Majority
Headnote
1. Railroads—Injuries at Crossings—Contributory Negligence—Question for Jury.The plaintiff’s husband, Dr. Hilbert B. Tingley, while endeavoring to cross in front of, or while attempting to board,
Taking the view most favorable to the plaintiff, the case was properly one for the jury. The situation was much like that in the case of Mackay v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 75 , where the crossing was at grade and unprotected by a flagman, and the defendant had piled
In the recent case of Cranch v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 107 App. Div. 341 , 95 N. Y. Supp. 169 , where the plaintiff attempted to cross in front of an approaching train which she rightfully assumed would stop at the station, but did not, a situation much like that presented in the case at bar, Mr. Justice Jenks, writing the prevailing-opinion on the affirmance of the judgment for the plaintiff, says (page 342 of 107 App. Div. and page 171 of 95 N. Y. Supp.) :
“I think that the plaintiff was not chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law in assuming that the approaching train would not continue on its way up to the point where she attempted to cross. She is entitled to the most favorable inferences. Smith v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 177 N. Y. 224 , 69 N. E. 427 .”
I dissented in the Cranch Case solely because the plaintiff, after seeing the approaching train, and being able to cross in safety, deliberately turned her back to the train and made a detour which brought her into collision with it.
The learned counsel for the appellant earnestly argues that error was committed in the admission of evidence that the doctor had a pass from the defendant. The following quotation from the record will make this clear:
“Peter H. Woodward, called as a witness for the defendant, duly sworn, testified (direct examination by Mr. Beecher): I am in the employ of the Long Island Railroad, in the express department. This signature on this card is mine. Q. Did you in January have anything to do with regard to "issuing passes on the Long Island Railroad? A. Yes, sir. That was one of my duties. Q. Do you know whether or not a pass was issued to Dr. Hilbert B. Tingley, in January, 1903? (Objected to as immaterial and irrelevant. The Court: Objection overruled. Mr. Goodrich: I except.) A. Yes, sir; it was issued around the 1st of January, or previous to that. This is a copy of the pass which was issued. The conditions on the back was (sic) contained on the pass issued to Dr. Tingley. (Mr. Goodrich: I object to that on the same grounds as immaterial and irrelevant, and move to strike the answer out. The Court: The objection is overruled. The motion to strike out is denied. Mr. Goodrich: I except.) Defendant’s Counsel: I offer in evidence the pass; they having failed to present the original. (Objected to as immaterial and irrelevant, and on the further ground that it is not shown that that pass was in the possession of Dr. Tingley at the time of this accident, or that he was using it. The Court: I do not consider that it is material or relevant. I will sustain the objection, and give defendant an exception, and permit it to be marked for identification. Marked Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)”
The doctor was not a passenger because he had not reached the station. June v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 153 Mass. 79 , 26 N. E. 238 . He had not even reached the defendant’s premises; being on Holland avenue when struck, but, even if he had been a passenger, according to another Massachusetts authority, a provision in the pass exempting the company from liability for injuries resulting from the negligence of its agents and servants is of no effect as against a statute by which damages are given to the widow and next of kin of a passenger whose
"It is clear that a person may at one time be an employs when passing over a railroad, and at another time in passing over the same road be a passenger, though continuing all the while, in a popular sense, in the employment of the railroad company. The ticket on which the plaintiff’s intestate was riding was not a mere gratuity. It furnished part of the consideration by which he was induced to enter the employment of the defendant.”
The objectionable testimony was admitted, as appears above, over the repeated objection of the plaintiff’s counsel, who duly excepted and whose motion to strike out was denied. While the learned trial justice sustained the. objection to the admission of-a copy of the pass, the error was not thus cured, for all the earlier testimony as to the pass was in, and must have had upon the jury an effect quite prejudicial to the plaintiffts case.
I also think the court erred in allowing the defendant to prove the contract by which the deceased had agreed to attend surgically the employes, and passengers of the defendant when called upon so to do by its officers and agents. Clearly such employment did not make him a fellow servant, and at the time of the accident he was going to attend one of his own patients.
For these reasons, I think the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.
. Judgment and order reversed, and new trial granted; costs to abide the event. All concur, except BARTLETT, J., not voting.
Cases cited
- Mackay v. New York Central Railroad 35 N. Y. 75 p. 866
- Cranch v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 107 App. Div. 341 p. 867
- Smith v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 177 N. Y. 224 p. 867