to be in full for his services upon this accounting. He also stated that it was not the intention of the executors, if this bill was allowed, to ask the surrogate to make any allowance under sections 2561 and 2562 of the Code. The estate was a large one, involving between a million and a quarter and a million and a half dollars, and consisted of both real and personal property in about equal proportions. The various figures which counsel has fixed upon these services, except the question in regard to the accounting, do not seem to me to be unreasonable or improper, considering the magnitude of the estate, and the consequent importance of the questions involved, and the high standing of the attorneys necessarily employed in the matter. It is contended, however, by the contestants, that, while the executors are entitled to employ and reimburse counsel for services necessarily rendered to them, they cannot include in such charge the services of counsel in making up their accounts for judicial settlement and attending to the same, but that upon such matters they are limited to the allowance which may be fixed by the surrogate under sections 2561 and 2562 of the Code, and that, therefore, so much of this bill as includes the fee for services in the settlement of this account should be disallowed, and that the surrogate should, in the decree, make such allowance as they may be enabled to show they are entitled to within the provisions of said sections of the Code. While the reading of this section of the Code would seem to give some foundation for this claim, yet it does not seem to me, from a consideration of the entire subject, that it was the intention of the Code to limit the pay for such services to the allowance fixed by these sections; as, if such had been the intention, it seems to me it would have been clearly expressed. It is unnecessary for me to consider this question at length, and give my reasons for arriving at this conclusion, as a similar question has been before Surrogate Ranson for his determination (In re Smith, 26 Abb. N. C. 56 , 12 N. Y. Supp. 88 ), and in his opinion he completely reviews all of the decisions upon this subject, and holds that the course adopted by the executors herein is proper, using the following language: “Until I am differently instructed by the appellate courts, I shall hold that the accounting party is not confined to the sections of the Code [2561 and 2562] for remunerating his counsel, but may expend such sum as he deems proper in that behalf, to be included in his accounts.” Believing that his opinion upon this subject is, therefore, correct, I shall follow the same, particularly as I am unable to find any decisions in which it has been criticised by the appellate courts. As the amount which is involved in this account is considerable, it is to be hoped that this will be presented to the appellate courts, and thus the matter set at rest.
There remains to be determined, however, the question of whether the charge for the services in connection with this account was a reasonable and proper compensation, before this bill can be allowed. Upon this point the evidence offered by the contestants is of no assistance, as the various counsel called by the contestant placed no value upon such services, stating that they regarded the sections of •the Code referred to as controlling. There was considerable differ