Majority
Headnote
1. Criminal Law—Election between Counts on Indictment.The indictment found against the defendant contained four counts,—the first, for rape in the first degree; the second, for assault in the second degree; the third, for rape in the second degree; ar.d the fourth, for abduction. At the close of the trial the defendant moved that the district attorney elect under which counts of the indictment he would ask the jury to convict the defendant. The district attorney thereupon withdrew the fourth count of the indictment, charging abduction, and elected to go to the jury upon all of the other counts contained therein. The defendant asked that the district attorney be further compelled to elect upon which of the remaining counts he would go to the jury. The court refused to direct the district attorney to make such election, and the defendant excepted. Error is sought to be predicated thereon upon this appeal. The evidence given in the case tended to show the commission of an offense as charged in each of the remaining counts of the indictment, and the jury would have been authorized to convict the defendant of the offense charged in any one of such counts. The crimes as charged therein were consistent with each other, and are such crimes as are authorized to be charged in separate counts in the same indictment. Code Cr. Proc. § 279. And the jury is
The main contentions of the appellant upon this appeal consist in the claim that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of •evidence, and that the prosecutrix was not corroborated upon all of the material elements constituting the crime of rape in the first degree, and that therefore the crime for which the defendant has been convicted was not established upon the trial. The prosecutrix was employed in a corset manufacturing concern at 145 Centre street, in the city of New York. On the morning of June 5, 1900, the prosecutrix, in company with Gussie Berkowitz, another girl employed at the same place, went to their place of employment, and, finding no work ready for them, started out to walk upon the street. The prosecutrix was a girl under 16 years of age, and her companion •about 14. While together upon the street they met one Peter Pel•ligrini at the corner of Park Row and Baxter street. Pelligrini invited them to go to his club, in the basement of 17 Baxter street; and, after walking about for a short time, they consented to, and did, go with Pelligrini to this place. ' The prosecutrix testified, in substance, that when she entered the basement there were present the defendant and two other men, called “Buck” and “Banjo.” " The ■prosecutrix and her two companions seated themselves at a table, .and, after being so seated, the defendant came and sat beside her, .and winked to Pelligrini, who thereupon left the basement, going ■out upon the street. The defendant then made an indecent proposal to the prosecutrix, and subsequently put his hand under her clothes. She resisted, and tried to push him away. Thereupon the defendant called to Buck and Banjo to come and assist him, which they did. Gussie Berkowitz thereupon became frightened, and ran •out upon the street. The defendant, with the assistance of Buck .and Banjo, placed the prosecutrix upon some chairs; Buck and Banjo held her arms and legs; the defendant tore off her drawers .and outraged her person; and such outrage was perpetrated by each one of the other two thereafter in succession; the others holding her arms and legs during the operation. The prosecutrix screamed .and resisted, but was not able to prevent the assault upon her. After the assault had been consummated, the prosecutrix testified that a bartender from upstairs came down with a whip, and drove the defendant and the other boys out of the basement. The prosecutrix thereupon arranged her clothing, went out upon the street, .and met the Berkowitz girl, but did not tell her what had happened, nor did she tell anybody thereafter of the commission of the offense until about a week after the occurrence, when her mother spoke to .her about it, who, she claimed, had been informed by her sister;
We are clearly of the opinion that the testimony as thus developed: presented a question of fact for determination by the jury. A bare recital of it shows that the prosecutrix, upon every essential element constituting the crime, was corroborated by other witnesses.. The corroboration was complete, both as to direct testimony and circumstances. Probably the weakest point in the case for the people rested in the fact that the prosecutrix did not make immediate disclosure of the outrage that had been committed upon her person.. The offense is so grave, in the case of a virtuous female, that its-commission raises a natural presumption in the mind that at the first suitable opportunity she would make disclosure of it. The fact that she does not make it when opportunity is presented so to do is a. strong circumstance against the integrity of the statement when the-disclosure is made for the first time -long after the offense was committed. Under such circumstances, facts tending to exculpate a defendant are entitled to greater weight than would otherwise be accorded them. Such omission, however, to make immediate disclosure, is always to be considered in connection with the circumstances by which the prosecutrix is surrounded. If there be no one-in whom she can confide, or if her surroundings be such as to indicate that her silence upon the subject is produced by fear, it may furnish to the jury satisfactory reasons why the disclosure was not earlier made. People v. O’Sullivan, 104 N. Y. 481 , 10 N. E. 880 ,. 58 Am. Rep. 530 . In the present case the age of the prosecutrix is to be considered, her home surroundings, and fears of punishment at home if she disclosed that she voluntarily went to the place-where the offense was committed, which are all matters which tend' to show a reason why the disclosure was not earlier made. These-were all questions for the jury; and while the testimony was conflicting as to the main facts, and contradictions in collateral circumstances were many, yet it is clear that the jury were authorized in finding the defendant guilty, and we see no reason why such conclusion should be disturbed.
It is further insisted that the court committed error in refusing to-charge that the supporting evidence must tend to establish every material fact necessary to constitute the crime. The charge itself, as-a whole, embodied a perfectly correct statement of the law, and clearly presented for the consideration of the jury every salient fact in the case, and the deductions to be drawn from the testimony offered by the defendant. It carefully guarded every legal right of which the
It follows that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. All concur.
Cases cited
- People v. O'Sullivan 104 N. Y. 481 p. 364
- People v. Plath 100 N. Y. 590 p. 365
- People v. Page 162 N. Y. 272 p. 365