Majority
Headnote
1. Deposits nsr Lieu op Bail — Presumption op OwnershipOne Ryshpan, having recovered a judgment against the defendant Joseph Sonberg, and the execution having been returned unsatisfied, on March 4, 1901, commenced supplementary proceedings to enforce the judgment, in which the plaintiff was appointed a receiver of the property of Sonberg, March 7, 1901, and duly qualified as such on March 12, 1901. On November 23, 1900, the defendant Joseph Sonberg, the judgment debtor, had been arrested in a civil action in the city court. On November 28, 1900, there was deposited with the sheriff of the county of New York by the defendant Razar Sonberg the sum of $900 in lieu of bail; the sheriff, upon its deposit, giving a receipt which was as follows: “Rec’d from Albert Sonberg the sum of $900 in lieu of bail for above defendant in the above action. Frederick Green, Bond Clerk, Sheriff’s Office.” The sheriff subsequently paid this sum to the clerk of the city court, whereupon the plaintiff commenced this action to recover such sum as the money of the judgment debtor. Upon the deposit of this sum of $900, Joseph Sonberg was released, whereupon, at the request of the attorney for Razar Sonberg, he executed a direction to the sheriff of the coúnty of New York, entitled in the action in which the bail was given, whereby the sheriff was directed that the sum of $900 “deposited with you in lieu of bail for my discharge from custody upon the order of arrest issued herein, in the above-entitled action, be paid to Joseph Wilkenfeld in the event that I become entitled to its return,” which was duly acknowledged. Subsequently, upon this consent, and an affidavit of Albert Sonberg that he had deposited this sum of $900 with the sheriff, in lieu of bail, under the order of arrest of the judgment debtor, and asking that this money be returned to him, an order of the city court was entered, reciting the affidavits of Joseph Wilkenfeld and Albert Son-berg, and the certificate of the sheriff, by which it appears that on the 30th of November, 1900, the said sheriff paid into court the sum of $900, received by him in lieu of bail by the defendant in the above-entitled action, and that the said defendant had subsequently given bail, and by order duly executed, directing the payment of the said sum of $900 to Joseph Wilkenfeld, it was, on motion of said Wilkenfeld, ordered that the sum of $900 paid into court by the sheriff to the credit of this action be paid to said Joseph Wilkenfeld, in pursuance of the written directions of the defendant. The plaintiff, however, claimed this money as the money of the judgment debtor, and commenced this action, alleging that the transfer of the money to Wilkenfeld was made with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, and demanded judgment for the payment of the money to him as such receiver. The answers of the defendants deny tha/: the money so paid by the judgment debtor to the sheriff in lieu of bail was the money of the judgment debtor; allege that the de
“At any time before tbe deposit is paid into court the defendant may deliver to the sheriff a written direction to pay it to a third person, therein specified, in the event that the defendant becomes entitled to a return thereof; but without expressing any other contingency. * * * The money thus deposited is deemed the property of the third person subject to the plaintiff’s interest therein; and subject to the rights of a creditor of the defendant, where the direction was given for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding creditors. The money, or the residue thereof, must be paid to the third person, where, by the provisions of the last two sections, it is required to be refunded to the defendant, or his representative.”
By this provision of the Code a method is provided by which a person for whom the money was deposited as security may provide for its return to the person depositing it, when the money is not the property of the person for whose appearance it has been deposited.' It is not in the nature of a transfer of the money, but a declaration that the money, when repaid, is to be repaid to the person specified; and the section expressly provides that the money deposited is then deemed the property of the third person, subject to the plaintiff’s interest therein, and to the rights of a creditor, where the direction is given for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors ; but, to entitle a creditor to secure the possession of this money, there must be proof that the money was the property of the debtor, which should be applied to the payment of his debts, and that the direction was given for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding his creditor. Under such circumstances, there is no presumption that the money is the property of the debtor. On the contrary, it is deemed the property of the third person to whom it is directed to be paid. In this case the judgment debtor executed the direction to pay to the third person, and the money was to be deemed the property of that third person unless the plaintiff proved that the money belonged to the judgment debtor, and that the direction to pay to the third person was given with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors. As I read this testimony, there is no evidence, as against this defendant, Albert Sonberg, that the money was not his, or that it was the property of the judgment debtor, and that he was not entitled to it when the object for which it had been deposited had been accomplished, and the money was to be returned. The
I think, therefore, that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellants to abide the event. All concur.