Majority
Headnote
1. Costs—Parties Liable—Assignors—Proceedings to Charge—Practice.The plaintiff, as assignee of Louis Siff, Max Siff. and Moses L. Siff, composing the firm of Louis Siff & Bros., brought an action in the Municipal Court for the Seventh District, Borough of Manhattan, against the defendant to recover the sum of $72 for its alleged failure as a common carrier to transport and deliver within a reasonable time certain merchandise. Such proceedings were had that the defendant obtained judgment for costs against the plaintiff, taxed at $111. The judgment was docketed in the office of the clerk of the Municipal Court and the time for plaintiff to appeal has expired. A transcript of said judgment was filed, and said judgment was docketed in the New York county clerk’s office. Thereafter an execution was issued, and execution returned unsatisfied. This proceeding was instituted against the assignors of said claim to charge them with the costs under section 3247 of the Code of civil procedure which provides:
“Where an action is brought in the name of another by a transferee of the cause of action, or by any other person, who is beneficially interested therein, * * * the transferee or other person so interested, is liable for costs, in the like cases and to the same extent as if he was the plaintiff; and where costs are awarded against the plaintiff, the court may by order, direct the person so liable to pay them.” ,
The proceeding resulted in the order appealed from, which, inter alia, provides:
“That said Louis Siff, Max Siff, and Moses L. Siff, composing the firm of Louis Siff & Bros., as the persons who brought the aforesaid action, entitled ‘Philip Friedman, Plaintiff, against Metropolitan Steamship Company, Defendant.’ and as the persons who were beneficially interested in the recovery therein, be, and they each are hereby, directed to pay « * * the costs recovered * * * against * * * the plaintiff in this aforesaid action, amounting to the sum of $111.30. * * *”
Upon the merits, namely, that the appellants were the persons who were beneficially interested in said suit, the evidence fully sustains the action of the learned court in making the order at bar. It is necessary, therefore, to consider only the questions raised as to practice, jurisdiction, and technical requirements.
There is, however, one objection urged which is of weight. In pleading or proving a judgment of a court of limited or special jurisdiction, the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction to render the judgment must be fully set forth, or every fact necessary to confer jurisdiction to render judgment in the action must be recited. Section 533 of the Code allows an alternative:
“In pleading a judgment or other determination of a court or officer of special jurisdiction, it is not necessary to state the facts conferring jurisdiction ; but the judgment or determination may be stated to have been duly given or made.”
The moving papers do not set forth the necessary jurisdictional facts, nor do they comply with the Code provision cited. In Werbelovsky v. Michael, 106 App. Div. 138 , 94 N. Y. Supp. 156 , the learned Appellate Division in the Second Department set aside an injunction in a judgment creditor’s action upon a Municipal Court judgment upon this precise point, stating:
“The mere fact that, a judgment was rendered in the Municipal Court in his favor and against said defendant does not establish his right to maintain the action; and there is no presumption that the court had jurisdiction” (citing Frees v. Blyth, 99 App. Div. 541 , 91 N. Y. Supp. 103 ).
Dor this reason the order must be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, with leave to renew the application upon proper papers to the court below. All concur.
Cases cited
- Marvin v. Marvin 78 N. Y. 541 p. 333
- Frees v. Blyth 99 App. Div. 541 p. 333