Whitmore v. Woodlawn Cemetery

We think the questions presented by this submission may be solved with approximate accuracy when the title under which the cemetery association holds is clearly understood. By the provisions of the statute, the land is dedicated, when acquired by the corporation, to cemetery purposes. As between the purchaser of a lot and the association, the former only acquires an easement in the lot so purchased for burial purposes. Such easement, however, is irrevocable, and continues during the time that the plots or lots continue to be used for such purpose. The title to the land, however, remains in the cemetery association, and it holds the legal title, subject to the exclusive right of the lot holder. Buffalo City Cemetery v. City of Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 503 . No question, however, arises in this submission out of the relations existing between the owner of the burial plot and the corporation or the certificate holder. The whole question is, therefore, to be solved based upon a consideration of the rights and liabilities of the corporation upon one hand, and the certificate holders upon the other.

The corporation was authorized by the statute (Laws 1847, c. 133) to acquire for cemetery purposes 200 acres of land, and by special act (chapter 325, Laws 1864) was further authorized, upon certain conditions, to take and hold for the same purpose not exceeding 250 acres of additional land. The corporation was organized, and the lands acquired, by virtue of the provisions of these two acts. The question, therefore, is, what title did the association acquire by virtue of the contracts of conveyance? By the provisions of section 4 of the Laws of 1847, it is provided that the lands acquired by the corporation are “to be held and occupied exclusively as a cemetery for the burial of the dead.” Then follows provision for surveying and subdividing the same into lots or plots and the laying out of paths, alleys, and walks, as the trustees of the association might determine upon, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act under which the land was acquired. The conveyance which was taken by the cemetery association follows the terms of the statute, recites the purpose for which the lands were conveyed, and states, as the consideration therefor, that the said lands shall, from time to time, as may be required, be surveyed and subdivided into lots or plots for burial purposes, and avenues, paths, alleys, and walks may be constituted for ornamental and other purposes; the grantors being entitled to have and receive, as a consideration for the conveyance, one-half of the proceeds of all sales of plots and lots. It is, therefore, evident that there was attached to this conveyance, both by its terms and by the provisions of the act under which the lands were acquired, a condition subsequent,

It was said in Rawson v. Inhabitants of School Dist. No. 5, 7 Allen, 125 , 83 Am. Dec. 670 , that:

“Where a deed is made in express terms for a specific purpose, or in consideration of an act to he done or service rendered, it will be interpreted as creating a conditional estate. But this is an exception to'the general rule, and is confined to cases where the subject-matter of the grant is, in its nature, executory; as of an annuity to be paid for service to be rendered, or a right or privilege to be enjoyed. In such case, if the service be not performed, or the enjoyment of the right or privilege be withheld, which formed the consideration of a grant, the grantor will be relieved from the further execution of the grant, to wit, the payment of the annuity.’’

In the case cited, one Daniel Tafft granted to the inhabitants of the town of Uxbridge a burial plot by a deed which recited “for and in consideration of the love and affection I bear to ye town of Uxbridge, and for diverse other valueable considerations me moveing hereunto,” “said land being improved for a burying place; to have and to hold the said given and granted premises, with all ye appurtenances, privileges, and commodities to the same belonging, or in anywise appertaining, to the said town of Uxbridge forever, to their own proper use, benefit, and behoofe, for a burying place forever.” It was held that this deed did not create a condition subsequent, for the reason that the granted premises were not to be so used as to inure specially to the benefit of the grantor and his assigns, but was in its nature general and public; that there were no words indicating an intent that the grant was to be void if the declared purpose was not fulfilled; and that, as it appeared that the premises granted had been used for a burial place at the time of the execution of the deed, it might have been so conveyed for a consideration. The town having removed the dead, and devoted the land to school purposes, it was held that such use did not defeat the grant, and no right of action could be maintained by the heir of the grantor for a re-entry for breach of the condition of the deed. But the case clearly recognizes that, where the whole consideration for the grant is the accomplishment of a specific purpose, and the enjoyment of the estate granted is made dependent upon the performance of the act for which the land is taken, such a deed is a conditional one, and may be defeated for failure to comply with the condition.

