Majority
Headnote
1. Bankruptcy—Discharge of Bankrupt—Sufficiency of Schedule.Joseph Kaufman and Leopold Oppenheimer recovered a judgment against the appellants on February 12, 1885, which judgment was duly docketed in the county clerk’s office of New York county on the same day. On July 19, 1899, the judgment debtors were duly discharged in bankruptcy and upon such discharge they move to cancel the judgment.
In the schedules filed in the bankrupt proceedings the judgment creditor is referred to as “Joseph Kaufman, Bond street, New York City,” and the notices required by the bankrupt law to be sent were sent to that address. It seems that Oppenheimer, one of the judgment creditors, died some years before the judgment debtors were adjudicated bankrupts, and that Kaufman, the other judgment creditor, was alive at the time the bankrupt proceedings were commenced. The name of the judgment creditor, Kaufman, was in the directory, down to the year 1899, as residing at No. 12 West Eighty-Third street, New York. An examination of the judgment roll would have disclosed the names of two judgment creditors, and
“A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as * * * (3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance with the name of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt unless such creditors had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy.”
I think that the name of the surviving partner, the creditor, was correctly scheduled, and the evidence shows that he had actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy and made no opposition to the discharge. If Oppenheimer had been alive at the time that the bankrupt proceedings were instituted, it is quite probable that his right would not have been cut off by the discharge, as he was not named as the creditor; but as he had died before the bankrupt proceedings were commenced, and the debt had vested in the surviving partner, I think it was sufficient to schedule the name of the surviving partner as the creditor, and, the surviving partner having had actual notice of the pendency of the bankrupt proceedings, the debt was discharged under the provisions of the bankrupt law, to which attention has been called.
I think the order appealed from should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion granted.
O’BRIEN, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN and LAUGHLIN, JJ„ concur. PATTERSON, J., dissents.