting upon the character and standing of the plaintiff, and tending to show what kind and manner of man he was, and no error was committed by the learned trial court in that regard.

The law applicable to the questions involved may be stated as follows: In an action for criminal conversation, brought by the husband, oral declarations or statements made by the plaintiff’s wife to him, or in his presence, before the commencement of the action, indicating the state of his wife’s feelings toward him, there being no proof of collusion, are competent solely for the purpose of proving such feeling and as bearing upon the question of damages, and may be testified to by the plaintiff, or by any other person who may have heard such declarations or statements. In such an action, such declarations or statements made to third parties,, and not in the presence of either of the parties to the action, and not made in explanation of or to characterize any act which is part of the res gestae, are not competent for any purpose; and the reception of such evidence, if harmful to the party objecting to it, constitutes reversible error. In such an action it is competent for the defendant to prove the adultery of the plaintiff, the relations which he sustained to his wife, —whether affectionate or otherwise; that his treatment of her was cruel; that his habits were bad; and any and all facts which tend to show the kind of man the plaintiff was before the commencement of the action,—provided only that such facts are pleaded in the defendant’s answer as a partial defense, and in mitigation of damages, but not otherwise.

It follows that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial ordered with costs to the appellant to abide event.

Judgment and order reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide event.

SPRING and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

I concur in the result upon the ground that the testimony of Louis J. Billings, the father of the plaintiff, objected to by the defendant, was improperly admitted. It seems to me that the only natural and reasonable effect of that testimony was to show the relationship ,and feeling of plaintiff’s wife with and toward defendant; that it did not, except in the indirect way of showing what her feelings were toward defendant, tend to develop what her mental attitude was toward the plaintiff. I-do not believe that there is any sufficient authority for proving the relations between the wife and the defendant by the declarations of the former m,ode in the absence of the latter. For this reason I think the evidence was incompetent, and that the judgment should be reversed.

(dissenting). The prevailing opinion, as I read it, discusses the competency of the evidence of the witness Louis T. Billings upon the assumption that it tended to show the relations existing between Mr. and Mrs. W. M. Billings, whereas its real and only effect was, I think, to show the relations existing between Mrs. Billings and the defendant. For that purpose it was doubtless incompetent. But the illicit relations existing between the defendant and Mrs. Billings are so overwhelmingly established by other evidence that I do not think this error is sufficiently prejudicial to require a reversal of the judgment.