People v. Dooley

The determination of this appeal depends upon the constitutionality of the amendments to the Greater New York charter, enacted by the legislature of igox, providing that the city magistrates in the Second division of the city of New York should be elected, instead of being appointed by the mayor. Under the Greater New York charter as originally enacted (chapter 378 of the Laws of 1897), the city of New York was divided into two divisions, for the purposes of the administration of criminal justice. The First division comprised the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx. The Second division comprised the boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond. Section 1390, Id. At the time of the enactment of the original Greater New York charter the office of city magistrate already existed in the former city of New York, having been established by chapter 601 of the Laws of 1895. The charter provided that the city magistrates in office when it took effect should continue to hold office until the expiration of their respective terms, and should be known as the “City Magistrates of the First Division.” It further provided that their successors should be appointed in the same manner as provided in the act of 1895. That act provided that they were to be appointed by the mayor, and should hold office for a term of 10 years. The charter conferred upon the city magistrates thus

“The successors of said magistrates shall at all times thereafter be appointed by the mayor of said city, and shall be residents and electors of the borough from which said magistrates whom they shall be appointed to succeed were appointed, and shall hold office for ten years.” Section 1394, Laws 1897.

The powers of the city magistrates whose continuance in office or appointment was thus provided for were dealt with in section 1396 of the original Greater New York charter in these words:

“The said magistrates appointed or continued in office pursuant to this title, shall have and exercise within the said Second division such powers as are conferred by law upon the city magistrates in the city of New York, by chapter six hundred and one of the Laws of Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-Five, and the acts amending the samé, except as herein otherwise provided.”

There was thus established a uniform system for the selection of city magistrates in both divisions of the Greater New York. After the expiration of the terms of those who were expressly continued in office, their successors were to be appointed by the mayor for terms of 10 years each. Generally speaking, their powers- were those formerly possessed by. police justices in the old city of New York. As has already been seen, the charter referred to their powers as having been conferred upon them by the act of 1895. Referring to that act, we find that section 3 thereof provides as follows:

“On and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, the city magistrates appointed pursuant to this act shall have and shall exercise all the powers and jurisdiction, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, which, on the thirtieth day of June, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, shall be vested by law in the police justices, except proceedings respecting bastards.” Chapter 601 of the Laws of 1895, § 3.

On the date thus specified the general provisions of law in force relating to the police courts and police justices, and their powers in the city of New York, were to be found in title 11 of the New York City consolidation act (Laws 1882, c. 410, §§ 1541 to 1568). Among these provisions was the following:

“In all cases of arrest for intoxication or disorderly conduct in the city of New York the police justices shall have power, in addition to holding the party to bail for good behavior, to impose a fine not exceeding ten dollars in each case, or to commit to the city prison not exceeding ten days, each day of imprisonment to be taken as a liquidation of one dollar of the fine.” Section 1562, Laws 1882.

It should be noted here that the four respondents whose contention that the charter amendment is unconstitutional has been sustained

The constitutional provision which is alleged to have been violated by the enactment of the amendment in question here is the last clause of section 17 of article 6 of the constitution of 1894, which reads as follows:

“The electors of the several towns shall, at their annual town meetings, or at such other time and in such manner as the legislature may direct, elect justices of the peace, whose term of office shall be four years. In case of an election to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of a full term, they shall hold for the residue of the unexpired term. Their number and classification may be regulated by law. Justices of the peace and judges or justices of inferior courts not of record, and their clerks, may be removed for cause, after due notice and an opportunity of being heard, by such courts as are or may be prescribed by law. Justices of the peace and district court justices may be elected in the different cities of this state in such manner, and with such powers, and for such terms, respectively, as are or shall be prescribed by law; all other judicial officers in cities, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in this article, shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof.”

The argument is that the city magistrates provided for in the charter are judicial officers in cities whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in article 6 of the constitution; that hence the command that such judicial officers shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof, becomes applicable; and that, where the legislature determines that the choice shall be made by election, all the electors in the city in which the officers are to exercise jurisdiction must be afforded an opportunity to participate in the election. This opportunity, it is said, has not been afforded in the present case, inasmuch as six of the magistrates

But it is argued that, even if it be conceded that section 17 of article 6 applies to the office of city magistrate, we must read that section in connection with section 18, which is said to be in pari materia with it, and that such reading forbids the conclusion reached by the court below. Section 18, so far as applicable to the questions under consideration here, provides as follows:

“Inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the legislature, but no inferior local court hereafter created shall be a court of record. * * * Except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers shall be elected or appointed at such times and in such manner as the legislature may direct.”

