Majority
Headnote
1. Injunction—Contract op Employment.On the ad of December, 1901, the copartnership of Geo. A. Kessler & Co. were the agents of the firm of Chandon & Co., successors to Moet & Chandon, of Epernay, France, to sell in the United States of America the champagnes and wines manufactured and produced by said firm of Chandon & Co. Upon said date the said copartnership entered into an agreement in writing with the defendant, by which agreement it was provided that said copartnership should be exclusively entitled to the services of the defendant for the period of five years, and the defendant agreed that he would not for that period engage himself with any wine house or dealer in champagnes in any capacity whatever, except with said copartnership of Geo. A. Kessler 81 Co.; the defendant further agreeing by such contract, during said time, and while in the employment of said copartnership, to devote himself exclusively to such employment, and not to go into any other business whatsoever. On the 13th of December, 1901, the plaintiff, a corporation, acquired and succeeded to the business of said firm of Geo. A. Kessler 8t Co., and since said 13th of December, 1901, has been engaged in the business of selling champagne wines as successors to said firm; and the defendant has rendered services to the plaintiff under and pursuant "to said agreement, and has accepted from the plaintiff the sums of money set forth in said agreement as compensation for such services, and has accepted the plaintiff as the party bound by the contract for which such services were to be rendered since the 13th of December, 1901. On the 31st of December, 1901, the defendant entered into a written agreement with Geo.
The question upon the motion before the court below was whether such injunction should be continued. The court below denied the motion to continue the injunction, upon the ground that the defendant’s services were not special, unique, or extraordinary, within the adjudged cases, and that injunctive relief must therefore be withheld. In this view of the law we concur. There is nothing in these papers which tends to show any special, unique, or extraordinary services upon the part of the defendant, except, perhaps, in his large expenditures, which seem to have increased his value as a salesman. On the contrary, they show that others occupy the same relations to the firm, and are performing similar duties. While the rule úndoubtedly is that the rendition of skilled services to others may be prevented by injunction, yet we fail to find any rule which allows an injunction of this kind unless there is something special, unique, or extraordinary in the services which the defendant, under his contract, is called upon to render.
The claim upon the part of the defendant that his contract with Geo. A. Kessler Sc Co. was a personal one is undoubtedly well taken; but it appears from the papers that the corporation of Geo. A. Kessler & Co. succeeded the firm of Geo. A. Kessler & Co. almost immediately after entering into this contract, and that the defendant recognized the corporation as the successor of the firm; and therefore by his recognition of the assignment of the agreement by the
A variety of cases have been cited, but none of them have any bearing upon the case at bar. The case of Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. 351, is referred to as an authority directly in point; but an examination of that case shows an entirely different state of facts. The defendant in that case engaged in the champagne business, which he had agreed not to do. He bought his wines in France, put his own labels upon them, with the same name as the plaintiff’s and entered directly, for his own personal advantage, into the business of importing and selling wines in Great Britain, which by his contract he had expressly undertaken to refrain from doing. That case is not similar to the one at bar. The defendant in this action is not going into a champagne business on his own account. He is being hired by another house in his capacity as salesman, and as salesman only.
It is undoubtedly true that the plaintiff has no remedy at law, because whatever damage it may sustain by reason of the breach of this agreement it is almost impossible to regulate; and, if there was any principle upon which injunctive relief could be granted, the plaintiff would undoubtedly be entitled to it. But as already seen, the case is not one in which injunctive relief can be given, and the order appealed from must therefore be affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur, except PATTERSON, J., who dissents.