Majority
Headnote
1. Administration of Estates—Claims of Creditors—Lien on Realty or: Proceeds Thereof.The testatrix did not, by her will, make her debts a charge or lien on her real estate. The surrogate’s decree did not in terms, nor as a matter of law, make the claims in said decree mentioned a lien on such real estate. Appellant claims, however, that the special term, in determining- the rights of the parties to the action, should have adjudged and decreed that the items of $1,408.02 and $300, respectively, mentioned in said decree, are equitable liens on the whole of said real estate, and that the court should have directed that the same be paid from the proceeds of sale. The claim of $300 is in favor of one Lucy Weir. Whether she is the wife of the appellant, and the same person named in the summons as Lucy M. Weir, does not appear. The statute of limitations had apparently run against her claim, even prior to the entry of the surrogate’s decree. Such claimant is either not a party to this action, or, if a party, she has made default in appearing and pleading. We fail to see how such account is now an equitable lien on the real estate, or how appellant is interested to have a review of the judgment in this court, so far as that claim is concerned.
The only evidence of appellant’s claim of $1,408.02 consists of the surrogate’s decree. The decree shows that appellant then had in his hands a balance of $124 of the personal estate of testatrix, ‘and it
We are of the opinion that the appellant did not sufficiently establish his claim against the plaintiff to require the court to consider whether, in a determination of the rights of the parties in an action for partition,, such a claim should be decreed to be paid from the proceeds of sale. It is unnecessary for us to consider the many other questions that arise in this case, or the legal objections urged by the plaintiff against making such a decree as desired by the appellant, in any event.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs. All concur.