Majority
Headnote
1. Taxation—Railroad Taxes—Disposition—Liability of Treasurer.In 1899 and in 1900 this defendant was treasurer of Delaware county. As such treasurer, upon the 9th day of January, 1900, he received from the New'York, Ontario & Western Railroad Company the sum of $2,640.66, its taxes for all purposes in the town of Walton. By section 12 of the municipal law (Eaws 1892, p. 1736, c. 685) it was his duty, with the part of such taxes not assessed for school district and highway purposes, to purchase the bonds of said railroad, where they could be purchased below par, and to cancel them, and, if such bonds could not be purchased below par, it was the duty of the treasurer to invest such moneys in bonds of the United States, or of the state of New York, or of any town or village or city of such state, and hold such bonds as a sinking fund for the redemption of the outstanding railroad bonds. This statute was a general statute, providing for all towns which had issued bonds in aid of the construction of a railroad where bonds had not been paid. Of such $2,640.66 so received by the defendant, after having deducted the highway taxes and the school district taxes, the sum of $2,062.14 remained for investment. Of this amount the sum of $1,403.68 was the amount assessed as for town purposes, the sum of $415.26 the amount assessed as for county purposes, and the sum of $243.20 the amount assessed as for state purposes. These moneys were all turned over to the supervisor of the town of Walton. Of these taxes, which, under the statute should have been invested, no question is made that that part of it raised for town purposes was wrongfully paid to the supervisor, and the town clearly has the right to recover the same, unless it be shown that the town has already had the benefit of these moneys. The respondent insists that the part of these rñoneys raised for county purposes was properly paid to the supervisor under another statute, which will be considered hereafter, and that, inasmuch as the county has paid in full its state tax, the county will be deemed to have received the benefit of that part of this fund which was collected for state taxes.
As to the last proposition the argument of the defendant is not convincing. The county treasurer pays from the moneys first received the
The statute requiring these moneys to be held as a sinking fund for the bonds issued in behalf of the railroad was chapter 907, p. 2303, of the Laws of 1869. Section 12 of the municipal law (Laws 1892, p. 1736, c. 685) is a re-enactment, in substance, of this act. At the time of the passage of the act of 1869, the New York, Oswego & Midland Railroad Company, the predecessor of the New York, Ontario & Western Railroad Company, from the assessment of which these taxes were collected, was exempt from taxation. By chapter 296, p. 353, of the Laws of 1874, it was provided that all the moneys collected from the said railroad for county taxes should be paid to the railroad commissioner. of the town, and it was made the duty of the railroad commissioner of the town to apply said moneys to the payment of the interest on the bonds issued in behalf of said railroad company, or of the principal thereof. By chapter 234, p. 315, of the Laws of 1879, it was provided that the duties of railroad commissioners in the towns of Delaware county should devolve upon the supervisor of the towns, respectively, who should act as railroad commissioners. Under this act, which remains unrepealed, as far as I have been able to discover, it was the duty of the collector of taxes to pay the amount assessed for county taxes against said railroad to the supervisor of the town, rather than to the treasurer, and the payment by the treasurer who had received them, without warrant of law, to the supervisor, will therefore be deemed to be in execution of the statute, and not a violation of his duty. Of the $2,062.14, therefore, which were properly for the payment of the bonds, or for investment either by the county treasurer and by the railroad commissioner, the sum of $415.26 was properly paid to the supervisor, leaving $1,647.88 as the amount of moneys wrongfully transferred by the treasurer of the county to the supervisor of the town of Walton.
The learned trial judge has found that these moneys all went to the benefit of the town, and upon this ground has dismissed this complaint. I am unable to find any sufficient evidence upon which this conclusion can rest. It must be based, if at all, upon the evidence, first, that in the making up of the tax levy no provision was made for the setting aside of this fund which has been called the “railroad tax rebate”; that the full amount was necessary for the payment of the audits against the said town; and" the further evidence of one Patterson that all those audits had been paid. If all these moneys were needed for the payment of the debts of the town, and those debts were paid from these moneys, the conclusion, of course, would follow that the town had had the benefit of these moneys, although wrongfully paid by the county treasurer to the supervisor. While there is evidence, however, that they were all needed for the debts of
Finally, the respondent insists that by chapter 515, p. 1182, of the Laws of 1903, this payment by the county treasurer to the supervisor was legalized. That act constituted an amendment to section 12 of the general municipal law (Laws 1892, p. 1736, c. 685), and the act recites that “any payment heretofore made in good faith by the treasurer of any county to any town, or to the supervisor thereof, of the taxes received in any year by such treasurer from railroad corporations in that town is hereby validated.” This would be an answer to this action if the Legislature has power to take from the town a cause of action existing. A cause of action is property which can only be taken from an individual or a town by due process of law, and as far as this act assumes to validate this proceeding and destroy the right of action which the town had against the county treasurer for the' moneys so wrongfully appropriated, the act must be deemed inoperative. The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
Judgment and order reversed, and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Importers & Traders' National Bank v. Peters 123 N. Y. 272 p. 233