City magistrates, we are told, are judges of inferior local courts, created under section 18, and its language therefore applies to them. I agree that the tribunals over which they preside are inferior local courts, within the meaning of section 18 of the constitution; but it does not follow that they are to be elected or appointed in such manner as the legislature may direct, under the provisions of the last clause of such section. That clause is qualified by the -introductory phrase “except as herein otherwise provided.” This exception cannot be disregarded, and when we look back we' find that so far as judicial officers in cities are concerned, with the exception of justices of the peace and district court justices, the requirement is that they shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof. As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Marean in the case of People v. Guden (printed in the appeal book herein) 75 N. Y. Supp. 347 , the exception in section 18 excludes the cases provided for in section 17.

Again, it is contended that, if the judgment below is correct, the organization of the present municipal court in the city of New York

“AH judicial officers of cities and villages, and all such judicial officers as may be created therein by law, shall b.e elected át such times and in such manner as the legislature may direct." Const. 1846, art. 6, § 18.

The judiciary article, as amended in 1869, was more specific, referring to district court justices expressly, as follows:

“Justices of the peace and district court justices shall be elected in the different cities of this state, in such manner, and with such powers, and for such terms, respectively, as shall be prescribed by law." Article 6 of the constitution as amended in 1869 (section 18).

And in the constitution of 1894 we find substantially the same language in section 17, where it is provided that:

“Justices of the peace and district court justices may be elected in the different cities of this state in such manner, and with such powers, and for such terms, respectively, as are or shall be prescribed by law."

The legislature, thus possessing, within its discretion, absolute power as to the manner in which district court justices might be elected, could provide for their election in districts, if it saw fit. The same line of reasoning applies to the justices of the municipal court; it having been determined by the court of appeals that the municipal court of the city of New York, as established by the Greater New York charter, is merely a continuation of the pre-existing district courts of the same city and the justices’ courts in the city of Brooklyn. Worthington v. Accident Co., 164 N. Y. 81 , 58 N. E. 102 . Hence the legislature could authorize the election of the justices thereof by districts, under section 17 of article 6 of the constitution of 1894, already cited. The fact, therefore, that municipal court justices may be elected by districts, in no wise tends to show that city magistrates may thus be constitutionally chosen.

By the Greater New York charter (section 1345) the city court of New York was continued, “and the said court and the justices thereof shall have the same powers and jurisdiction as are now conferred upon them by law.” The justices of this court are chosen only by electors in the territory which comprised the old city of New York before consolidation; and it is suggested that a construction of the last clause of section 17 of article 6 of the constitution which requires that judicial officers in cities, if elective, shall be chosen at an election in which all the electors of such cities shall have an opportunity to participate, would render the present method of choosing city court justices unconstitutional. This argument I would answer thus: The word “cities,” as employed in that section, refers to municipalities existing as cities at the time provision was originally made by law for the es

Two other provisions of the constitution are cited as tending to show that the result reached in the court below was erroneous. One of-these provisions is contained in section 2 of article 10, in these words:

“All city, town and village officers, whose election or appointment is not provided for by this constitution, shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns and villages, or of some division thereof, or appointed by such authorities thereof, as the legislature shall designate for that purpose.”

I do not see how this provision can be deemed applicable to the case of judicial officers in cities, since their election or appointment is provided for in a prior article of the constitution, to wit, in section 17 of article 6.

The other provision cited is contained in section 3 of article 12, which relates to the election of city officers, and the main purpose of which is to regulate the times at which the elections of such officers shall be held. The only portion of the section material to the present inquiry reads as follows:

“All elections of city officers, including supervisors and judicial officers of inferior local courts, elected in any city or part of a city, and of county officers elected in the counties of New York and Kings, and in all counties whose boundaries are the same as those of a city, except to fill vacancies, shall be held on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November in an odd-numbered year, and the term of every such officer shall expire at the end of an odd-numbered year.”

