People v. Adams

The defendant was indicted under section 344a of the Penal Code (Laws 1901, p. 431), and there are two questions presented upon this appeal which we think require discussion. The constitutionality of this section of the Penal Code has been sustained by this court in People ex rel. Wilson v. Flynn, 72 App. Div. 67 , 76 N. Y. Supp. 293 , and that question is not open to further debate here.

The first question is as to the sufficiency of the indictment, and the objection taken is that it is insufficient because it neither alleged knowledge by the defendant of the character of the papers the possession of which was prohibited by the statute, nor that the defendant either had used or intended to use them for an unlawful purpose. Section 344a of the Penal Code provides that:

“A person * * * who shall have in his possession, knowingly, any writing, paper or document, representing or being a record of any chance, share or interest in'numbers sold, drawn or to be drawn, or in what is commonly called ‘policy,’ or in the nature of a bet, wager or insurance, upon the drawing or drawn numbers of any public or private lottery; or any paper, print, writing, numbers, device, policy slip, or article of any kind such as is commonly used in carrying on, promoting or playing the game commonly called ‘policy’; * * * is a common gambler, and punishable by imprisonment.”

The act which this section makes a crime is the possession, knowingly,. of any writing, paper, or document representing or being a record of any chance, share, or interest in numbers sold, drawn, or to be drawn, or in what is commonly called “policy,” or any paper, print, writing, numbers, device, policy slip, or article of any kind, such as is commonly used in carrying on, promoting, or playing the game commonly called “policy.” There are two elements necessary to constitute this crime. The first is possession by the defendant. The second is a knowledge of the fact that the writing is in his possession and of the character thereof, and, if the indictment sufficiently and clearly charges the defendant with these two essential facts — the possession of the papers, documents, or articles specified in the statute, and knowledge by the defendant of such possession, with knowledge of its character — it is sufficient.

By section 275 of the Criminal Code, the indictment must contain “a plain and concise statement of the act constituting the crime,

The only objection to this indictment that can be considered on appeal from a judgment is that the facts stated do not constitute a crime, and it follows that, if the indictment charges the defendant with “having in his possession, knowingly, any writing, paper or document, representing or being a record of any chance, share or interest in numbers sold, drawn or to be drawn, or in what is commonly called ‘policy’ * * * or any paper, print, writing, numbers, device or policy slip, or articles of any kind such as is commonly used in carrying on, promoting or playing the game commonly called ‘policy,’ ” it states the facts which constitute the crime, and is sufficient after a plea of not guilty. It is settled, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, that it is generally sufficient to state an offense in the language of the statute defining the crime. People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293 , 12 N. E. 610 , 60 Am. Rep. 452 ; People v. Weldon, 111 N. Y. 569 , 19 N. E. 279 ; People v. Williams, 149 N. Y. 1 , 43 N. E. 407 . The indictment in this case is in the words of the statute. There are two counts. The first count charges that the defendant, “did knowingly have in his possession a certain writing, paper and document representing and being a. record of a chance, share and interest in numbers sold in what is commonly called policy, which said writing, paper and document is as follows, that is to say”; and then follows a description of the document and writing alleged to. have been found in the defendant’s possession. The second count charges that the defendant “did knowingly have in his possession a paper, print, writing, numbers, device, policy slip and articles of a kind such as is commonly used in carrying on, promoting and playing the game commonly called policy, which said paper, print, writing numbers, device, policy slip and articles aforesaid is as follows”; then

The case of People ex rel. Wilson v. Flynn, supra, is not at all opposed to this view. The court was there considering the question of the constitutionality of section 344b of the Penal Code, and, as that section was to be construed in connection with section 344a, the section was considered only in relation to the constitutionality of section 344b. We held that the presumption provided for in section 344b could only be applied where the document or articles are found under such circumstances and conditions as indicate that they may have been used in violation of the prior section, and, in order that the people may avail themselves of the provisions of section 344b, it must be made to appear that the articles were in use in connection with a place used for doing the prohibited acts, or that a fair inference arose, from the circumstances surrounding the possession, that they were or might have been unlawfully used; that, to justify the presumption specified in section 344b, the people must show a relation as to the principal fact, viz., the existence of a condition from which it may be fairly inferred that the articles may have been used in violation of the provisions of the section defining the offense. The discussion there had no relation to the sufficiency of an indictment under section 344a, and nothing that was said can be construed as applying to an indictment or proof necessary to convict under that section.

The indictment being sufficient, we think the evidence justified a conviction of the defendant of the crime charged in section 344a of the Penal Code. There was found in a trunk, in a private office exclusively occupied by the defendant, certain sheets which were records of numbers upon which bets had been made in playing the game commonly called “policy.” This game of policy is described by a witness who had been connected with the game, and was familiar with the materials, papers, and writings that are used in the promotion of the game. He testified that there are “policy manifold books.” The method of this form of gambling was described as follows: When an individual makes up his mind to play policy he goes into a place for that purpose, and goes to the man in charge of the place, and says he wants to play 9-19-29, which is known as a “dead gig”; he puts 10 cents on it, or he may put 2 cents, or whatever he sees fit. The man takes his money, and formerly he used to give him what they called a “lottery policy,” which is a record. In the case I illustrated it was 9-19-29, and 10 cents alongside the gig mark, which would serve to identify him in the afternoon, to find the result of his play, and the writer would record that bet on a similar sheet to those. He would take a stylus, or lead pencil — whatever he would see fit to use — and mark in one of those columns, 9-19-29, gig-mark — 10 cents, and he would have a carbon paper over two similar sheets, and make two copies and an original; that the player got a little slip of paper with the numbers on it, and a record of his bet, so as to identify him on this return; that “at the times the books

There was, therefore, evidence that these manifold sheets were the sheets used in playing policy as thus described by the witness, and if they were found in the possession of the defendant, and he had knowledge of the fact that they were there, he was guilty of the crime specified in section 344a of the Penal Code.