In the present case, both the grant and the statute provide and require that the land conveyed shall be devoted to a specific purpose, which inures to the benefit of the grantors, and which in its nature 'is executory; therefore, the same is conditioned upon the performance of the act which furnishes consideration for the grant. It is true that conditions subsequent, by which an estate is defeated, are not favored in the law; but where the condition is clear and unequivocal, and its performance remains executory, a condition subsequent operates with as much force as any other, and is to be supported and upheld. The very necessity of this case required that the condition upon which the grant was founded must be subsequent, as it remained executory, and consequently compliance there

It cannot be doubted in the present case but that if this association had attempted to make conveyance of these lands for other purposes than that of burial in the method specified by the statute and by the grant, it would be in violation of the condition which was the consideration of the grant, would create a forfeiture and authorize a re-entry by the grantor or his heirs. Such conveyance would not only violate the terms of the grant, but also the terms of the statute. Good title could not be acquired by a purchaser, as he would necessarily be chargeable with notice of the condition which was attached to the grant and under which the grantor held the same. Such attempted disposition of the property might be enjoined at the instance of the grantor or any person having a beneficial interest in the fulfillment of the condition. Such beneficial interest exists' in this case in favor of the grantor and the certificate holders, and is of such a character as authorized them to insist upon the performance of the same.

All grants of land, with few exceptions, are held subject to the exercise of the sovereign power of the state, the only limitation being that when the state exercises such power, or authorizes its exercise, compensation for the property taken thereunder must be made. The condition of this land was such that at the time of the exercise of the sovereign power it was subject thereto, and it, of course, must be held that both parties granted and received this property subject to its exercise. This being the condition under which the lands were held, the corporation could not be charged with a breach of the condition under which it held the land, so as to work a forfeiture of the grant and authorize a re-entry for the breach.

It is clear, however, that the rights of the grantors and also of the corporation in the land were not defeated by reason of such condition. The purpose for which the land was to be devoted had failed. It was rendered impossible of performance by an act of supreme power, but such condition did not deprive the parties of right to compensation for their interest in the land. Neither did it authorize the appropriation of the whole of the proceeds by one to the exclusion of the other. Such result would be manifestly inequitable.

It is a well-settled equitable rule to grant relief in case of forfeiture where the breach arises out of an accident, and where the damages resulting therefrom can be accurately estimated by the court. Under such circumstances, equity will prevent a forfeiture and decree in place thereof compensation in damages. Tied. Real Prop. § 279; Livingstone v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 415 , 8 Am. Dec. 598 ; Baxter v. Lansing, 7 Paige, 350; Stone v. Ellis, 9 Cush. 95 . The rule is not different when there is a breach of a condition arising out of the exercise of sovereign power. Under such circumstances, the rights of the parties are to be protected by the application of equitable principles, and the effect of the forfeiture will be admeasured in money, according to the respective rights of the parties, where that may be

The fact that under the grant a portion or the whole of this land might have been laid out in streets and alleys, from which the plaintiff would have received nothing, is not of consequence; it is a sufficient answer to say that it was not so laid out, but, on the contrary, was sold, and money realized therefrom. If it had been laid out in streets and alleys, no money would have been realized therefrom by the association; therefore the parties stand upon terms of equality in this respect. In every case under the grant, when money was realized by the sale of lots and plots, the plaintiffs shared therein on equal terms. When that was defeated, and the sale otherwise made, the money realized therefrom belonged to each of the parties equitably, in proportion as it would have been had it been produced in the manner contemplated by the grant.

In the view we have taken of the statute and the construction of the grant thereunder, the doctrine announced in Thacher v. Association, 126 N. Y. 507 , 27 N. E. 1040 , has no application. Therein was attempted to be enforced an obligation taken for the loan of money. There was no question raised as to the construction of the grant under which the land was held. ' It was assumed that the real estate belonged to the association subject to no condition whatever. Nor is it necessary to determine any question as to a vendor’s lien, as such lien is not essential to the right of the plaintiff to share in the fund.

It follows from these views that judgment should be ordered providing that the plaintiff be awarded his proportional interest in one-half of the fund, with costs.

