Dolan v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co.

The plaintiff’s intestate was in the employ of the defendant engaged in constructing a safe deposit vault in a building on the corner of Sixteenth street and Union Square, in the city of New York, when, on the morning of June 4, 1903, the plaintiff’s intestate, with other employés of the defendant, commenced work in the construction of this vault they found that certain steel plates had been temporarily put in place by other employés of the defendants, and the plaintiff’s intestate and a fellow workman named Golding started to put in the permanent screws which were to hold these plates, in place. As thus engaged, two of these plates fell over, injuring the two men at work, and the plaintiff’s intestate subsequently died as a result of the injuries he then sustained. The men who were injured had been engaged in working at their vaults 11 or 12 days before the accident. The side of the vault upon which the men were at work was constructed of four upright steel plates, one of which was screwed to the doorway or entrance to the vault, and one to the opposite corner, and these two plates were formerly fastened in place. Between these two upright 'plates there were placed two upright plates which should have been temporarily secured by what were called “fish plates,” or small pieces of steel fastened to the two corner plates and the two middle upright plates, so that the middle plates should be held in place by the fish plates. These upright plates rested on top of the angle iron at the bottom of the vault. The method of construction was to place horizontal plates inside of these vertical plates, and screw them to the upright plates which would form the side of the vault. When the plaintiff’s intestate went to work on the morning of June 4th the two corner vertical plates had been securely fastened in place. The two middle vertical plates were also in place, and a horizontal plate had been placed in position at the bottom of these upright plates. The plaintiff’s intestate and his associate had to put bolts through the horizontal plate into the upright plates. To do this it was necessary that the holes in the plates should coincide, and it was found necessary to move the horizontal plates. This was done by what was called drifting the horizontal plates by means of a pin which was put through the hole in the horizontal plate into the screw hole in the vertical plate and moving the horizontal plate so as to bring the two holes opposite to each other, and then to insert the screws. As they were thus attempting to drift the horizontal plate, the two middle plates fell over. The plaintiff’s intestate’s associate testified that when he went to work he saw the horizontal plate in place; that he did not look to see whether the upright plates had been fastened ór not, but that, seeing the horizontal plate in place, he started in to screw them to the upright plates; that, so far as the witness knew, when he and the plaintiff’s intestate went to work, these'plates were not fastened in position at all by-anything; that, if any-qf the fish plates had.been removed before they went to work, the witness could have seen it by looking; that neither plaintiff’s intestate nor the witness had anything to do with placing the upright plates in position; that other men employed by the defendant did that work; that ‘there was a foreman

It is quite clear that this testimony was incompetent.' The-only negligence which was complained of, and upon which the plaintiff sought to obtain a verdict, was the failure to furnish, set' screws. To allow this question in effect allowed a workman employed upon work who' had set in place the plates that fell to testify that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. Whether or not the tools and appliances supplied by the defendant was a compliance with the duty that the master owed to his employés was the question- to be determined by the jury, and the facts should have been, placed before the jury, ánd they should have been left to determine whether the appliances- furnished by the defendant -were safé or otherwise. Expert testimony of this character has been uniformly condemned

“Upon the trial of the action the main issue to be determined by the jury was whether the Buffalo belt fastener was suitable and safe for fastening the belt in question, and the. plaintiff was permitted, against the objection of the defendant’s counsel, to ask several of his witnesses their opinion as to their safety and fitness. We think these questions were objectionable. A sample of this belt fastener was produced before the jury, and also a piece of-belt showing how the fastener was used. Its size and mode of use were apparent to the jury. It was cómpétent for the plaintiff to prove the strain to which it would be subjected, its liability to break, and all the experiences of persons who had used it; and thus all the facts could be placed before the jury, from which they could determine whether or not it was a suitable and safe belt fastener. It cannot be proper to have the issue determined by the opinions of experts, however skilled and experienced they may be. The facts should be placed before the jury, and they should be left to determine whether the belt fastener was safe or otherwise.”

In Dougherty v. Milliken, 163 N. Y. 527 , 57 N. E. 757 ; the opinion of experts upon such questions was held inadmissible, as it was to be the province of the jury, not of the experts, to determine the question. See, also; Winters v. Naughton, 91 App. Div. 80 , 86 N. Y. Supp. 439 . But assuming that expert testimony upon this subject would have been admissible, there was no evidence that the witness was an expert, so that his opinion would have been competent. Upon his direct examination he testified that he had been an ironworker for 18 years; that he had been assistant foreman on one job for Remington & Sherman in the same kind of work; that he had been working as a journeyman on that before, doing that kind of work, and had been engaged in that kind of work for years. He wa.s not examined as to the kind of tools that he had used; whether or not these set screws were in common use or had been used on the work in which he had been engaged; nor was it shown that he had any special knowledge upon the subject which was superior to that of the jury or any other intelligent man; and when the defendant objected to his giving his opinion upon the ground that he was not qualified as an expert the ruling of the court that he would allow the defendant to bring out his qualification upon cross-examination was a reversal of the rule which requires that, before a witness can be examined as an expert, the party calling him must show him qualified, and not throw the burden upon the party .objecting to the testimony of showing that he was not qualified. But it conclusively appeared upon cross-examination that the witness was not an expert. He testified that he could not say how many weeks he had been engaged in vault construction prior to the accident; that he was engaged about five weeks before the accident at the Broad Exchange by the firm of Remington & Sherman, and that that was all the work he ever did on vault construction prior to the happening of this accident. The only qualification as an expert, therefore, was that he had been engaged for five or six weeks-in constructing two other vaults. There was certainly nothing in this experience to justify him in determining whether or not set screws were necessary to safely construct a vault Of this.character.

The complaint alleges a violation of the employer’s liability act (chapter 600, p. 1748, of the Laws of 1902), and a notice was duly served upon the defendant to comply with the provisions of that act; but it is quite clear that the proof did not bring the case within the provisions of that act. There was no evidence to show that this accident had happened by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer, intrusted with and exercising superintendence, whose sole or principal duty was that of superintendence, as provided by subdivision 2 of section 1 of that act. There, was no evidence that the foreman or any superintendent had any knowledge of the condition of these plates, had given any directions about them, was present at the time of the accident and directed the men to go to work, or that the accident can be in any way attributed to any negligence of the foreman, or any person engaged in supervising or superintending the work. So far as appears, the accident

I think, therefore, that the judgment should be reversed, and a new; trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur.