Majority
Headnote
Equity—J uuisdiction.Upon the plaintiff’s proofs and the consent of all parties on the trial, a decree will be granted in behalf of the plain
I will now consider the respective rights of the defendants to the stock, and dividends due thereon, involved in this suit, under the order of interpleader granted upon the trial. It appears that the stock in queston was part of a block of stock which one Mrs. Huff had acquired from the late Joseph Thorne; the certificates having been issued by plaintiff to Mrs. Huff, in whose name, so far as the record shows, the stock still remains. In an action in the supreme court, Second department, brought by the defendant Brantingham against Mrs. Huff ( 73 N. Y. Supp. 643 ), it was adjudged, among other matters, that the stock was procured in fraud of the right of Mrs. Brantingham by Mrs. Huff, who was ordered to deliver up the certificates to Mrs. Brantingham. It further appears that thereafter a referee was appointed in the suit aforementioned, and that, so far as he was able to do so, in default of Mrs. Huff making a transfer and delivery of the stock, he executed an assignment of her interest therein to the defendant Brantingham. After the decision of the court against Mrs. Huff, and before the formal entry of a judgment, the defendant Thaxter appeared as a claimant to the stock. Both party defendants in this action have interposed answers asserting ownership. The defendant Brantingham sets, up in her answer the proceedings had in the action against Mrs. Huff relative to the stock as above outlined, and alleges that the defendant Thaxter obtained possession thereof without paying any consideration therefor, and with full notice of the action brought against Mrs. Huff in relation thereto. A copy of this answer was served upon Thaxter’s attorneys. The defendant Brantingham rested her case after she had established upon the trial the facts showing her rights to the stock as above described, and after she had further shown that defendant Thaxter is a relative of Mrs. Huff; that her counsel in this action did not know where his client, Mrs.' Thaxter, was, but believed that she lived in Boston, and that he had never seen her in this city, and had' never had anything to do with her. The counsel for Mrs. Thaxter, pursuant to an order of the court impounding the certificates, produced them in court, and an inspection of them showed that they had been indorsed by Mrs. Huff in blank. The defendant Thaxter did not offer any testimony, and submitted her rights upon the motion to dismiss the answer of the defendant Brantingham for failure of proof in establishing a cause of action. In support of defendant Thaxter’s contention, her learned counsel argued that the case must be treated either as one for specific performance, treating Thaxter as an assignee with notice, as a judgment creditor’s action, as an action to impose a constructive trust, or as an action to set aside a fraudulent transfer. It is then urged that neither of these actions is here maintainable, and that the defendant Brantingham has an adequate remedy at law. It may be well at the outset to dispose of the last-mentioned contention first. The court has acquired equitable jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter; the parties, although brought in ad invitum, have submitted to this jurisdiction; and no such plea was raised, by any reply which the defendant Thaxter might have served to,
Judgment for defendant Brantingham, with costs and extra allowance.
Cases cited
- Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon 136 N. Y. 465 p. 767