Majority
Headnote
1. Deeds—Description—Construction.The decision in this case hinges on the location of Bailey’s Stage. This is conceded to be its only issue. If that, structure, during its existence, stood on or adjacent to the western bounds of the town of Southampton, on the Great South Beach, instead of about a mile or mile and a half west thereof, as the plaintiffs claim, the defendants must succeed in this action of ejectment. In the latter part of the seventeenth century Col. William Smith obtained Indian deeds and patents of the locus in quo and adjoining property. It appears from some of the deeds in evidence that there stood in the neighborhood “a certain house which Stephen Baily & Company used when they went a whaling,” and this house, called in some of the more recent conveyances “Bailey’s Stage,” was treated as a landmark or monument in fixing the boundaries in many of the several deeds which form the plaintiffs’ chain of title, and in many of the deeds by which neighboring property on the east and west had been, prior to the commencement of the last century, described. Bailey’s Stage has long since passed totally out of existence, and the memory of no living witness extends far enough back to locate its ruins, or the place
It is evident that the referee intended to follow the rule quoted by Greenleaf in his work on Evidence (volume I, § 145):
“Accordingly, though evidence of reputation is received in regard to the boundaries of parishes, manors, and the like, which are of public interest, and generally of remote antiquity, yet by the weight of authority and upon better reason such evidence is held to be inadmissible for the purpose of proving the boundary of a private estate, when such boundary is not identical with another of a public or quasi public nature. Where the question is of such general nature, whether it be of boundary or of right of common by custom, or the like, evidence of reputation is admitted only under the qualifications already stated, requiring competent knowledge in the declarants or persons from whom the information is derived, and that they be persons free from particular and direct interest at the time, and are since deceased.”
That this rule was not applicable for the reason, to be discussed hereafter, that hearsay evidence of reputation and tradition is not admissible where there is sufficient in the documents to mark the location of boundaries without its aid, and that there was sufficient in the deeds we find in the record, is, we think, clear. On the 22d day of July, 1768, the owners of all the meadow on the Great South Beach from Bailey’s Stage to the westerly' side of Reeves’ Point entered into a partition agreement and deed, by which there was set off to each of the owners certain parts of the property which had been held in common. This deed was received without objection. Division was made therein by reciting the act of the surveyors to whom was referred the matter of allotment, and the description of that portion laid out at the most eastern portion of the lands treated by the deed is described by reciting what the referees had done, as follows:
“Then they laid at the east end of the tract of meadow next to Bailey Stage a lot for John Tuthill, containing about four acres being 25 rods wide next the bech to jaw bone of a whale marked on the east side J. T. on the west J. S. the course between sd. lots is north 15 degrees west, then they laid all the meadow between sd. John Tuthill & sd. Matthew Smith, together with Eeeve’s Island for the part of Opt. Josiah Smith.”
Had there been no other deeds which, at first notice, seem to dispute the determination of the location of Bailey’s Stage, as indicated in those we have mentioned, it does not seem likely that the referee would have admitted evidence of tradition for the purpose of ascertaining its location. The defendants rely particularly upon the deed of William Smith, the patentee, dated June 14, 1693, as fixing Bailey’s Stage adjacent to the Southampton town line, and evidently admitted the evidence of tradition for the purpose of expelling, if possible, the doubt raised in relation thereto by what appeared contradictory statements in regard to the place where this house formerly stood.
This deed purports to have been executed on the 14th day of June, 1693, and conveyed to the trustees of the freeholders of the commonalty of the town of Southampton all that “tract of medow on ye north side of ye South beach situate lying and being on ye East side of a certain house which Stephen Bayly & company used when they went a whaling near to a place called Copsowogue about a mile and a half from ye gut near ye place called ye green pines. To have and to hold ye said medow with convenience of making yards to set up hay to ye use of ye said Trustees of ye freeholders & commonalty of ye town of Southampton and their heirs and sucksesors forever.”. The defendants hold that this deed, the oldest in which this whaling station of Stephen Bayley is mentioned, locates the stage at or near Copsowogue; and, inasmuch as there is abundant proof, and no apparent denial, of the fact that Copsowogue was in or near the Southampton west line, they claim that it is demonstrated by this instrument of extreme antiquity that the landmark in question was at the Southampton bounds. A close inspection of the description which we have
With this deed of 1693 construed in this manner, there is no violent discrepancy in the instruments or records appearing in the printed book in reference to the location of Bailey’s Stage, and we think that the ruling of the referee, admitting parol evidence of tradition or reputation as to the place where that landmark stood, was error under the rule that a deed cannot be contradicted or explained by parol evidence. It was said by Judge Allen, speaking for the Court of Appeals in Drew v. Swift, 46 N. Y. 204 , 209:
“Where there are no monuments, or if monuments once existing are gone, and the place where they originally stood cannot he ascertained, the courses and distances, when explicit, must govern, and cannot be controlled or affected by parol evidence. Linscott v. Fernald, 5 Greenl. 496; Bell v. Morse, 6 N. H. 205 ; Van Wyck v. Wright ( 18 Wend. 157 ); Clark v. Baird, 9 N. Y. 183 ; Clark v. Wethey, 19 Wend. 320 .”
It was held in Seaman v. Hogeboom, 21 Barb. 398 , that parol evidence is unnecessary and inadmissible to ascertain the locus, where
The judgment should be reversed, therefore, and a new trial granted.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted before another referee, to be appointed at Special Term; costs to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Higinbotham v. Stoddard 72 N. Y. 94 p. 37
- Buffalo, New York & Erie Railroad v. Stigeler 61 N. Y. 348 p. 37
- Ayers v. Watson 132 U. S. 394 p. 37
- Frier v. Jackson ex dem. Van Allen 8 Johns. 495 p. 37
- Drew v. Swift 46 N. Y. 204 at 209 p. 37
- Clark v. Baird 9 N. Y. 183 p. 37
- Clark v. Wethey 19 Wend. 320 p. 37
- Seaman v. Hogeboom 21 Barb. 398 p. 37
- Donohue v. Whitney 133 N. Y. 178 at 186, 30 p. 38