VAN BRUNT, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN and O’BRIEN, JJ., concur.

The decision in this case is based, as I understand it, upon the principle that there was attached to this conveyance, both by its terms and by the provisions of the act under which the lands were acquired, a condition subsequent, which, upon a failure to perform, might defeat the conveyance and authorize a re-entry; that by reason of the appropriation by the city of New York, under the right of eminent domain, of a portion of the prop

We have, therefore, a statement by the parties to the controversy that the lands have been conveyed to the defendant, and as a consideration therefor the defendant had executed an agreement whereby it had agreed to pay to the grantors one-half of the proceeds of all sales of lots and plots made from the said land. I am unable to see how it can be said that from this recital of the conveyance or the statute under which the defendant was incorporated there is an indication that the conveyance was other than an absolute conveyance of the land to the defendant. Certainly, if this conveyance was made for a present consideration, it would be absolute, subject to no condition. Instead of the grantors insisting upon a present consideration, they accepted the obligation of the defendant to pay one-half of the amount that it would receive for the sale of lots and plots of the said lands. It may be that there was an implied covenant of the defendant that the property should be devoted to cemetery purposes, for in no other way could the agreement made by the defendant be carried out, and by the act under which the company was incorporated it was required to- devote the property purchased for such purposes; but to say that that covenant constituted a condition subsequent, by which, upon a breach of the covenant, the title to the land should revert to the grantors, would be, I think, totally inconsistent with the declared object of the incorporation of the defendant and

Assuming, however, that there was a condition subsequent, which was broken upon the appropriation of a portion of the property by the city of New York, it was the grantors or their heirs, and they only, who could take advantage of it. The election to do so could be signified by a re-entry, or some other equivalent act (6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] 506; 1 Washb. Real Prop. p. 451), where it is said: “By the common law, the only mode of taking advantage of a breach of a condition which had the effect to defeat or work a forfeiture of an estate, was by an entry, upon the principle that it required as solemn an act to defeat as to create an estate. And when such entry had been made, the effect was to reduce the estate to the same plight, and to cause it to be held on the same terms as if the estate to which the condition was annexed, had not been granted” ; and nothing short of an actual entry will serve to defeat an estate upon a condition which has been broken (Washb. Real Prop, side p. 452). This right of re-entry is a right which cannot be aliened or assigned or passed by a grant of the reversion at common law. “Such a right is not a reversion, nor a possibility of a reversion, nor is it an estate in land; it is a mere chose in action, and, when enforced, the grantor is in by the forfeiture of the condition, and not by reverter.” Washb. Real Prop. 451; Van Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 N. Y. 102 .

The plaintiff is not, however, one of the grantors, nor, so far as appears, is he the heir at law, assignee, or devisee of one. Nor have the grantors, their heirs or assigns, elected, by a re-entry or any equivalent act, to terminate the title of the defendant to the property conveyed. The plaintiff’s claim is not that he is entitled to re-enter, but that the fee of the property vested in the defendant, and the grantors retained a lien thereon for the payment of the consideration which the defendant agreed to pay for the property, and, ,as this appropriation of the property by the city of New York devested the defendant of the title to the property taken, the plaintiff is entitled to the money received by the" defendant from the

The learned counsel for the plaintiff makes no claim that the conveyance was not absolute, nor does the submission state that any such question is involved. The answer to the claim of the plaintiff that he and the other certificate holder are entitled to this money as the enforcement of a lien for the unpaid consideration money to which the grantors were entitled for the conveyance of the property seems to me to be that there is nothing due by the defendant as the consideration for the property conve)red to the defendant. The conveyance was made, as it is expressly stated in the submission, in consideration of the defendant executing the agreement, a copy of which is thereto annexed. The grantor accepted the covenant of the defendant to pay in the future one-half of the moneys that it received upon the sale of lots or plots of land for cemetery purposes, and there is no allegation that that obligation of the defendant has been fully performed. The parties to this agreement contemplated that the defendant should apply a portion of the premises granted for avenues, paths, alleys, and walks. The

• I think, therefore, that the defendant is entitled to judgment.