Majority
Headnote
1. Master and Servant—Personal Injury—Save Appliances—Evidence-Verdict—Setting Aside.Apart from any statute, it is the duty of employers to a place to 81 of the labor law (chapter 415, p. 480, of the Laws of 1897, as amended by chapter .192, p. 353, of the Laws of 1899) provides that all set screws shall be properly guarded. In Glens Falls Cement Co. v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 162 N. Y. 399 , 56 N. E. 897 , the court, in speaking of the factory law (chapter 409, p. 629, Laws of 1886, as amended by chapter
“There are but few cases to be found in our Reports in which the provisions of the factory law have been construed, and those cases afford but little aid in construing the provision here involved. The manifest purpose of the enactm'ent was doubtless to give more force to the existing rule that masters should afford a reasonably safe place in which their servants are called upon to work. We think, however, that the Legislature could not have intended that every piece of machinery in a large building should be covered or guarded. This would be impracticable. .What evidently was intended was that those parts of the machinery which were dangerous to the servants whose duty required them to work in its immediate vicinity should be properly guarded, so as to minimize as far as practicable the dangers attending their labors.”
The court, in submitting to the jury the question of the defendant’s negligence in this case, assumed that the plaintiff was entitled to have the jury consider the provisions of the labor law as bearing upon the question of its duty in furnishing to the plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the defendant obeyed said statute, and that the set screw was properly guarded. Whether the set screw was or was not properly guarded, within the terms of said statute, is a question of fact. It is said in Glens Falls Portland Cement Co. v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., supra:
“The necessity for the guard, and the character and description of the guard, must of necessity depend upon the situation, nature, and dangerous character of the machinery, and in each case becomes a question of fact. We think, under the evidence in this case, a question of fact was presented for the determination of the trial court, and that it could not be held, as a matter of law, that the screw in question was not properly guarded.”
The majority of this court, in Shaw v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 76 App. Div. 296 , 79 N. Y. Supp. 276 , in referring to the labor law, and to an injury to a^painter’s helper caused by a set screw, said:
“Does the act in question define the duties of an employer towards an employe under such conditions? I think not. As stated in the act, it is for the ‘protection of employees operating machinery.’ That is, those whose duties require them to work about machinery in motion—those who cannot do their work except when assisted by such motion, and therefore must work in the midst of it.”
I express my individual opinion in saying that this act should be construed in view of the general purpose of the act, and for the benefit of all employés whose duties require them to work upon, or in the immediate vicinity of, moving machinery. The special danger arising from the failure of an employer to properly guard machinery is as great to employés who are required to perform their work upon or in the immediate vicinity of moving machiney, when such work is not assisted by the motion of the machinery itself, as to such employés who cannot perform their work without the assistance of such motion. The language of the catchwords at the beginning of the section containing the direction in regard to properly guarding machinery should not be held sufficient to materially limit the purpose of the act. The case of Foster v. International Paper Co., 71 App. Div. 47 , 75 N. Y. Supp. 610 , is one where the accident occurred while the machinery was being installed for use.
Whether the court was right in assuming that the plaintiff was entitled to have the jury consider the provisions of the statute as bearing upon the question of the defendant’s duty toward the plaintiff, or not, I do not think, upon the evidence in this case, that it should be said, as a matter of law, that the defendant furnished the plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to do his work.
Notwithstanding there were questions of fact in the case that required its submission to the jury, the trial court decided that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, and directed a new trial. It was held by this court in Larkin v. United Traction Co., 76 App. Div. 238 , 78 N. Y. Supp. 538 , in substance, that a judge presiding at a jury trial may set aside the verdict and direct a new trial although the case is one that was necessarily submitted to the jury, and in many cases even where the evidence given was sufficient to sustain the verdict. On the facts, the order for a new trial made by the court upon the judgment of the justice presiding at the trial as to the advisability of having the case presented to another jury must stand.
Order affirmed, with costs to abide the event. All concur; CHESTER, J., in result.
Cases cited
- Glens Falls Portland Cement Co. v. Travelers' Insurance 162 N. Y. 399 p. 531
- Shaw v. Union Bag & Paper Co. 76 App. Div. 296 p. 532
- Foster v. International Paper Co. 71 App. Div. 47 at 75 p. 532