ord of deposits by Jacob Suess in a bank to his own credit and subject to his own checks. This proceeding is not against Jacob Suess or his legal representatives, as such; and even if the property was acquired by him from the administratrix with notice of the trust, without consideration, or for a consideration moving personally to the administratrix, a decree cannot on that ground be rendered against the administratrix or her executors for moneys received by him which never reached her hands; and even if an accounting could properly be required of the administratrix as to the profits of the business, on proof, now unsupplied, that Jacob Suess acted as her agent with respect to its management, the measure of the recovery must be limited to profits, and on no just theory could she be denied all allowance for necessary expenses. On the report as made no deduction is made for rent, or for cost of supplies, or for services of Jacob Suess or of his employés, or for the many other charges which must have been incurred to have secured so substantial a result in receipts. The theory that all receipts constituted assets, and that the administratrix can only be discharged as to any of them by the production of vouchers, is untenable. The proceeds of beer purchased on the credit of Jacob Suess, or of Mrs. Suess, after the death of the decedent, were not assets of his estate, and were not constituted such assets by the fact that the saloon where the sales were made, with its fixtures and good will, were assets. For the value of such saloon, fixtures, and good will, the administratrix was clearly chargeable. She was also chargeable with interest on that value. If she used it in carrying on a trade for her own benefit, and realized profits, the parties in interest could demand such profits in lieu of interest. This is the attitude of the objectants in this proceeding. But they cannot recover the whole gross returns of the business. They are confined to profits, and the burden of proof rests upon them to establish that profits were obtained over and above all of the expenses of the business. If such expenses are to be proved by vouchers, or not at all, then the failure to produce such vouchers must result in the loss of the objectants, since the actual or probable expense of carrying on the business is a part of their affirmative case. The rule requiring vouchers in an accounting by an administrator has no- application to such an issue. In re Munzor’s Estate,
4 Misc. Rep. 374 , 25 N. Y. Supp. 818 ; Kenyon v. Olney (Sup.) 15 N. Y. Supp. 416 . Unfavorable inferences might be drawn from the conduct of the accountants in resisting proof of expenses, but they could not be punished for this to the extent of charging them with the gross proceeds of all sales. The transfer of the saloon was made about May, 1878. The parties to it are dead. The declarations alleged to have been made by the deceased administratrix to the witnesses Snyder and Rose, as to the fact that a sale had been made, were parts of the res gestae, since they served to characterize the possession of Jacob Suess as being that of an owner, and not an agent. In so far as they were against the interests of Mrs. Suess, they may also stand, since they concerned her own act in making a sale, and did not refer to any act of the decedent, and she is dead.
Livingston v. Arnoux, 56 N. Y. 507 . Independent of those declarations we may safely assume that the payments shown to have been