This brings us to another question suggested by the amendatory legislation, the constitutionality of which is here attacked. May not the legislature provide for the establishment of inferior local courts of criminal jurisdiction in a city, confining the jurisdiction of the tribunals thus created to that particular portion of the city whose electors are allowed to participate in the choice of the magistrates ? And in case this was done, would not the requirements of section 17 of article 6, that such judges, if elected, shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, be substantially complied with, even though no electors were allowed to vote for them except such as resided within the territory to which the jurisdiction of the court was to be confined? In other words, may not the amended provisions of the Greater New York charter, providing for the election of city magistrates, some of them by congressional districts, and others at large, in the borough of Brooklyn, be regarded as a valid exercise of the power conferred upon the legislature by section 18 of article 6 to establish inferior local courts of criminal jurisdiction? The answer to this question is furnished by the decision of the court of appeals in the case of People v. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68 . There an act of the legislature was pronounced unconstitutional which assumed to create a police court for a district not coterminous with the boundaries of any county, town, city, or village. In that case, Andrews, C. J., wrote as follows:

“The general authority given to the legislature by section 19, art. 6, to establish inferior local courts, supplements the other provisions, and was doubtless intended to authorize the legislature to establish local courts on the organization of new cities or villages, requiring the establishment of local judicial tribunals therein, or where, in an existing city or village, the existing courts were inadequate. But we are of opinion that the language of this section must be construed to refer to local courts, as historically known (that is, courts established for and within one of the recognized territorial divisions of the state, and as a part of the system of local government), and that it cannot be so construed as to authorize the legislature to carve out from the territory of the state a district for judicial purposes, not bounded by town or county, city or village, lines, and erect therein a local court. This construction is confirmed by what has been called the ‘political tendency of the constitution.’ The intention of the instrument was to define, as far as practicable, all the courts of the state; and, so far as they are defined, they are either courts of general jurisdiction, coextensive with the whole state, or courts of counties, towns, villages, or cities. By the section in question a flexible provision was made, to meet the wants of new political communities, which from time to time should be organized accord? ing to the general plan. The constitution seems carefully to guard the autonomy of the several divisions in all matters of local government, and to avoid, as far as practicable, any confusion or division of powers, or any

obliteration o£ their local independence and control in all matters of local government. * * * It would not, we think, comport with the spirit of the constitution to allow a portion of a town or of a county, not constituting either a city or village, to be dissevered, for local judicial purposes, from the rest, leaving it a unit for all other purposes of civil government. It would tend to a separation and confusion of interests, and impair the usefulness of the system of town and local government, plainly fostered by the constitution."

The congressional districts in the borough of Brooklyn, in which the large number of city magistrates of the Second division were respectively to be chosen, are not recognized territorial divisions of the state, forming a part of the system of local government, but are established for federal purposes; and it seems to me that the power to create an inferior local court for such districts is denied by this decision in the Porter,Case. It may be that if the legislature had undertaken to create an inferior local court of criminal jurisdiction for the territory of Greater New York, bounded by the limits of Kings county, the statute establishing such a tribunal could be deemed constitutional; but this has not been attempted in the present case. There is an intimation that a distinction can be made in regard to the two magistrates elected at large in the borough of Brooklyn, the boundaries of that borough being coterminous with those of the county of Kings; but I think that the provisions in regard to those two magistrates are so interwoven with the entire scheme as to be indissoluble from it, and that all the legislation on the subject must stand or fall together.

As has already been pointed out, the certificates of appointment held by the four respondents herein, by the terms of the instruments, declared, in substance, that their offices as city magistrates should terminate on December 31, 1901. This declaration, however, must bq regarded as surplusage. The section of the Greater New York charter in force at the time the appointments were made provided that the term of a city magistrate should be 10 years; and when the mayor appointed a person to that office he was entitled to hold it for the term thus prescribed by law, unless that term had been abridged by some other law constitutionally enacted.

