Majority
Headnote
1. Default Judgment—Setting Aside—Proof of Service of Summons.This action was brought to foreclose a mortgage, and judgment was entered by default on October 21, 1904. Annexed to the judgment roll was an affidavit of the service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant Gallagher, who was the owner of the equity of redemption, in which the affiant swore that she had served the summons and complaint upon the defendant Gallagher, and that she knew the person served to be the person mentioned and described in the summons as one of the defendants in the action. On December 16, 1904, defendant Galla-, gher noticed a motion to set aside the judgment on the ground that the summons had never been served upon her. Her affidavit was corroborated by that of an employé, who swore that on July 16, 1904, a woman called at the place of business of the defendant Gallagher, and asked the deponent whether she was “Miss Callahan”; that deponent said she was not, that her name was “Miss Maher”; that after this woman had gone the deponent noticed a paper lying on the floor, which the deponent picked up, and found it to be a paper marked “Copy Summons and Complaint” in an action wherein Thomas F. O’Connell was plaintiff and Margaret C. Gallagher and others were defendants; that the deponent was the only person who saw this woman, and was with her all the time
Subdivision 4 of section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that personal service of the summons upon the defendant being a natural person must be made by delivering a copy thereof within this state to the defendant in person; and section 434 of the Code provides that proof of service must be made by affidavit. The affidavit of service in this case states that the deponent knew the person served to be the defendant Gallagher, but from the affidavits submitted on this motion it appears that this statement was untrue; that the affiant did not know the defendant Gallagher personally, her only knowledge being that before proceeding to serve the summons, the affiant was given a description of the defendant Gallagher to enable tier to identify her as the defendant. What this description was, or by whom it was given, does not appear; but the evidence is substantially undisputed that the summons and complaint was never delivered by the person serving the same to the defendant Gallagher. If we accept the affidavit of the employe of the defendant Gallagher, who saw the person who is alleged to have made the service, there was no service of the summons and complaint upon anybody, but it was left upon the floor of the defendant Gallagher’s apartment by the person pretending
The motion was denied upon the ground that it was absolutely certain that the defendant Gallagher was apprised of what was going on, and that, as all that the Code requires is that the process shall be personally given to the defendant, and left with her, it makes no difference in whose employ a person is who made the service; that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the defendant satisfied every requirement of the Code; and that, as the-defendant Gallagher had been guilty of gross and inexcusablelaches in deliberately refraining from moving to set the service-aside, relying upon the supposed invalidity of any judgment which might be entered, the motion should have been denied. I do not. think this correctly states the requirements of the Code. The fact-that the summons and complaint is found upon the floor of a house or in the street by a defendant in an action, or is delivered-to a defendant in the action by one so finding it, is not the service-that the Code requires, and defendant is under no obligation to* appear and answer because a copy of the summons in an action ini which she is named as a defendant comes incidentally into her possession, when there is no delivery of the summons as a service upon her. Under such circumstances the defendant was justified in waiting until the judgment was sought to be enforced. The question of laches, therefore, cannot be considered, as the defendant had the legal right to have this judgment set aside at any time upon it appearing that it had been entered without actual service of the summons. The proof by affidavit of the service of a summons required by the Code must be the affidavit of one who-has some personal knowledge that the person served was the defendant in the action, or at least some proof from which such: knowledge can be inferred. A judgment entered without personal service of the summons is void as against the defendant who has not been served, and, as it appears that the defendant Gallagher was not served, I think this judgment was void, and that the person against whom it purported to have been granted was entitled to have it vacated upon presenting to the court the fact that the summons had not been served upon her. The only case which sustains such a service is Hilton v. Thurston, 1 Abb. Prac. 318 . That motion was denied because it was an irregularity to serve the summons upon the defendant’s bookkeeper, and not upon the defendant, but such, we think, is not the result of such an attempted service of the summons. It was not an irregularity, but a nullity
Our conclusion is that the order appealed from must be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion granted, with $10 costs.
PATTERSON, McLAUGHLIN, and LAUGHLIN, JJ., concur.
I do not think that there is a particle of proof that the summons and complaint have ever been served. The person who claims to have made the service admits having committed perjury in the affidavit of service. Hence no reliance
whatever can be placed upon anything else sworn to by her.