Majority
Headnote
1. Intoxicating Liquors—Proceedings to Procure License—Assent to Application.This is an application for cancellation of a liquor tax certificate issued to one William Byrne by the county treasurer of Cayuga county on June 26, 1903, allowing him to traffic in liquors at No. 292 Genesee street, in the city of Auburn. It is alleged that William Byrne, in his application for such certificate, incorrectly and
The claim of petitioner is that this structure was erected for the purpose of overcoming the effect of the refusal of the neighbors to sign consents for Byrne to run a saloon at No. 292 Genesee street, and that the structure so erected and divided does not constitute seven buildings, and that they are not occupied bona fide as seven separate dwellings. It is evident that in the erection of the building the intention was to make a sufficient number of dwellings on the premises Nos. 292—294 to overcome the effect of the refusal of consents by the owners of other dwellings within the prescribed limit. From an examination of the application of Byrne for a certificate and of the evidence it appears that there were four buildings occupied exclusively as dwellings, other than the Koenig buildings, within the prescribed limit, the owners of which had refused to give their consents. To overcome these it was necessary to have the consent of the owner or owners of at least eight other buildings occupied as dwellings in order to meet the requirement of the law, which provides that the applicant for a license shall file consents of at least two-thirds of the owners of such buildings. In this emergency the portion of the building on Mr. Koenig’s property, known as No. 294 Genesee street, now occupied by Byrne as a dwelling, was counted as one such building (which, I think, fairly comes within the law, and should be counted and allowed). The other seven buildings relied upon were the seven divisions of the building constructed upon the rear of the premises. To sustain the certificate, it is necessary to hold that this structure, divided by partitions into seven parts, each 8j4 feet wide, constitutes seven distinct buildings, each occupied exclusively as a dwelling; in other words, that it is a “block” of seven buildings, each a “dwelling house” within the meaning of the law. In the case of Lyman v. Garrison, 24 Misc. Rep. 552 , 53 N. Y. Supp. 577 ,
“This law, like any other, should receive a fair interpretation. It should not be construed harshly as against the holder of a certificate, nor interpreted so loosely as to emasculate its restrictive provisions and break down that protection which it gives to adjacent property owners, the public, and the dealer who honestly complies with all its conditions, as against one who seeks to evade it.”
The restrictive features of the law were enacted by the Legislature for a purpose; that purpose evidently being to protect residential, portions of a city and the owners of dwellings against the establishing of saloons in their midst. This same restriction applies also to the establishment of a saloon within a certain distance of a school or a church.
In the case of People ex rel. Sweeney v. Lammerts, in the Supreme Court, reported in 18 Misc. Rep. 343 , 40 N. Y. Supp. 1107 , the judge, in his opinion, says: •
“I can see no reason why a liberal construction should be given to the restrictive provisions of this act. It was probably intended by the Legislature to reduce the number of places in which the liquor traffic was carried on, and to increase the revenues by increasing the tax for doing business, and. in a measure protect dwellings, schools, and churches from surroundings dangerous, to good morals, and tending to disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood by limiting and prohibiting the places where such traffic may be’ carried on;, and the court always furthers the effort of the Legislature by giving the statute such a construction as will carry out the legislative intent.”
The legislative intent, no doubt, was that the consents required before a certificate could be issued to traffic in liquors at a place located in the midst of residences should be- consents of owners of buildings occupied exclusively and in good faith as dwellings, and should not include buildings constructed, used, and occupied as dwellings merely as a pretense and a show; not buildings constructed and tenanted temporarily, and for the purpose of evading the law. The consent of the owner of such “fake” buildings will not avail the applicant for a certificate, nor would it avail the owner of adjoining property to construct such buildings upon his land, for the purpose of requiring his consent, as the applicant for a certificate might disregard and not count such as a dwelling. Matter of Vail, 38 Misc. Rep. 392 , 77 N. Y. Supp. 903 . If the owner of a house and lot in a residential portion of a city, for the purpose of establishing the right to traffic in liquors upon such premises, can erect upon his property a building of the character described, partitioning it into a sufficient number of parts, and calling them dwellings, and can thus obviate the necessity of obtaining the consents required by law from the owners of dwellings within the prescribed limit, and can thereby establish the right to maintain a saloon in their midst, then the law is ineffectual in its object and intent, and is of no protection to residence owners. If so, as far as such owners are concerned, a saloon could be opened upon any residence street at almost any point. I am of the opinion that William Byrne, in his application for the certificate, incorrectly and falsely stated that he had obtained and filed the consents of two-thirds of the owners of buildings occupied exclusively as dwellings, as required by law, and that the seven divisions of the buildings upon the rear of the premises of
After a careful consideration of the evidence submitted, and of what appears to me to be the purpose, effect, and intent of the liquor tax law, I determine that the application for the cancellation of the certificate should be granted. This determination makes it unnecessary to examine the other reason urged by the petitioners for revocation—that there were more than four buildings within the limit, occupied exclusively as dwellings, other than those of Mr. Koenig’s.
The attorney for the defendant contends that the proceedings should be dismissed for the reason that petitioners have not affirmatively shown that the building occupied by the saloon was not occupied as a hotel on March 23, 1896, and that it is not shown thát any consents whatever of the owners of buildings were required by law. In my opinion, the petitioners are not required to make it affirmatively appear as to either of such matters. This is a proceeding to revoke the license of the defendant for making a material false statement in his application for a certificate. But this omission, if important, the defendant has supplied in his application, wherein he has established the number of consents necessary to entitle him to a certificate by stating that there are 12 buildings, dwellings, within the limit. Further, the testimony of the witnesses describing the buildings within the limit and their use and occupancy enables the court to determine the consents necessary to be obtained. As to the saloon building having been a hotel, the undisputed evidence is to the effect that the whole building Nos. 292 and 294 Genesee street was for years next prior to the occupation by the defendant occupied as a double dwelling house.
The application of petitioners is granted, with costs to be fixed in the order.
Application granted, with costs.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Sweeney v. Lammerts 18 Misc. Rep. 343 p. 440
- In re Vail 38 Misc. Rep. 392 p. 440