To sum up the general conclusions reached in this opinion, they may be stated thus: (1) The amendatory legislation contained in the revised Greater New York charter, making the city magistrates of the Second division in the borough of Brooklyn elective, instead of appointive, is unconstitutional; (2) the repealing clauses which form a part of that amendatory legislation are so connected with it that they are not to be regarded as any more effective than the rest, and hence a judgment condemning the substitution of the elective for the appointive system, so far as the borough of Brooklyn is concerned, operates to restore the provisions of the original Greater New York charter in regard to the appointment of magistrates in the territory in question; and (3) the demurrer to the answer of the four respondents herein, on the ground that it was insufficient in law upon the face thereof, was properly overruled.

There is another question discussed in the briefs, the determination of which does not seem essential upon this appeal, inasmuch as it does

“No person shall be appointed to the office of city magistrate unless he shall have been admitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor at law in the courts of this state at least five years prior to the date of such appointment, unless he was a police justice in office on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-five.”

It is said that three of the defendants in this action, Messrs. Ingersoll, Devoy, and Brennan, are not lawyers of the requisite standing, and hence were not eligible for election. As neither of these gentlemen is a respondent here, and as there appears to be no question about the qualification in this respect of the persons who are respondents, it is unnecessary now to express any opinion upon the point.

For the foregoing reasons, I advise an affirmance of the interlocutory judgment appealed from.

JFNKS, J., concurs.

I concur in the result reached by Mr. Justice BARTLETT, but I am unable to agree with him in so far as he suggests that, under the language of the last clause of section 17 of article 6,' the legislature has no power to provide for the election of police magistrates by districts. Under the constitution-, as adopted in 1846, it was provided by section 18 of article 6 that “all judicial officers of cities and villages, and all such judicial officers as may be created therein by law, shall be elected at such times and in such manner as the legislature may direct.” Acting under this provision, the legislature, by chapter 153 of the Laws of 1848, provided for the establishment of the office of police justice, and six police justices were to be elected,—one in each of the six districts created by the act. These police justices succeeded by that statute to the power and jurisdiction which had previously been vested in officers entitled “Special Justices for Preserving the Peace in the City of New York,” and their jurisdiction was exclusively criminal. Wenzler v. People, 58 N. Y. 516 , 521. Under the amended judiciary article of 1869, it was provided, in section 18 of article 6, that “justices of the peace and district court justices shall be elected in the different cities of this state, in such manner, and with such powers, and for such terms, respectively, as shall be prescribed by law,” which was, in effect, saying that as to these offices, which were embraced in the general provision for “all judicial officers of cities and villages” of the former section 18, the legislature might continue to provide for their election by districts or by general ticket. The district courts of the city of New York were originally created by chapter 153 of the Laws of 1848, which established in each of the six judicial districts into which, by the act, the city was divided, a court “to be called the justices’ court of the city of New York,” and in each district there was to be elected a justice to-hold the court in said district. These justices’ courts, and the justices thus elected, succeeded to the jurisdiction which had belonged to the officers known as the “Assistant Justices of the City of New York,” and to the courts known by the name of the “Assistant Justices’ Court,” which courts and justices were by the said act abolished. The

“Inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the legislature; and except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers shall be elected or appointed at such times, and in such manner, as the legislature may direct.”

There was no provision in the constitution denying the right of the legislature to create inferior local courts, and section 19 was entirely unnecessary, unless it was to add the clause to- the powers over these courts that they might “be elected or appointed at such times, and in such manner, as the legislature may direct.” This, it will be seen, would have the effect of placing these inferior local courts in exactly the same position that they were in under the original constitution of 1846, except as to the matter of election or appointment, and which would give the same right to determine whether they should be chosen by districts or by the entire body of electors, which appears to have been conceded for a long series of years under the act of 1848. In other words the legislature, if it determined upon the election of these officers of local and inferior courts, could have exactly the same power, of determining the manner of election as under the original provision; and, if it adopted the system of appointment, it would have to determine upon the local authorities who were to be charged with this duty. I am supported in this view by the provisions of section 2 of article 10 of the constitution, which, while not controlling here, shows the general spirit of the-constitution. It provides, among other things:

“All city, town and village officers, whose election or appointment is not provided for by this constitution, shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns and villages, or of some division thereof, or appointed by such authorities thereof as the legislature shall designate for that purpose.”

This provision has formed a part of the constitution since 1846, and indicates clearly that it has never been the intent of the constitution to require that all of the voters of a municipal corporation shall be called upon to vote for all of the officers who are to be chosen.

