People ex rel. Stewart v. Feitner

This proceeding was commenced for the purpose reviewing the assessment for taxation of certain real estate in the city of New York. A writ of certiorari was issued, to which the defendants made a return. The defendants moved upon the petition, writ, and return to quash the writ, which motion was denied; whereupon the court appointed a referee to take evidence upon .the issues raised by the petition and the return thereto, and report the same to this court, with his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties proceeded before the referee, who filed his report whereby he found that one of the pieces of property was assessed for taxation for the year 1899 in the sum of $50,000 over and above its value; that the other piece of property was assessed at the rate of 642/7 Per cent, of its value; that real estate throughout the borough of Manhattan, taken as a whole, was assessed on the second Monday of January, 1899, for the purpose of taxation, not to exceed 55 per cent, of its actual value; and that the ratio of the assessed value to actual value of real estate at the said date in the financial district of the city of New York in which the property of the relators was located did not exceed 50 per cent.; and, as a conclusion of law, that the assessment on No. 120 Broadway, for the purpose of taxation, should be reduced from $300,-000 to $137,000, and that the assessment on Nos. 36 to 40 Rose street, for the purpose of taxation, should be reduced from $225,000 to $192,500. This report of the referee was confirmed by the Special Term, and a final order entered reducing the assessment in accordance with this finding, and from that order the defendants appeal.

The proceeding must thus be treated as one to correct an assessment upon real property upon the ground that it was erroneous by reason of inequality, in that the real property was assessed at a higher proportionate value than other real estate on the tax roll of the city for the same year was assessed; and the substantial question is one of fact, whether the conclusion of the referee is sustained by the evidence.

By article 11 of the tax law (chapter 908, p. 881, Raws 1896) provision is made for a review of the action of the taxing officers in the assessment of property for taxation. Section 250 provides that:

“Any person assessed upon any assessment roll, claiming to be aggrieved by any assessment for property therein, may present to the Supreme Court a petition duly verified setting forth that the assessment is illegal, specifying the grounds of the alleged illegality, or if erroneous by reason of over valuation, stating the extent of such over valuation, or if unequal in that the assessment has been made at a higher proportionate valuation than the as

Section 353 provides that:

“If it shall appear upon the return to any such writ that the assessment complained of is illegal or erroneous or unequal for any of the reasons alleged in the petition, the court may order such assessment, if illegal, to be stricken from the roll, or if erroneous or unequal, it may order a reassessment of the property of the petitioner, or. a correction of his assessment upon the roll, in whole or in part, in such manner as shall be in accordance with law, or as shall make it conform to the valuations and assessments or other property upon the same roll and secure equality of assessment.”

Under these provisions the Court of Appeals held in People ex rel. Warren v. Carter, 109 N. Y. 576 , 17 N. E. 222 , that to justify a reduction of the assessment upon the ground of inequality the relator must show, in addition to inequality of assessmént, that he is or will be injured by the unequal assessment; that where there is no overvaluation of the-relator’s property it does not follow that he will be injured by an undervaluation of some pieces of property belonging to another; that if all the valuations on the assessment roll, other than that of the party complaining, were proportionately equal, and also proportionately lower than the valuation of'his property, injury to the. relator might perhaps be a just inference; but the mere fact that the claimant can show that his land is assessed proportionately higher than a certain other piece on the same roll does not alone show that he is aggrieved, or that he will be compelled to pay more than his just share of the aggregate tax; that “where the assessors in a particular case depart from a general rule or ratio of assessment which they have adopted, to the injury of the taxpayer in the particular case, the statute affords a remedy,” but that the petitioner must show a state of facts from which a presumption justly arises that the inequality of which he complains will subject him to the payment of more than his just proportion of the aggregate tax; and this presumption is not raised by proof that in a particular instance property is assessed at a proportionately lower valuation than his own. And in the case of People ex rel. Allen v. Badgley, 138 N. Y. 314 , 33 N. E. 1076 , the same principle was applied.

The charter of 1897 (chapter 378, vol. 3, Laws 1897), which was in force at the time this assessment was made and these proceedings commenced, provides a system for the assessment of real property in the city of New York under which the defendants acted in making the assessment of this property for taxation. Section 889 provided that the deputy tax commissioners, under the direction of the board of taxes and assessments, should assess all of the taxable property of the several districts which might be assigned to them for that purpose by the said board, and they were required to furnish to the board a detailed statement of all such property, particularly describing each house, building, lot, pier, or other assessable property, and the sum for which said property under ordinary circumstances would sell; and section 893 provided that (he assessed valuations of such property within the limits of the several boroughs of the city of .New York should be entered in certain books, to be called “The An

This necessarily involves an inquiry as to the general ratio of- the assessments for the particular borough in which the property is situated, and based upon which the tax for that particular borough was imposed. Where a particular piece of property is not assessed at a greater value than its fair market value, the owner is not injured unless he can make it appear that the valuation placed upon his property is in excess of that at which the other real property in the same taxable district is assessed. If all the real property in a particular taxable district is assessed at 100, or 75, or 50 per cent, of its real value, the tax is imposed upon all property equally; and while the ratio would be higher at the lower valuation, the amount of tax to be collected being the same, the proportion that each piece of property would have to bear to the total amount to be raised by,taxation is the same, and there is no inequality. If, however, a piece of property is assessed at a greater proportion of its market value than the other real property in the- same taxing district is assessed, there is imposed upon that property a larger proportion of the burden of taxation than is borne by property generally, and the owner of the particular piece of property is injured by this inequality of assessment.

To entitle the owner of property to relief, he must show that his property has been assessed at a higher proportionate value than other real estate on the tax rolls of the city generally for the same year, and he is also required to specify the instances in which such inequality

We now come back to the question as to the finding of the referee that the established ratio of assessed to market value for the city, taken as a whole; does not-exceed 55 per cent. If it does, it follows necessarily that the relators were entitled to have the assessment upon their premises reduced to that percentage of its actual value; for in that way only can the relators be relieved from paying a greater proportion ■ of the aggregate tax than is paid by the other owners of property, taken as a whole. The evidence taken before the referee is very voluminous. There was evidence showing the sales of many pieces of property throughout the city, with the consideration named in the conveyances, and this was compared with the assessed value of each particular piece of property sold. Assuming that the consideration stated in these conveyances was the actual price at which the property was sold, this would furnish a satisfactory basis for determining the actual ratio between the market value and the assessed value of these particular pieces of property; aiid it does not seem to be disputed but that generally conveyances of this kind, when they express an actual consideration, and not a nominal one, state the actual price at which the property was sold. At any rate, the price is not understated. It would appear that these pieces of property are fairly representative of all the property in the city, and this evidence furnishes material for determining the actual ratio between the assessed and market value of property in the city generally. The actual price at which a piece' of property is sold is much more 'satisfactory evidence of its value than the estimate of experts. An examination, of the ratio between actual sales and the assessed value of property sold bears out, I think, the finding of the referee as to the existing'ratio between assessed and market values, and there is also other evidence scattered through this record that

A further consideration of this testimony is hardly necessary, as I am satisfied that, considering the peculiar conditions here shown to exist, the finding of the referee was fairly sustained, and the court below was justified in accepting it, and in basing its final order upon these conclusions.

It follows that the order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs and disbursements. All concur.