Majority
Headnote
1. Checks—Forged Indorsement—Agents—Authority.Upon oral pleadings were brought these three actions for the conversion of certain checks drawn to the order of the plaintiff and indorsed with his name by another. It is contended that plaintiff is estopped from disputing these indorsements because of circumstances which he knew, or may be assumed to have known. This contention the learned trial justice has sustained, and rendered judgment for the defendant.
The indorsements were made by one Hecht, the plaintiff’s general _ clerk, among whose duties and occupations are enumerated that he kept the books, made out bills and accounts, collected debts, wrote letters, attended to making deposits in the bank. 'Plow he receipted bills and accounts is not shown. To letters he signed his employer’s name with the addition of “IT.,” his own initial. For depositing in the bank checks payable to his employer’s order, he used a rubber stamp reading: “Pay to the Northern National Bank. Joseph Rosenberg.”
It is not shown that Hecht ever signed or indorsed a check with plain-tiff’s name to plaintiff’s knowledge, excepting by the stamp for transfer to the plaintiff’s bank. It was of frequent occurrence—almost like a practice—in the neighborhood to send out checks to be cashed, particularly on Saturday afternoons, and especially to the liquor stores; one Gerdes’ bartender testifying that they cashed checks for as much as $1,500 for different persons on a Saturday. The plaintiff himself sent out checks in that way, he said, not oftener than once in four
Not one of the incidents in evidence, nor all combined, make out or imply authority to write the plaintiff’s name upon either side of a check. That of which the most is made—provision of and authority to use a stamp for the indorsement of checks for deposit—carried with it only power to do that specific thing under the method familiar, by custom, to every man and woman in this town of affairs enough to have a bank account. That method, in its present prevalence, is novel. Its legality is ancient doctrine. It was settled long ago that a person may be bound by any mark or designation he thinks proper to adopt, providing he intends to bind himself thereby (Brown v. Butchers’ & Drovers’ Bank, 6 Hill, 443 , 41 Am. Dec. 755 ); and, if the intention to bind by even a mark be shown, inquiry may not be made in court as to whether the person can write his name (Baker v. Dening, 8 Ad. & El. 94). At the beginning of the present practice, not many years ago, banks required of each customer a letter or other paper of request and indemnity. Increase of business to a volume rendering the elder practice impracticable in many cases, especially of cashiers of banks, brought the convenient substitute of a stamp for the written name of the payee into use, until the usage ripened into the custom recognized by the clearing house and its members and by the subtreasury since its affiliation with that institution; savings banks alone, of financial concerns, still standing aloof.
Clamorous assertions that the plaintiff’s action under this well defined and recognized custom covers Hecht’s forgery of his employer’s name avails nothing. As little may it be said that reversal of this judgment and the ruling upon which it rests will endanger the business of banking, of such convenience to the commercial community, by holding that banks act at their peril. Of course, banks, as others, taking paper, in a way act at their peril. Herein a bank is party defendant, but not because of the writing of the employer’s name by Hecht, which concerned the bank only because of its guaranty by its customer,
The determination of this appeal will establish no novel precedent, but, were that so to be, the court would need more than herein appears to determine that whenever a man, because of insufficient schooling, occupation in his workshop, or other cause, employs a bookkeeper to do his countinghouse work, he thereby exposes himself to such disposition of his funds as his bookkeeper may make under what a bartender or bartenders consider the bookkeeper’s authority. The judgment should' be reversed.
Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- New York & New Haven Railroad v. Schuyler 34 N. Y. 30 p. 954
- Morris v. Hofferberth 81 App. Div. 512 p. 954