I am, nevertheless, persuaded that, when the constitution provided for taking these inferior local courts out of the provision which required their election, it imposed the duty upon the legislature of determining between the policy of election or appointment, and that it, by necessary implication, denied the power to the legislature to make use of the elective system in one portion of a municipality, and of appointment in another, for the same office. The language of section 17 of article 6 of the constitution of 1894, which is the same as that of the amended judiciary article of 1869, in so far as it has any relation to the question now before us, is that "all other judicial officers in cities * * * shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof.” It is not that those officers shall be chosen by the electors and by appointment, to suit the political exigencies of the hour, but that they are to be chosen by the electors, or appointed by some local authorities thereof, and it is for the legislature to determine which one of these methods shall be adopted. In the original act (chapter 378, Laws 1897) it was provided, under title 3 (section 1390), that “for the purposes of administration of criminal justice the city of New York, as hereby constituted, is divided into two divisions,” etc.; and provision was made for the changes which were made necessary by a consolidation of the various municipalities, and the mayor of the city of New York was authorized to appoint the various city magistrates who became the successors of the court of special sessions and of the police justice courts in other districts of the new city. This was an exercise of the discretion vested in the legislature, and was unobjectionable. In 1901, however, this title of the act was remodeled by the provisions of chapter 466, and it was provided that as to the First district, comprising the boroughs of the Bronx and of Manhattan, the mayor should continue to appoint the city magistrates; but as to the Second district it was provided (section 1392):

“At the general election to be held in the borough of Brooklyn in the year nineteen hundred and one, there shall be elected in each congressional district, as then constituted in said borough, one city magistrate, and in the territory constituting the borough of Brooklyn there shall be elected two city magistrates at large, and the terms of office of all said city magistrates so elected shall commence on the first day of January nineteen hundred and two and continue for six years thereafter.”

Here we have an act in reference to the incorporation of a city, creating a court of equal jurisdiction for the entire city, yet one district has its magistrates appointed for a term of ten years, while the other has them elected for a term of six years. There has been no exercise of the discretion vested in the legislature in the creation of this court. It has neither provided for the election or appointment of the members of the court, but has made a combination, evidently dictated by political

“Its very presence in the constitution of the state since 1846 evidences the importance which the people attach to the preservation of this right in the management of their local affairs. It means the right to choose their local officers, in all its reality, or it means nothing. If it does not mean that the people have reserved the right of administering existing local offices by officers of their own choosing, whether it be done directly, through an election, or indirectly, through the method of an appointment by some of their local authorities, I am at a loss to understand its signifieánee, or in what consists its peculiar value. * * * The theory of the constitution is that the several counties, cities, towns, and villages are, of right, entitled to choose whom they will have to rule over them, and that this right cannot be taken from them, and the electors and inhabitants disfranchised, by any act of the legislature, or of any or all the departments of the state government combined. This right of self-government lies at the foundation of our institutions, and cannot be disturbed or interfered with, even in respect to the smallest of the divisions into which the state is divided for governmental purposes, without weakening the entire foundation; and hence it is a right not only to be carefully guarded by every department of the government, but every infraction or evasion of it to be promptly met and condemned,—especially by the courts, when such acts become the subject of judicial investigation.”

If the city of New York is entitled to choose its own city magistrates, it is difficult to suggest a reason why the inhabitants of one portion of the city should be given a share in the indirect appointment of the members for the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx, and the absolute right to choose all of the city magistrates outside of those boroughs. This operates to disfranchise the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx to the extent that it denies them a voice in the selection of over one-half of the magistrates, while it enfranchises the other boroughs to the extent that they are permitted to participate in the election of the mayor who makes the appointments. It is such a discrimination as between the citizens of a single municipality, and so foreign to a system of government which is based upon the idea of equal political rights to all, that it cannot be within the purview of the legislature. If the city was divided into districts, and each district was permitted to elect or appoint its own city magistrates, I am of the opinion that the legislation would not be objectionable from a constitutional standpoint, but to create two districts, and to give the people of one district larger privileges than are enjoyed by the other, is quite another matter; and

Interlocutory judgment affirmed, with costs.

I cannot concur in the conclusion reached in the opinion of Mr. Justice BARTLETT. I do not discuss any matters other than such as compel my dissent.

