Majority
Headnote
1. Municipal Corporation—Excavation in Street—Injury to Gas Main-Decedent’s Suffocation in Manhole—Negligence.This is a statutory action to recover for the death of Cornelius J. Murphy. On the 27th day of August, 1901, the decedent, who was in the employ of the Empire City Subwaj Company, with one John Smith, who was an inspector for the Consolidated Gas Company, were looking for a gas leak. They removed the cover of a manhole at the corner of Thirteenth street and Fourth avenue, and Smith descended a ladder for the purpose of discovering from which direction the gas was coming. The evidence tends to show that he was suddenly overcome by the gas, and that the decedent, after motioning and shouting for help, descended the ladder
We deem it unnecessary to consider the' sufficiency of the evidence to justify the inference that the gas which asphyxiated the decedent came from the break in the pipe two' blocks distant, or to decide whether the city would be liable for the negligence of the department of watef supply in failing to properly support the gas main, or whether there was contributory negligence on the part of Smith which constituted an intervening cause of the decedent’s death notwithstanding the fact that he himself could not be chargeable with contributory negligence as matter of law in attempting to rescue a fellow being in imminent peril, or whether such intervening cause would absolve the defendant from liability. Assuming, without deciding, that the city is chargeable with negligence on account of the manner in which the trench was refilled, and that such negligence resulted in the breaking of the gas main, and that the gas which caused the death of decedent came from such break, yet we are of opinion that the accident was one which, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have been foreseen, and that the negligence on the part of the city, if any, w.as not the proximate cause thereof. If the city
It is well settled that a person cannot be held liable for negligence in failing to guard against an accident that could not, in the exercise of ordinary care, have been foreseen. Dougan v. Champlain Transportation Co., 56 N. Y. 1 ; Hubbell v. City of Yonkers, 104 N. Y. 434 , 10 N. E. 858 , 58 Am. Rep. 522 ; Cleveland v. N. Y. Steamboat Co., 125 N. Y. 299 , 26 N. E. 327 ; Ayers v. Rochester Ry. Co., 156 N. Y. 104 , 50 N. E. 960 ; Lafflin v. Buffalo & S. W. R. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 136 , 12 N. E. 599 , 60 Am. Rep. 433 ; McGrell v. Buffalo Office Building Co., 153 N. Y. 265 , 47 N. E. 305 ; Nelson v. Lehigh Valley, 25 App. Div. 535 , 50 N. Y. Supp. 63 . It is equally well settled that, even though a person is guilty of negligence, he is not responsible for consequences of his negligent act or omission which could not, in the exercise of reasonable care, have been foreseen upon the theory that in such case the negligence is not the proximate cause. In Hoffman v. King, 160 N. Y. 618 , 627, 55 N. E. 401 , 46 L. R. A. 672 , 73 Am. St. Rep. 715 , “proximate cause” is defined as follows: “The damage must be the proximate result of the negligent act. It must be such as the ordinary mind would reasonably expect as a probable result of the act; otherwise no liability exists.” See, also, Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N. Y. 12 , 18, 56 N. E. 502 , and Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73 , 52 N. E. 679 , 44 L. R. A. 216 . The accident did not result directly from such failure. There were intervening causes, and there was a long period of intervening time. If the gas" escaped into the public highway, and by explosion or otherwise injured some one there, or if the gas escaped directly into the adjacent premises, and a person was injured thereby, perhaps the failure to properly support the pipe might be said to be the proximate cause; but here, if the gas came from this break, after escaping it found its way into this manhole, over which the city had no. control, and then it followed these electric light conduits, over which the city had no control, from manhole to manhole. It did not injure the manholes or the con-' duits, nor did it explode, but the decedent uncovers the manhole one avenue block and one street block distant, and, with knowledge on
We are of opinion that the decisions in the cases of fires negligently caused are applicable here. In those cases it is well settled that a person who negligently starts a fire on another’s land or building is only responsible for the damages caused on those premises; and, even though the condition of the wind, weather, and adjacent premises is such that the fire will spread upon adjacent premises, the damage caused thereon is not the proximate result of the original negligent act. In Hoffman v. King, supra, Judge Haight, writing for the court, in reaffirming this rule, says:
“No man is able to answer for all the remote consequences of his acts, ancl those for whom he is responsible. Hence the wisdom of the rule of proximate cause, which, as defined by Webster, is that which immediately precedes and produces the effect. The fire set by the defendant did not immediately precede the fire upon the plaintiff’s land. Other lands Intervened, covered with inflammable material, over which the defendant had no control, and without which the fire could not have extended upon plaintiff’s premises. The drought, atmosphere, and wind were the principal agents assisting the fire in its work of destruction, and were the intervening causes of the damage. It is unfortunate for the plaintiff, but we think her damage was the remote, and not the proximate, result of the defendant’s fire.”
It follows, therefore, that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
Cases cited
- Dougan v. The Champlain Transportation Company 56 N. Y. 1 p. 448
- Hubbell v. City of Yonkers 104 N. Y. 434 p. 448
- Cleveland v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 125 N. Y. 299 p. 448
- Ayers v. Rochester Railway Co. 156 N. Y. 104 p. 448
- Lafflin v. Buffalo & Southwestern Railroad 106 N. Y. 136 p. 448
- McGrell v. Buffalo Office Building Co. 153 N. Y. 265 p. 448
- Nelson v. Lehigh Val. Railroad 25 App. Div. 535 p. 448
- Hoffman v. King 160 N. Y. 618 at 627, 55 p. 448
- Schoepflin v. Coffey 162 N. Y. 12 at 18, 56 p. 448
- Laidlaw v. Sage 158 N. Y. 73 p. 448