Majority
Headnote
1. Police Officers—Preferring Charges—Verification.The relator, a patrolman, who had served about 10 years, was charged with conduct unbecoming an officer, in that on the 7th day of January, 1903, he had agreed to receive from one Meyer Steinbrink the sum of $25, and had promised, in consideration of such sum, to Testify in favor of one Samuel Selig in the trial of an action. Upon the hearing of this charge before one of the deputy commissioners
It is urged upon the part of the relator that the charge in this case was made by Meyer Steinbrinlc, and that under the provisions of rule 280, adopted by the commissioner of police under the authority of the Greater New York Charter, it -was necessary that the charge should have been made under oath. But the return to the writ shows that the charge was made by “Moses W. Cortright, chief inspector,” an officer provided for by section 276, c. 466, p. 118, of the Laws of 1901, and who is clearly a “subordinate officer” within the meaning of the rule referred to. The fact that such officer may have made the charge upon •information furnished by Meyer Steinbrinlc is of no importance. The rule and the statute are satisfied xvhen charges are made in writing (section 300, Greater Nexv York Charter, Laws 1901, p. 127, c. 466) b)' a subordinate officer of the police department, without verification, and the only question to be determined is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the determination reached by the deputy commissioner of police, whose authority to try the relator is not brought into question. We have examined the testimony, and we are persuaded that the result is supported by the evidence, and that the contention of the relator that “in making the determination a rule of law affecting the rights of the relator has been violated to the prejudice of the relator” is without force. This latter contention is based upon the assertion in the brief for the relator that it is alleged in the petition that the affidavits of Stein-brink and Selig “xvere considered and acted upon by the deputy commissioner in making his determination or decision as though the same had been offered in evidence,” and that this allegation was not denied in the return. We find no such allegation in the petition. The allegation of the petition is that the relator is informed and believes that the affidavits were considered, but the source of information and the grounds of belief are not disclosed, and no averment of fact is made which called upon the respondent for a categorical denial. In this respect the case differs from People ex rel. McGuire v. Monroe, 97 App. Div. 283 , 89 N. Y. Supp. 929 , wherein we recently held that, when the return to a writ of certiorari is silent as to material allegations of fact contained in the petition, the presumption is that the officers making the return intended to admit those allegations.
Even, however, if the allegation of the use of the affidavits were to be regarded as an allegation of the fact based upon information and belief, we do not regard it as of controlling importance in this case. The return states “that this return and the schedules hereto annexed contain, as commanded by said writ and directed by statute, all and singular, the proceedings had herein by the police department of the city of Nexv York.” The return shows upon its face charges made in the manner and form prescribed by the statute and the rules, followed by a formal-trial, in which both Steinbrink and Selig w7ere called as witnesses in support of the charges. This afforded the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine these men, and to point out any variations between their alleged affidavits and their testimony, and under the rule xvhich prevails in hearings of this character it need not control the result on appeal whether the deputy commissioner considered these alleged
The determination of the second deputy police commissioner being supported by the evidence, and no error appearing in the proceeding, the determination should be confirmed, with costs.