It is well to remember the fundamental law, so often declared, that the legislature has all power of legislation which the people of the state can grant, except as it is expressly or impliedly restrained from the exercise of particular powers by the constitution. Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459 , 470, 45 N. E. 15 , 34 L. R. A. 408 ; Koch v. City of New York, 152 N. Y. 72 , 46 N. E. 170 , and cases cited. We have followed these authorities in McGrath v. Grout (decided at the present term of this court) 74 N. Y. Supp. 779 . In other words, the legislature has supreme and absolute authority unless it is fettered by constitutional impediments. It is not altogether fanciful to point out the fact that the constitution itself recognizes this principle when it specifically provides that the enacting clause of all bills shall be “The people of the state of New York, represented in senate and assembly, do enact as follows.” Article 3, § 14. A second cardinal rule is declared in People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532 , where, at page 549, the court said:

“When the court declares a law unconstitutional, it, in effect, declares that the sovereign power of the people has so far been abdicated by themselves. This consideration has led the courts, in all governments which are based on the theory that all power resides in the people, to give a strict construction to compacts which deprive the people of this sovereign power. It will not be presumed that they intended to abdicate their power, unless they have so declared in express terms or by necessary implication. These principles are fundamental, conservative, and cannot be disregarded without infringement upon the reserved rights and power of the people. Hence the courts have frequently and uniformly declared that they will not adjudicate a law unconstitutional when it is to be made so by inferences or presumptions onljr, or when the question rests in doubt. Any other rule of construction would bring the legislative and judicial branches of government into collision, to the ruin of one or both.”

We must therefore inquire whether there is any express inhibition in the constitution against the legislature creating the new office of city magistrate, and providing that the manner of election shall be by electors of congressional districts and of the borough of Brooklyn at large. Section 1392 of the Revised Charter purports to do this. If the legislature has such power, the section is constitutional; otherwise not. The validity of the section depends chiefly upon the construction to be given to sections 17 and 18 of article 6 of the constitution. Evidently these sections are interdependent. Section 18 authorizes the legislature to establish local courts of inferior criminal jurisdiction. There can be no possible question that this relates, though not necessarily exclusively, to courts not in existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution. It then provides, “Except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers shall be elected or appointed at such times and in such manner as the legislature may direct.” Here is declaratory

It is said that the legislature may not provide for the election of a judicial officer by the electors of a district smaller than the entire territory in which he is to exercise his judicial powers, and that to hold otherwise is to disregard the spirit of our institutions. The constitution expressly provides for the election of justices of the supreme court by the electors of the eight judicial districts into which the state is divided, and these justices exercise their powers in any part of the state. Senators, assemblymen, aldermen, and supervisors are similarly elected by districts, and yet legislate for the whole state or for the city or county. Certainly there is no greater inharmony in the one case than in the other. The point which I desire to make is that there is nothing in the constitution which prevents the election by the electors of one district of an officer who is to exercise his functions in and over a district the electors of which have had no voice in his selection. Neither do I attach significance to the use of the words “the electors of such cities,” as indicating that this necessarily means all the electors of the city. Such interpretation is not in accord with the general plan of the constitution. The spirit of the provision is observed if the choice of the judicial officer is made by electors of cities in any territorial division thereof. Neither do I think the point well taken that section 1392 of the Revised Charter is disapproved by the case of People v. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68 . In that case the court held unconstitutional an act which assumed to create a police court for a district not coterminous with the boundaries of any county, town, city, or village. But this is not to say that an inferior local court may not be created for a district coterminous with any other political division of the state. It is true that the court said that the language of section 19 of the constitution did not “authorize the legislature to carve out from the territory of the state a district for judicial purposes, not bounded by town or county, city or village, lines, and erect thereon a local court.” But the controversy before the- court did not involve, nor bring before it, the question whether a congressional district was not, equally with those referred to, a recognized territorial or political division, which could be taken into consideration by the legislature in the formation of a new judicial district, and the remark is consequently a mere dictum. That august court has not expressed itself upon the question before us. The congressional district, while not referred to in the state constitution, is just as much a political or territorial division of the state as a village, town, or city, or a ward in a city. Each is created by act of the legislature. The states have surrendered to the federal government control over the method of administering federal legislative affairs, and the federal constitution provides that all legislative powers shall be vested in a congress, to be composed of members chosen by the people of the several states, and apportioned among the states according to a fixed ratio of population. The legislature has divided the state into congressional districts, and in so doing has erected the congressional dis

