Majority
Headnote
1. Lease—Reformation—Mutual Mistake.The complaint, after setting forth the lease in ex-tenso, alleges that the clause therein contained relating to the supply of steam by the lessors should be reformed by eliminating therefrom the words and figure “four (4) horse,” on the ground of mutual mistake and inadvertence of the plaintiff and the defendants. It will be noticed, therefore, that there is no claim of fraud or deceit practiced by the defendants in inducing the execution of the lease, but* the question presented is as to whether the words, “four (4) horse power”. were inserted in the lease by mutual mistake. It will be further noticed that in the lease itself the covenant of the defendants
The respondent states the rule correctly, that, in order to justify the interposition of a court of equity in undertaking to reform a contract in writing, the evidence should be clear and convincing—such as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the mutual mistake. The burden of producing satisfactory evidence rested upon the plaintiff, and, in our opinion, he has successfully sustained it, because it is seldom, if ever, that a case is presented wherein a mutual mistake has been so satisfactorily proved.
According to the plaintiff, the words “four horse power” were in the lease when first presented to him by the broker, and he then objected to them upon the ground that he did not know what these words meant, and that what he needed and must have in the conduct of his business was 60 pounds’ pressure of steam; and he insisted that the covenant to supply that amount of pressure should be inserted in the lease, which was done, and the other words were allowed to remain upon the assurance of the broker that 1 horse power equaled 15 pounds’ pressure, and 4 horse power would be equiv-lent to 60 pounds’ pressure. It was upon this representation as to the terms being equivalent, which was undoubtedly relied upon by the plaintiff, and which we must assume that the broker himself believed, that the words “four horse power” were allowed to remain in the lease. We do not, therefore, agree in the contention of the respondent that this evidence fails to show that there was any mistake on behalf of the defendants in adopting the phraseology appearing in the lease relating to the supply of steam. The defendants were represented in the transaction by their broker, and as the agreement was arranged between the plaintiff and the broker, representing the defendants, the latter’s acts and understanding of the meaning of the language used and its purpose are binding upon the defendants. The broker’s testimony shows that he did not know the difference between 4 horse power and 60 pounds’ pressure, and all the surrounding circumstances support the plaintiff’s version that he refused to sign the lease with the words “four horse power” in it, until there was also inserted the covenant as to the 60 pounds’ pressure. Unless the parties understood these terms to be equivalent, it is difficult
It has been many times held that the practical construction put upon a contract by the parties to it is sometimes almost conclusive as to its meaning (Nicoll v. Sands, 131 N. Y. 24 , 29 N. E. 818 ), and that there is no surer way to find out what the parties mean than to see what they have done (Insurance Company v. Dutcher, 95 U. S. 273 , 24 L. Ed. 410 ).
The entire evidence, including the nature of the plaintiff’s business, the custom in furnishing steam for that business, the way in which the lease was made, and the conduct of the defendants in supplying for over a year the pressure needed, seems to us to point with unerring certainty to the fact that the words “four horse power” were inserted in the lease as the result of a mutual mistake, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have the lease reformed by striking out therefrom those words.
The question of damages, if any, to which the plaintiff would be entitled, is not before us upon this appeal; the judgment having been for the defendants.
The judgment accordingly should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Insurance Co. v. Dutcher 24 L. Ed. 410 p. 680