Majority
Headnote
1. Wills—Undue Influence—Burden of Proof.The evidence upon which it is argued by the contestants that the decedent was of so low an order of intelligence that she should be classed as an imbecile does not lead me to that conclusion. She was at the time of her death, on April 22, 1904, of the age of about 68 years. It had never been necessary for her to take practical control of business affairs. Her life had largely been spent in her home, and her interests were mainly those of her household and of her church and circle of social friends. For many years her mother was a bedridden invalid, and this circumstance, with the infirmities of her advancing age, discouraged social activities. She was very nearsighted. She was corpulent and moved about with some difficulty. Her teeth were bad. She had in her later years a trouble with her salivary glands not uncommon to aged people.- With no large or important interests, she found diversion in little things, and she was sometimes inquisitive. None of these things is at all inconsistent with a normal degree of intelligence, and they serve to explain nearly all of the circumstances proved by the contestants, and claimed to establish lack of testamentary capacity. The matters not thus covered are not important, and probable explanations are given or suggested by the evidence entirely consistent with average mental power. As furnishing much more than an offset to all of the testimony of alleged foolish or unconventional conduct of the decedent, a great number of her letters have been produced and offered in evidence both by the proponent and by the contestant. I do not recall any one of these letters, or any single sentence or phrase in any of them, which appeared to me, or which has been contended by counsel, to indicate any degree of insanity, imbecility, stupidity, or lack of a full, normal degree of intelligence. It may justly be said of them that they mainly contain observations concerning her health and personal comfort and her immediate surroundings and friends, and that they do pot deal with abstruse matters; but they also contain references to the business matters of herself and of her friends, and her observations on these subjects are not at all lacking in acuteness and vigor, and it is quite clear that she possessed a power of consecutive thought and of logical expression. Conceding that the letters are at least fairly good letters, the learned and earnest counsel for the contestants argues that an ability to write cleverly may be the result of an education which was in itself destructive to other valuable mental qualities. It may-be that an imbecile may be taught to copy words in a clear handwriting, or to repeat the words of his own or a foreign tongue, but he cannot be so instructed as to be able to think and to observe and to communicate his thoughts and observations
The peculiarity of this case is found in the fact that the propounded paper, if valid as a will, will operate to transfer title to a large sum of money, all of which was during the lifetime of the decedent bound by a trust for her benefit, the principal being withheld from her, and that the trustee, who had actual custody and control of the fund when the paper was executed, is named as a general legatee for $20,000, and as the residuary devisee and legatee, and, as such, will receive the larger part of the property.
The principles and the rule laid down in Matter of Will of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516 , 522, 523, have application, though some of the circumstances shown in that case are lacking here. The court in that case said that the relation in which the parties to a transaction stand to each other is often a material circumstance, and may of itself in some cases be sufficient to raise a presumption of the existence of undue influence. It was then added as follows:
“The rule to which we have adverted seems, however, to be confined to cases of contracts or gifts inter vivos, and does not apply, in all of its strictness, at least, to gifts by will. It has been held that the fact that the beneficiary was the guardian, attorney, or trustee of the decedent does not alone create a presumption against a testamentary gift, or that it was procured by undue influence. Coffin v. Coffin, 23 N. Y. 9 , 80 Am. Dec. 235 ; Post v. Mason, 91 N. Y. 539 , 43 Am. Rep. 689 ; Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 Pro. & Div. 462. The mere fact that the proponent was the attorney of the testatrix did not, according to the authorities cited, create a presumption against the validity of the legacy given by her will. But taking all the circumstances together— the fiduciary relation, the change of testamentary intention, the age and mental and physical condition of the decedent, the fact that the proponent was the draftsman and principal beneficiary under the will, and took an active part in procuring its execution, and that the testatrix acted without independent advice—a case was made which required explanation, and which imposed upon the proponent the burden of satisfying the court that the will was the free, untrammeled, and intelligent expression of the wishes and intentions of the testatrix.’’
Following this decision, I am of opinion that a case was made here which imposed upon the proponent in this case the burden of satisfying the court that the propounded will of Madame de Vaugrigneuse “was the free, untrammeled, and intelligent expression of her wishes and intentions.”
It will be remembered that the decedent had a perfect right to prefer Mr. Carpenter to her first and second cousins, and to give to him the whole of her estate, and that he had a right, by faithful service to her, or by delicate personal attentions, to win her esteem and her affection, and thus to create a testamentary intention in his favor in her mind. It will also be remembered that, if she had a wish and desire to benefit him by her will, there is no legal presumption, arising from his fiduciary relation to her, that such wish and desire was created by his fraud.
It was shown that Madame de Vaugrigneuse was fully informed as to her rights in the estate of her father, and knew that it would pass under her will. She was a party to the agreement made with
The circumstance that Madame de Vaugrigneuse did not prefer her next of kin to Mr. Carpenter in making division of her estate is not inconsistent with the facts shown in the evidence. She made provision for her cousin Mrs. Rutherfurd, and the fact that she did not desire to benefit others of that family appears in her letters on
The fact that Mr. Carpenter’s name was inserted in the testamentary paper of May 31, 1899, as residuary legatee by her wish and desire appears from the instructions for the preparation of the document, written wholly in the handwriting of Madame de Vaugrigneuse. This was directed to Mr. Carpenter, and is in pencil. Its very informality is evidence that it is her own act. The will of December 24, 1900, is a mere repetition as to this, and is evidence of a continued testamentary wish, after an opportunity for reflection lasting about 18 months.
The wills of May 31, 1899, and of December 24, 1900, were both of them drawn by Mr. Genet, and were both of them executed in his presence, after full and careful examination by her, with ample explanations. of their legal effect. It is true that Mr. Genet was selected by Mr. Carpenter, and that he had had business relations with Mr. Carpenter. It would have been more satisfactory if some attorney unknown to Mr. Carpenter had been selected by Madame de Vaugrigneuse, but I do not understand this to be essential. The question in each case is as to whether the paper has been honestly prepared in accordance with the wishes of the testatrix, and duly executed by her with an intelligent understanding of its meaning and effect. Mr. Genet had been employed to prepare an opinion as to the rights of Madame de Vaugrigneuse and Mrs. Stout in the Aquila Giles Stout estate, and his investigations had practically been concluded at the time of the execution of the will of May 31, 1899, though his formal opinion was not completed until August following. He was peculiarly well qualified to explain facts to Madame de Vaugrigneuse, then fresh in his mind. He was subjected to a searching cross-examination by eminent counsel, and the impression he left upon my mind was entirely favorable as to his ability to perform the task imposed upon him, and as to his desire to perform it properly and honestly, and to testify truthfully concerning it. In the sense that he had no personal interest to serve in defrauding the decedent, he was an independent counsel.
I do not find any evidence in all of the bulky record upon which any finding could be based as to any act performed by Mr. Carpenter amounting to undue influence to procure the propounded paper to be made in his favor. I am, on the contrary, persuaded that the provisions contained in it are the “free, untrammeled, and intelligent expression of the wishes and intentions of the testatrix.”
No question has been made as to the sufficiency of the formal factum.
Costs of proponent will be paid out of the estate. Tax costs, and settle findings and decree admitting will to probate on notice.
Probate decreed.
Cases cited
- In re the Probate of the Will of Smith 95 N. Y. 516 at 522, 523 p. 366
- Post v. Mason 91 N. Y. 539 p. 366