Even if, however, the legislature is not authorized by article 6 to provide the manner of electing the new judges, it seems to me that such authority is clearly conferred in article 10, § 2, where it is said:

“All city, town and village officers, whose election or appointment is not provided for by this constitution, shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns and villages, or of some division thereof, or appointed by such authorities thereof, as the legislature shall designate for that purpose. All other officers, whose election or appointment is not provided for by this constitution, and all officers, whose offices may hereafter be created by law, shall be elected by the people, or appointed, as the legislature may direct”

The final clause seems to have been intended as an emphatic declaration of an intention on the part of the convention to confide to the legislature the power to provide the manner of electing new officers. This is still further emphasized by section 3 of article 12, which clearly authorizes the election of “judicial officers of inferior local courts” in any city or part of a city. I see no escape from the application of this provision to the city magistrates. It is a clear recognition of the authority of the legislature,—all the more that the final clause restates that the section applies to judges and justices of inferior local courts.

There is another fatal objection to the claims of the respondents. Section 1547 of the Greater New York charter provides that every person who shall be appointed to any office under the city government shall receive a certificate of appointment, designating the term for which such person has been appointed. The complaint sets out in full the mayor’s certificates of appointment of the four answering defendants. They state that the mayor has appointed the several defendants as city magistrates “for a term commencing this day [May 15, 1901] and ending December 31, 1901.” The answer admitted the language of the certificates, but alleged that, notwithstanding the statute as to the duration of the term, the appointment was for the term of 10 years specified in section 1392 of the charter. In People v. Hall, 104 N. Y. 170 , 10 N. E. 135 , the matter under consideration was an appointment by the mayor of the city of Troy of a chamberlain in place of Church, who had absconded. The mayor appointed Hall “to discharge the duties of the office of chamberlain during the absence” of Church. The claim was that the mayor, under the charter, had no power to make a temporary appointment, but had power to nominate for a full term,

“Regularly it is true that when a man doth less than the commandment or authority committed to him, then the commandment or authority not being pursued, the act is void. And when a man doth that which he is authorized to do, and more, that is good for that which is warranted, and void for the rest. Yet both these rules have divers exceptions and limitations.”

It was held that there were very strong reasons, founded in public policy, against permitting a person to hold public office against the intention and through the mere mistake of the appointing power. The court added:

“It might very well be that the public interests would, in the judgment of the mayor and common council, require a different appointment for a full term than for a temporary period. The restrictive words in the appointment cannot be disregarded without changing the essential character of the appointment. They constitute an integral part of the transaction, and cannot be separated from the prior words without subverting the whole intention of the appointing power. We conclude, therefore, that if the power to make a temporary appointment could not, under the circumstances, be exercised, the appointment of Hall was void, and did not inure as an appointment for a full term.”

In the case at bar, according to the contention of the respondents, the mayor exercised less than his authority. It was clearly his intention to appoint the respondents only for the remainder of the year 1901, and that appointment is a nullity and void. The respondents have no valid title or appointment to office for the year 1902, and are not in office, and cannot,, as prayed for by them, be adjudged lawfully entitled to hold office for the term of 10 years from the date of their appointment.

Neither do I agree with the conclusion that the provisions in regard to the two magistrates at large are so interwoven with the entire scheme of the section as to be indivisible from it, and that all the legislation on the subject of city magistrates for the borough of Brookfyn must stand or fall together. In Duryee v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 477 , the court said at page 491:

“It is only when the various enactments of a legislative body are plainly dependent upon each other, and so inseparably connected in matter and design that they cannot be divided without defeating the object of the statute, that the invalidity of one provision will entail that of those remaining. If effect can, consistently with the general legislative intent, be given to such parts of a statute as are not in conflict with paramount authority, and are within 'the authority of the body enacting them, it is the duty of a court, while rejecting its unconstitutional and unauthorized parts, to enforce the remaining provisions of a law which are within the legislative power of its authors. When part only of a statute or a section is unconstitutional, that part only is void, unless the other provisions are so dependent and connected

with that which is void that it cannot be presumed that the legislature would have enacted the one without the other.” Citing Sedg. St. Const 413; Com. v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482 .

