In re Gall's Will

Josépli Gall died on the 22d day of May, 1886. Two months afterwards the suit of Gall v. Gall was commenced in the supreme court, Kings county; the plaintiff claiming dower in the real estate of Joseph Gall, deceased, as his widow. This action resulted favorably to the plaintiff, and the judgment was affirmed by the general term and court of appeals, (Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 109 , 21 N.

Joseph Gall left a last will and testament, dated April 3, 1883, with a codicil thereto, dated April 28, 1884. Proceedings for probate were begun in the first instance in the Hew York county surrogate’s court, on the theory that deceased was a resident of the city and county of Hew York, as undoubtedly he was when both will and codicil were executed. The case of Gall v. Gall, supra, fixed testator’s residence in the city of Brooklyn, county of Kings, at the time of his death, whereupon the surrogate of Hew York county, having lost jurisdiction, dismissed the proceeding, and it was commenced de nova, in this court. The testator left a widow, Amelia, and two children,—Betsy A. Gall, born February 29, 1884, and Caroline Gall, born July 8, 1886, about six weeks after the death of the father. The contestants claim that under Rev. St. c. 6, tit. 1, art. 3, § 43, (Banks’ 8th Ed. vol. 4, p. 2548,) the wrill and codicil, being made before testator married a second time, were revoked oby such subsequent marriage and birth of issue. It is not contended that testator was married when the will was executed on April 3, 1883; but the proponents insist that this non-ceremonial marriage was consummated some time between the making of said will and the codicil on April 28, 1884. To this I cannot assent. The relation between these parties was, at its inception, confessedly, illicit; and Judge Daneorth says in Harbeck v. Harbeck, 102 N. Y. 714 , 7 N. E. Rep. 408 : “That the union between the parties was at first illegal is conceded. If a change occurred, it was followed by no formal celebration, nor is there evidence of any present agreement to fake each other for husband and wife.” I do not think the evidence warrants me in finding that these parties had on or before April 28, 1884, “passed by contract or by mutual consent from the state of concubinage into that of marriage. ” A case strongly relied upon by the proponents is Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 546 . It differs from this case in that the proof therein failed to establish an illicit origin of the cohabitation as a separate and independent fact. Judge Finch, in his opinion, says, (pages 553, 554:) “Therule that a connection confessedly illicit in its origin, or shown to have been such, will be presumed to retain that character until some change is established, is both logical and just. The force and effect of such a fact is always very great; and we are not disposed, in the least degree, to weaken or disregard it. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 198 . Very often the changed character of the cohabitation is indicated by facts and circumstances which explain the cause and locate the period of the change, so that in spite of the illicit origin the subsequent intercourse is deemed matrimonial. Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52 ; Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige, 574; Starr v. Peck, 1 Hill, 270 ; Jackson v. Claw, 18 Johns. 346 . But a change may occur, and be satisfactorily established, although the precise time or occasion cannot be clearly ascertained. If the facts show that there was, or must have been, a change; that the illicit beginning has become transformed into a cohabitation matrimonial in its character,—it is not imperative that we should be able to say precisely when, or exactly why, the change occurred. ” Canjolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90 . But, in order to hold that such a change has taken place, and to approximate the time, it is necessary to show a mutual, present consent between the parties to become husband and wife. “ The concubinage which existed for so long a period cannot be transformed into matrimony by evidence which falls short of establishing the fact of an actual contract of marriage. Such a contract, it is true, may be proved by circumstances; but they must be such as exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of an actual marriage by mutual consent.” Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun, 72 . At or before the making of this codicil, I do not think “the shadow cast by their daily lives” would be regarded as matrimonial. The evidence introduced in the dower suit was substantially the same as that before

The commencement of the intercourse in Rutherford place in 1888 was illicit. In January, 1884, the testator places her in a tenement house in East Tenth street, where the first child is born, while he takes a suite of rooms in. the Westminster Hotel; and it is while she is living in Tenth street that the codicil is drawn and executed. His relations with her in the Tenth-Street house were, undoubtedly, the same as they were at Rutherford place. He did not live with her, nor hold her out to be his wife. This marks the end of the second period as set forth in Judge Cullen’s charge. She moved over to-Brooklyn on the 1st of May, 1884. The defendants in the suit for dower, and the parties interested in having this will admitted to probate, are many of them the same; and they occupy the anomalous position of strenuously contending in the dower suit that no marriage of any kind had ever been entered into between Amelia Steeb and Joseph Gall, and in tiiis proceeding of insisting with equal vigor that a marriage had been entered into on or before April. 28, 1884. The principal evidence relied upon to sustain their contention is-the cohabitation of the parties; that testator called Magdalena Steeb “mother” prior to the making of the codicil, and that he bought a house in Brooklyn ire the latter part of April, 1884, about the time the codicil was executed, which, he said was “for his family,” or, perhaps, “for his wife and family.” This evidence is somewhat uncertain, as the parties who gave it are Germans, and-did not speak or understand our language perfectly. The proponents also-rely upon the evidence that the wife of the testator’s business partner went with the testator to look at the house with him before he purchased it. From this and similar evidence they claim that a presumption of marriage arose on or before the making of this codicil. The testimony of Charles Lempke, the business partner of the testator, to whom he had confided all his relations-With Amelia, and who was wTell acquainted with both parties, indicates that at this time there had not been any mutual agreement of marriage between them, or that he regarded her as his wife. He told Lempke on April 24 or 25, 1884, that his social standing, and the ignorance of the girl, would not admit of his contracting a marriage with her at that time. He went to Europe on the 1st day of May following, and was absent for two months; and when he returned he again took apartments at the Westminster Hotel. In this codicil he describes her as “a former servant of my late wife,” and bequeaths her $1,000, and gives $5,000 to his child, leaving the rest of his estate, which was quite large, to his nephews and nieces,—some residing in Hew Zealand, some in California, and one lately in the city of Hew York. This-testamentary disposition towards her, both in language and amount, renders-it strongly improbable that he regarded her as his wife at this time. It appears from the stenographer’s minutes, (page 58:) “He said the old lady seemed to give him a good deal of trouble.” The old lady was Amelia’smother, and she, undoubtedly, frequently importuned the testator to make-some provision for her daughter and the child; and the fact that his partner-also urged him to do the same thing seems to me to sufficiently account for

I have nob allowed any question of sentiment as to the legitimacy of the first child to enter into my decision in this matter; nor have I attempted to state all the reasons which lead me to the conclusion that these parties, on the 28th of April, 1884, had not passed, by mutual consent, from a state of illicit intercourse into that of marriage. Such, however, is the conclusion which I have reached upon the whole case. The will must be deemed revoked by reason of the marriage of the testator and birth of issue after its execution; and the application for probate must, therefore, be denied.