Majority
Headnote
1. Civil Service—Employe op New York—Probationary Term—Commencement.The relator presented to the supreme court a ^petition stating that, after having passed a competitive examination, "he was appointed by the board of City Record of the city of New York a bookbinder in the office of the City Record. This resolution appointing the relator was passed on the 13th day of November, 1901, “said appointment to take effect on and after November 14, 1901,” and it appeared that the relator commenced work under this appointment on the 18th of November, 1901.
By rule 35 of the municipal civil service rules of the city of New' York, it is provided that:
“Every original appointment to or employment in any position in the competitive class shall be made for a probationary term of three months, and an appointing or nominating officer, in notifying the person certified to him for employment, shall specify the same as for a probationary term only; and if the conduct and fitness of the probationer are satisfactory to the .appointing officer, his retention in the service after the end of such term -shall be equivalent to his permanent appointment, but if his conduct, capacity or fitness "be not satisfactory, he may be discharged at the end of such term' without regard to the provisions of rule 42, limiting the power of removal.”
It’ further appeared that the conduct and services of the relator were not. satisfactory; that on the 17th day of February, 1902, a ■resolution was passed by the board of City Record of the city of New York ordering the relator’s dismissal at the end of his probationary term of three months, and upon the same day notice thereof was given to the relator. The relator claims that his term' of service commenced on the 14th of November, 1901, and, his proba'tionary term having expired, his retendon in office beyond that time ■ was equivalent to a permanent appointment, and thenceforth he could only be removed as provided for by rule 42 of the municipal civil •service rules.
We think the court below incorrectly determined that the period ■ of the relator’s employment commenced from the date of his appointment. On the contrary, we think that it began when he commenced work under his appointment, and not from the date specified in the resolution appointing him. The relator did not hold a public of-fice.. He was an employé of the city, and his appointment was to take effect “on and after November 14th.” His term of employment commenced when he accepted the appointment, by actually entering into the service of the city. The object of this probationary period is “to enable the head of the department who has made the appointment not only to ascertain the fitness of the pro
It follows that -the order appealed from should be reversed, and the application denied, with $50 costs and disbursements. All concur.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Kastor v. Kearny 164 N. Y. 64 p. 663