We also think it quite clear that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that these manifold sheets were in the defendant’s possession. They were found in a trunk in his private office, which the defendant had directed should be placed in this office, in which there was also a desk and tin boxes. In the desk and tin boxes were found papers that manifestly belonged to the defendant, relating to his business, some of which were in his handwriting or had been signed by him. The trunk in which these manifold sheets were found was locked. It had been placed in his office open and empty by his direction, and these sheets were found in the trunk, with other papers which clearly belonged to him. We think the jury were entirely justified in finding that these papers were in the “possession, knowingly,” of the defendant.

The remaining question is as to the competency as evidence of the papers found in the desk, tin boxes, and trunk in the defendant’s office. This office of the defendant was in a back room in the offices of a firm of real estate brokers and agents in the city of New York. It had been occupied by the defendant for several weeks as his private office, and had his name upon the door. Police officers, under what is stated in the evidence to have been a search warrant — although this search warrant was not produced — took possession of the defendant’s office. Shortly after they were in possession the defendant came in, and when he was informed of the object of the presence of the police officers he warned them not to touch anything in the office, as nothing there belonged to him. He was, however, arrested, and the officers proceeded to examine the trunk, the three tin boxes, and the desk. Having discovered in the trunk policy sheets, they took from the desk all papers that were there, and, with the trunk and tin boxes, these were conveyed to the district attorney’s office. The officers testified that they were acting under a search warrant which was exhibited to the defendant. When the various papers that were found in the desk, tin boxes, and trunk were

The papers thus found in the defendant’s office, either in the trunk or tin boxes, that had relation to the game of policy, were competent ■evidence as' to the main fact upon which the indictment was founded, i. e., the possession by the defendant of these documents and papers. The other papers found in the defendant’s office, in connection with these prohibited documents, with proof that they related to the defendant’s private business or property, were competent to prove that the defendant was in possession of the policy papers, unless the fact that they were illegally taken from his possession makes them incompetent evidence against him. We will assume that the seizure by the police officers of all the defendant’s private papers was unlawful, and that officers thus seizing the papers were liable for a trespass ■or larceny. The question, then, is whether papers thus procured are incompetent evidence against a defendant charged with the commis.sion of a crime, because possession of them was illegally obtained.

In support of this objection the learned counsel for the defendant relies upon the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 6 Sup. Ct. 524 , 29 L. Ed. 746 . That case held that an act of Congress authorizing a court of the United States, in revenue cases, on motion of the government’s attorney, to grant an order requiring the defendant charged with a crime to produce in court his private books, invoices, or papers, was a violation of the fifth amendment of the federal Constitution. This -amendment relates solely to proceedings in the courts of the United States, and, while there are undoubtedly some expressions in Judge Bradley’s opinion which question the admissibility in evidence of ■private papers illegally seized as against a person accused of crime, ■the question decided was as to the provision of an act of Congress which justified the court in granting an order requiring the person .accused of a crime to produce in court his private books and papers for examination. The learned counsel for the defendant insists that the admission in evidence of the private papers of the defendant, thus unlawfully seized by the police officers, was a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to be secure in his person, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that he was compelled thereby to be a witness against himself. The provision of the Constitution of this state which is alleged to be violated is section 6 of article 1, which provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”; and the question is whether, by the admission in evidence of these papers ■and 'documents, the property of the defendant, unlawfully seized by

But, irrespective of that, we do not think that this privilege of the defendant was violated by the introduction of papers taken from his possession, however taken. While this question does not appear to have been directly presented in this state in relation to books and papers, it has been uniformly held in other states,.and in text-books, that the fact that the possession of papers or articles have been ille

Without further discussion, we think it clear that the introduction of these papers and documents was not a violation of any right assured to the defendant either by the Constitution or the law, and the admission of the papers did not constitute legal error.

Our attention has also been called to other rulings on evidence, and to objections to the charge of the court. It is sufficient to say that we have examined these rulings and find no error. The charge of the court to the jury was very full, and fairly stated the questions that they had to decide, throwing around the defendant all the safeguards to which he was entitled. All of the requests made by the defendant were charged, and there is but one exception to the charge as made, and that is clearly without merit. Twice the jury returned for further directions, and both times the instruction given was satisfactory to the defendant. No exception was taken, and the court instructed the jury in accordance with the requests of the defendant’s counsel. The defendant had a fair trial. He was defended by experienced and able counsel. The jury, upon competent and sufficient evidence, found him guilty, and there is nothing in the record that would justify the court in reversing the conviction.

It follows that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. All concur.