In the Hitchings Case the supreme court of Massachusetts said:

“The constitutional and the unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand, though the last fall. The point is not whether they are contained in the same section, for the distribution into sections is purely artificial, but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance.”

In the light of this authority, I do not see why the part of section . 1392 which provides for the election of two magistrates at large is not severable from the remainder. The part of the section which we are to construe reads as follows:

“At the general election to be held in the borough of Brooklyn in the year nineteen hundred and one, there shall be elected [in each congressional district, as then constituted in said borough, one city magistrate, and] in the territory constituting the borough of Brooklyn [there shall be elected] two city magistrates at large.”

Striking out the parts in brackets, the rest of the sentence is complete in and by itself. It provides a system for the election of two magistrates, which is clearly not open to the objections urged as to the election of magistrates by the electors of congressional districts; that is, by all the electors of a city which was in existence when the constitution was adopted. Under it the electors of the whole borough have elected two city magistrates,—the defendants Durack and Ingersoll,—and the will of the electors thus expressed ought not to be defeated unless the legislation is clearly unconstitutional, and unless such unconstitutionality is beyond rational doubt. People v. Draper, supra.

For these reasons, I think that the judgment should be reversed.

I dissent from the result reached by the majority of the court. My reasons may be briefly expressed:

The onus is on those who challenge the constitutionality of an act of the legislature to point out the precise provision of the fundamental law which is deemed to be infringed. In this case the main contention seems to be that section 17 of article 6 of the constitution requires all the electors of the city to vote for each magistrate, if the office is elective, while the law which is herein assailed limits the exercise of the franchise in each case to a prescribed section or division of the city. While the respondents’ contention is apparently supported by some of the general expressions contained in the opinion delivered in People v. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68 , I think that case should be confined to'the facts before the court, and the conditions existing at the time when it was decided; The court had in mind cities as they then existed in this state. The Greater New York has been created since, and, as a city, is unique in including several counties whose entity as such political divisions of the state is still continued, notwithstanding the legislative fusing of such counties into a single municipality. The spirit of the reasoning in the Porter Case, therefore, has no necessary appli

“The words ‘all other elective officers’ mean all such officers of the city as the law might make elective; but this language, when taken in connection with the remainder of the section, does not necessarily mean that every elective officer must be elected by the voters of the entire city.”

So, in Brown v. Holland, 97 Ky. 249 , 30 S. W. 629 , where the constitution required the officers of towns and cities to be elected “by the qualified voters thereof,” it was held, as per the headnote, that the general assembly might lawfully provide “that councilmen ‘shall be elected by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters of the wards for which they respectively stand’; it not being necessary that they should be elected by the voters at large before it can be said they are ‘elected by the qualified voters of the city.’ ”

_ In order to reach the conclusion that the constitution has been violated in this case, it is necessary to import words into the document which are not there, or to import ideas into it by ingenious construction. The constitution only provides that the officers in question “shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed 'by some local authorities thereof.” There is no magistrate, under the law in question, as I understand, who has not been either chosen :'by the electors of New York, or appointed by a local authority. If each judicial officer must be chosen by all the electors of the city, there is no reason why the fact should not have been inserted in the provision in set terms. If, in a city like New York, all the local magistrates must be either elective or appointive, there is no good reason why the constitution should not have so stated ex-plicitfy. It may be granted that the language actually employed might be open to either or both constructions, but the point is that neither idea is expressly stated or necessarily conveyed. Under such circumstances, the courts may not add or take away by the process of judicial interpretation. As was said in People v. Rathbone, 145 N. Y. 434 , 438, 40 N. E. 395 , 396, 28 L. R. A. 384 :

"The latitude allowed in the construction of legislative acts is out of place, and would be unwise, when interpreting the fundamental law. Legislation aims at arranging the mechanism of the state for the benefit of its members, and the question of intention, necessarily, is often of great importance, and must be open to judicial inquiry; but the constitution, which underlies and sustains the social structure of the state, must be beyond being shaken or affected by unnecessary construction or by the refinements of legal reasoning.”

1 vote for reversal.