Tramblay v. Supreme Council Catholic Benevolent Legion

This is an action on a beneficiary certificate issued by the defendant, a fraternal assessment association, to one Louis Fontaine, a member, by which upon his death it promised to pay a beneficiary fund to the plaintiff. Fontaine died on the 1st day of April, 1901. Fie applied for membership in the defendant by an application in writing dated the 9th day of April, 1886, in which he designated his daughter Henrietta as the beneficiary, subject to •change pursuant to the laws of the defendant. A beneficiary certificate was issued to him on the nth day of April, 1886, in accordance with the designation contained in the application. On the 1st day of September, 1886, he surrendered this certificate to the defendant, in the form and manner required in case of a change of designation of beneficiary, and requested that a new certificate be issued designating “Delima Tramblay, dependent,” as his beneficiary. The defendant duly accepted the surrender of the first certificate, and issued to the deceased member a new certificate, dated the 1st of September, 1886, in and by which, upon condition that the material statements contained in his application and in the medical examination were true, and that he would strictly comply with the laws, rules, and regulations of the legion, it agreed, upon the death of the member in good standing, to pay out of its benefit fund to “Delima Tramblay, dependent,” the sum to recover which this action was brought. This certificate was duly accepted by him in writing.

The contention of the defendant is that the plaintiff was not a “dependent,” within the intent and meaning of the constitution, by-laws, and beneficiary certificate, and that, therefore, the beneficiary certificate is null and void on the ground that its issue was ultra vires. The defendant was incorporated on the 12th day of September, 1881, pursuant to the provisions of “An act concerning charitable, benevolent and beneficiary associations, societies and" corporations,” passed May 12, 1881. Its constitution provides that the particular business and object of the corporation, among other things, shall be “to afford moral and material aid to its members and their dependents by establishing a fund for the relief of sick and distressed members, and a beneficiary fund, from which, on satisfactory evidence of the death of a member, who shall have complied with all its lawful requirements, a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars shall be paid to the family or dependents of such member, as he shall have directed.” The plaintiff alleged not only the issuance of the beneficiary certificate, but also that she was in fact from the time the certificate was issued to the time óf Fontaine’s death “a dependent of the said Louis Fontaine, to wit, his housekeeper.” The answer admits the surrender of the

At the commencement of the trial the plaintiff moved for judgment upon the pleadings, upon the theory that the defendant was estopped from contending that the plaintiff was not a “dependent.” This motion was denied. The plaintiff then rested her case upon the admissions contained in the pleadings. The defendant, therefore, moved for a dismissal of the complaint upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show that she was a “dependent” of the deceased, within the intent and meaning of the defendant’s constitution, by-laws, and the beneficiary certificate. The court denied the motion. The defendant thereupon, under plaintiff’s objection and exception that it was estopped therefrom, gave evidence tending to show .that the plaintiff, when about 12 or 13 years of age, became a member of decedent’s family, which then consisted of the decedent, his wife, son, and daughter; that she remained thereabout two or three years, and was known as the decedent’s daughter or niece; that she then left for the purpose of bettering her condition, or was required to leave by the decedent’s wife, who accused her of improper relations with the decedent; that shortly thereafter decedent and his wife separated on account of the plaintiff; that a few years thereafter the plaintiff was living with the deceased member as his housekeeper, and was known and addressed as his wife, and was so living with him at the time of the issuance of both beneficiary certificates. At the close of the case the court reserved its decision. In the opinion which was subsequently filed the court states that this evidence, which was received under plaintiff’s objection and exception, was disregarded, and excluded from consideration, and judgment was directed for the defendant upon the theory that the designation of the plaintiff as a beneficiary was nugatory.

We think the defendant was estopped from claiming that the certificate was invalid on the theory that it had not authority to issue the same except to a member of the family of the decedent or to some one having a lawful claim upon him for support. It is neither averred nor claimed that the defendant was induced to issue the certificate designating the plaintiff as the beneficiary by any deception or fraudulent misrepresentation, nor is its cancellation demanded or sought.

The decedent was under no obligation to continue his membership or the payment of assessments. The presumption is that during the 15 years which elapsed between the issuance of this certificate ana the death of the member he remained a member and paid his dues relying upon the faith of this certificate that the plaintiff would be the re

It follows that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.