Majority
Headnote
Thial—Witnesses—Repetition of Evidence.The cause of action—the nonpayment of a promissory note for $700—was admitted, but in defense was pleaded a discharge in bankruptcy by decree of the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York upon proper proceedings therefor and actual knowledge by plaintiff of such proceedings. At the close of the trial, plaintiff moved to strike from the record certain -exhibits, purported schedules in bankruptcy proceedings, as not only not duly proven, but, even if proven, not stating the facts concerning notices thereunder; and the refusal to grant such motion was excepted against. The case went to the jury on the question as to whether or not plaintiff was served and had notice óf the bankruptcy proceedings, and the finding was in favor of defendants. Aside from the contention of appellant that unproven documents w'ere received in evidence, he also maintains that he is entitled to a new trial because he was refused permission by the trial court to call and have testify a witness (Jacob D. Cohen), the court asserting that his testimony would be mere repetition. We think this ruling was error, the witness not being an expert, and one among a number of such called to testify as to opinion. In such case the court, being apprised of the character and extent of the proposed testimony, may, in its discretion, limit the number of witnesses testifying to the
Dissent
The judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
(dissenting). The refusal of the trial justice to permit the recalling of the witness Jacob D. Cohen was not such an abuse of judicial discretion as warrants the reversal of the judgment in question. As that is the only error insisted upon, the judgment, in my opinion, should be affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- Sixth Avenue Railroad v. Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co. 138 N. Y. 548 p. 922
- O'Neil v. Dry Dock, East Broadway & Battery Railroad 129 N. Y. 125 p. 922