Majority
Headnote
1. Principal and Agent—Poweb oe Attorney—Death of Principal—Termination of Authority of Attorney.This action was brought to recover a certain sum of money deposited by the plaintiff’s intestate with the defendant. After the money sought to be recovered had been deposited, plaintiff’s intestate executed to one George Thoma a power of attorney, appointing him her attorney to deposit for her in such banks as he saw fit any moneys belonging to her, and conferring upon him authority to draw, in her behalf and for her use, any such moneys so deposited or already on deposit by her. This power of attorney was delivered to the defendant, and the account thereafter designated as “Julia Huf, George Thoma, Attorney.” On the 14th of September, 1900, Julia Huf died intestate, and on the day following her decease Thoma presented the bankbook issued in connection with such deposit, together with a draft signed by him as attorney for her, to the defendant, and it paid to him a portion of the moneys, and upon like presentation and order,' within a few days thereafter, it paid him the balance. Thoma did not disclose to the defendant that Julia Huf was dead, and when it made these payments it did not know that fact. Notwithstanding the apparent harshness of the rule, therefore, it must be conceded, under a long line of authorities, that if the power given to Thoma to draw the money was not coupled with an interest, his authority ceased upon the-death of his principal, and a payment thereafter made to him did not bind the estate of his principal, although the defendant was not aware of the death at the time of making the payment. Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y. 600 , 21 N. E. 985 ; F. L. & T. Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284 , 34 N. E. 784 , 36 Am. St. Rep. 696 ; Hoffman v. Union Dime Savings Inst., 95 App. Div. 329 , 88 N. Y. Supp. 686 . Kelley v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 180 N. Y. 171 , 72 N. E. 995 , relied upon by the 'respondent, is not an authority to .the contrary. In that case no agency was involved, but rather what was or was not due care in the examination of a signature. The defendant, however, insists that it established up-,
The case was before this court on a former appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff ( 95 App. Div. 329 , 88 N. Y. Supp. 686 ), and we then held that error had been committed in rejecting the evidence of Thoma as to personal transactions and communications had by him with the plaintiff’s intestate, and ordered a new trial for that reason. Upon such new trial, resulting in the judgment for defendant from which the present appeal is taken, Thoma testified to con-' versations and transactions had with the intestate and alleged agreements made by her which the defendant insists establishd the fact that Thoma had the right to draw the moneys on deposit, and that a verdict of the jury in his favor was justified.
Many errors are alleged to have been committed, harmful to the plaintiff, in the course of the trial, but inasmuch as we are of the opinion that a new trial must be granted because the verdict is against the weight of evidence, and because there was no such clear and satisfactory proof as is required to establish a power, coupled with an interest, or a trust, or a gift of the moneys on deposit, a consideration of them is unnecessary, for they may not occur on a subsequent trial.
It is quite apparent from the evidence that there was no such .consideration for the power to draw the moneys as is required to constitute a power coupled with an interest irrevocable and incapable of being revoked by the death of the principal. There was evidently no idea on the part of Mrs. Huf that she was giving the power of attorney to Thoma as security for moneys advanced or services performed by him. She had had trouble with her former agent; she desired another. She had confidence in Thoma, who was the husband of her favorite niece. He performed small services, and, as he says, advanced to her from time to time small sums of money, but neither he nor she apparently believed that, in the execution of the power of attorney and the delivery of the bankbook to him, she intended to pledge the moneys on deposit with the defendant for the payment either of services rendered or moneys advanced. The rule is well settled that, in order that a power of attorney shall survive the death of the principal, it must be given on consideration, and there must be vested in the donee some estate, right, or interest in its subject-matter. Terwilliger v. Ontario C. & S. R. R. Co., 149 N. Y. 86 , 43 N. E. 432 ; Knapp v. Alvord, 10 Paige, 205, 40 Am. Dec. 241 .
Nor does the evidence satisfactorily establish the creation of a trust in the fund on deposit for proper burial and the saying of masses. While such a trust might be created by parol, delivery of the money or its equivalent for that purpose in the lifetime of the creator of the trust is an essential element. Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451 , 2 N.
The judgment and order appealed from must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Weber v. Bridgman 113 N. Y. 600 p. 1046
- Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Wilson 139 N. Y. 284 p. 1046
- Kelley v. Buffalo Savings Bank 180 N. Y. 171 p. 1046
- Terwilliger v. Ontario, Carbondale & Scranton Railroad 149 N. Y. 86 p. 1047
- Gilman v. McArdle 99 N. Y. 451 p. 1047
- Wadd v. Hazelton 137 N. Y. 215 p. 1048
- Beaver v. Beaver 117 N. Y. 421 p. 1048