Majority
Headnote
1. Municipal Coubt—Jubisdiction—Action fob Assault.The gravamen of the cause of action set forth in the complaint is an alleged assault made by the defendant, and so the action is for assault, and under the statute the Municipal Court is without jurisdiction. Section 1, Municipal Court Act (Laws 1902, p. 1487, c. 580); Fister v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 30 Misc. Rep. 430 , 62 N. Y. Supp. 467 . It does not appear in Hart v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 34 Misc. Rep. 522 , 69 N. Y. Supp. 906 , that the attention of the appellate court was called to the question of jurisdiction. At the trial there was evidence that plaintiff, while a passenger on defendant’s car, was assaulted by defendant’s conductor. A complaint could have been framed according to this evidence against the defendant for damages for breach of contract, and of such an action the Municipal Court would'have had jurisdiction, for the assault, according to the evidence, was not that of the defendant, but solely that of the conductor, for it did not appear that the conductor acted in the course of his work, and within the scope of his employment. There is an implied contract on the part of a common carrier that its employes will not subject the passengers to unlawful violence, and when an employe does so subject a passenger he has a right of action for breach of contract, in which compensation for the injuries caused by the assault will ordinarily be the measure of damages. In view of the fact that all evidence bearing upon the doings of the plaintiff and the conductor at the time in question which the parties were able to present was received, and that, according to the justice of the case, without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect the merits, the complaint can be amended so as to conform to the proof, and that the amendment will be in support of the judgment, the complaint is amended accordingly, and the judgment
Concurrence
SCOTT, P. J., concurs.
(concurring). The plaintiff alleged that on or about September 5, 1904, he was a passenger of the defendant for hire, and, while such, the defendant, by and through its agents, servants, and employés, wrongfully, unlawfully, and forcibly assaulted him. Literally this is within the inhibition of subdivision 14 of section 1 of the Municipal Court act (Laws 1902, p. 1489, c. 580), and not within the jurisdiction of that court. But in Hines v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. R. Co., 75 App. Div. 391 , 78 N. Y. Supp. 170 , upon an oral complaint for personal injuries, amplified by particulars to the effect that the plaintiff boarded a car of the defendant and tendered his fare, that the conductor refused to take it, and without cause or provocation assaulted the plaintiff, it was held that "the cause of action was founded upon the contract between passenger and carrier, and the liability of the defendant arose from the breach thereof,” and was not within the purview of subdivision 2 of section 1364 of the Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, p. 579, c. 466). In deference thereto, and under similar pleading, I am of opinion that the judgment herein should be affirmed, without resort to further refinement of interpretation.
Cases cited
- Fister v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. 30 Misc. Rep. 430 p. 637
- Shirtcliffe v. Wall 68 App. Div. 375 p. 638
- Hawkes v. Burke 34 Misc. Rep. 189 p. 638