Majority
Headnote
1. Carriers—Carriage of Goods—Connecting Carriers.The plaintiff claims to have delivered freight in good condition to the defendant the Chicago, Milwaukee & St Paul
The complaint alleges that the defendant “the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company carried the goods and delivered the same to the defendant the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company some time in the month of March or early part of April in the year 1904 at one of-its connecting points with the road of the defendant the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company.” The answer of the Central Company, after admitting that it is a domestic railroad corporation and a common carrier of goods, “denies, upon information and belief, each and every allegation of the complaint, charging fault, carelessness, and negligence on the part of the defendant, its agents, servants, and employés,” and closes with the usual prayer. The allegations that the two roads are connecting carriers and that the goods were delivered by the St. Paul road to the Central must therefore be deemed to be admitted, for it is apparent that only those allegations of the. complaint are denied which charge fault, carelessness, and negligence, and the allegation quoted charges neither.
The answer of the St. Paul road allegés affirmatively that:
“This defendant delivered said goods and personal property to the defendant the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, and that when so delivered they were in the same condition as they were when received by this defendant, and that any loss or damage to said goods was caused while in transit on the roads controlled by the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, and not while in transit by any road controlled by this defendant.”
It was established, therefore, by the pleadings themselves, that as-far as the law of liability as between and against connecting common carriers is concerned these two defendants were connecting carriers. The proof offered by the plaintiff tended clearly to establish that when the goods were delivered to the St. Paul road at Milwaukee they were in good condition, and that when they were seen by the plaintiff at the freighthouse of the defendant the Central road they were badly damaged. In this state of the proof, the presumption arose that they were delivered to the Central road in good condition, and the damage, if any, occurred while they were in the possession of that defendant. The rule has been correctlv stated thus:
“Where the last carrier delivers the shipment to the consignee in an injured condition, the presumption is that the injury occurred on its line. A consignment in good order when delivered to the initial 'line is presumed to remain so.” 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 625.
And again, in different language:
“In the case of a mere injury to the goods, no failure to deliver being shown, if the last carrier is sued for the damage resulting from the injury, the burden of proof will be upon it to show that the goods were delivered by it in the same condition in which they were received by it; the presumption being that the goods remained in the same state when delivered to it as when originally shipped.” Id. 651, 652.
Applying this rule to the case at bar, it is clear that the nonsuit as to the defendant the St. Paul Company was properly granted; for, in the absence of direct proof showing in whose possession the goods actually were injured, the presumption arises that they were delivered to the last connecting carrier in good order, and this fact would, of course, absolve the St. Paul Company. Bearing in mind that common carriers are insurers while acting as such, the presumption that these goods were delivered to the Central Company in good order, coupled with the proof that they were brought to its freighthouse at the end of the journey in damaged condition, establishes a prima facie case against the Central Company¡ which imposed upon it the burden of showing some facts which might constitute a defense. The rule rests upon the recognized principle in the. law of evidence, by which .the burden of proof of a negative averment is cast upon a party purely because of his better ability to adduce proof upon the subject. Smith v. New York Central R. R. Co., supra.
The evidence of value was not as satisfactory as might be wished; but we are of the opinion that there was clearly some competent evidence upon this question, which called for its consideration upon the merits of the controversy.
The judgment should be affirmed as to the respondent the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, with costs, and reversed as to the defendant the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, and a new trial ordered; costs .to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Smith v. New York Central Rail Road 43 Barb. 225 p. 827
- Canfield v. Baltmore & Ohio Railroad 75 N. Y. 144 at 148 p. 827
- Fox v. Wabash Railway Co. 16 Misc. Rep. 370 p. 827
- Myerson v. Woolverton 9 Misc. Rep. 186 p. 827