Jokinsky v. Miller — 88 N.Y.S. 928

Majority

p. 928

JOKINSKY v. MILLER.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

June 23, 1904.)

Headnote

L Landlord and Tenant—Leases—Operation as Conveyances—Necessity oe Record.

A card, on which was written, “I hereby lease the stoop floor at 174 Orchard St south side to [tenant] from 1901 to May 1st, 1905 for the sum of $17 per month. [Signature],” being for a term exceeding three years, and not acknowledged, is insufficient, under Laws 1896, p. 607, c. 547, § 240, defining the term “real property,” as including chattels real, except a lease for a term not exceeding three years, and section 241, making unrecorded conveyances of real property void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration, to support the possession of the tenant against summary proceedings brought by a subsequent bona fide purchaser.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Fourth District.

Summary proceedings by Max Jokinsky, landlord, against Louis Miller, tenant. From a final order for the landlord, the tenant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and MacLEAN and SCOTT, JJ.

Leopold W. Harburger, for appellant.

Louis Levene, for appellee.

In answer to the petition of the plaintiff, the owner of certain premises, that defendant be dispossessed of a portion thereof, wherein he continued after the expiration, as alleged, of his monthly tenancy, the defendant set up a general denial, excepting as to continuance in possession, and on the trial introduced in evidence a card upon which was written: “New York, April 15, 1901. I hereby lease the stoop floor at 174 Orchard St. south side to Mr. Miller from 1901 to May 1st, 1905 for the sum of $17 per month.' A Greenspan.” Upon that, Miller claimed to be in possession as a lessee from the plaintiff’s vendor, Greenspan, who testified that he had given this paper, and that he had told the plaintiff, his vendee, that Miller was in under a lease. That he had been so told, or had any such information, the petitioning landlord denied. The learned justice evidently disregarded the story of personal notice, and found the petitioner a purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration. If this memorandum, signed by the landlord only, be called a lease, on the doctrine that one who has delivered a contract subscribed by himself is estopped from denying that it was well' executed, it still is insufficient to support the defendant, for, being for a period exceeding three years, it-would be a “conveyance,” and require record, which might not be of this unacknowledged paper. Sections 240, 241, Real Property Law (Laws 1896, p. 607, c. 547). The final order should be affirmed.

Final order affirmed, with costs and disbursements. All concur.