Cramsey v. Sterling

The action is brought to set aside a conveyance-of the plaintiff’s interest in certain real estate owned and devised by Harriet Cramsey, deceased, and an assignment of his interest in her estate to the defendant, Charles A. Sterling, on the ground that he-was induced to execute the deed and assignment by false and fraudulent representations. The plaintiff claims to be the grandson of said Harriet Cramsey, and the son and only heir at law of her son Benjamin F. S. Cramsey, who survived her and died on the 2d day of July,.

The will of said Harriet Cramsey- directed her executors to divide her residuary estate into five parts, and set aside and invest one of the shares and pay the net income thereof to the use of her son Benjamin F. S. Cramsey—designated in the will as Benjamin D. Cramsey—during his life, and upon his death she gave the principal “to his. children then living” and to the issue of any deceased child of his per stirpes; and, in the event of his dying without leaving children, or the issue of children him surviving, she gave the principal to his surviving brothers and surviving sisters and the issue of a deceased brother or sister per stirpes. The testator also left another son and two daughters, and she made a like provision for each of them and their issue. Her husband also survived her, and she directed that one of the shares be likewise set apart for his benefit during life, with the remainder over to her four children and their issue. The residuary estate has not been divided into five separate shares, as directed in the will. The decedent at the time of her death owned the premises situated at the northeast corner of Lexington avenue and Eighty-Fourth street, having a frontage on Eighty-Fourth street of 36 feet 8 inches, and extending in depth 102 feet 2 inches. The conveyance sought to be set aside is of the plaintiff’s interest in this parcel of land, which is claimed to-be one-fifth, subject to the life interest of his grandfather in the income of one-fifth part thereof. The action is defended on the ground that the execution of the deed and assignment was not procured by fraud, and also upon the ground that the plaintiff is not the lawful issue of the son of the testatrix.

The plaintiff did not solicit the purchase of his interest in either the land or the estate by his grantee and- assignee. The transfer of his interest was solicited by the latter. The deed prepared at the instance of Sterling, the grantee, who is a grandson of the testatrix and had every opportunity of obtaining information as to his relatives, contains the recital concerning the plaintiff, who was the party of the first part, “Edward Cramsey, commonly known as Edward Farrington, son of Benjamin F. S. Cramsey”; and the assignment, likewise prepared at the instance of the assignee, contains a recital that Benjamin F. S. Cramsey became entitled, under the will of Harriet Cramsey, to the income of a certain trust fund, the principal of which was. bequeathed to his surviving children or their issue, and that he died on the 3d day of July, 1902, “leaving him surviving Edward Cramsey, commonly known as Edward Farrington, his only child and heir at law,” who was, by virtue of said will, then entitled “to the principal of said trust fund as well as to certain other interests in and to the estate of said Harriet Cramsey.” The consideration recited in the deed is $1, and that recited in the assignment is $500. The entire consideration paid to the plaintiff for the execution of both instruments was $500. The plaintiff offered in the complaint to return it with interest from the 22d day of October, 1902, the day on which it was paid to him, and duly tendered the amount in open court during the

' Assuming the plaintiff to be the sole heir óf Benjamin F. S. .Cramsey,'the assignment transferred a claim to $133.70, his share of net rents collected and on hand, and he owned a one-fifth interest m the real estate then vested in possession, and a one-fourth interest in still another fifth, subject to the life use of his grandfather, who was then 83 years of age. The evidence as to the fair market value of the premises varies from $30,000 to $60,000, and they were mortgaged for $19,-000, leaving the equity worth from $11,000 to $41,000. One witness, the father of the'defendant, testified that at a forced or foreclosure sale the premises would not bring over $36,000 or $30,000, subject to a $19,000 mortgage. It is claimed that he meant that the equity on such a sale would only bring $7,000 or $8,000; but that is not entirely clear, and, even so, this was not a forced sale, and it was not to a party interested in the mortgage, and there is no evidence that a foreclosure action was threatened, or even that there -was a default in any payment secured by the mortgage. It thus appears, on the undisputed evidence, that the interest of the plaintiff in the estate and in the premises, assuming him to be the sole heir of said Benjamin F. S. Cramsey, as recited in the assignment and deed, was worth, even at a forced sale, about four times what he received, and the fair inference from all the testimony is that it was reasonably worth about ten times what he received. It is to be borne in mind that the defendant had no other interest in the premises or in the estate, and that since the assignment and deed his claim has been recognized to the full extent as the successor in interest to the sole heir of Benjamin F. S. Cramsey. The conveyance and assignment were solicited and executed on the assumption that the plaintiff was such sole heir. It is difficult to perceive on what legal theory the defendant may retain the fruits of the assignment and conveyance, if they were procured by fraud, and place upon the plaintiff, as a further condition precedent to his right to be restored to his former position, which would enable him to assert and establish his right and interest as against the claimants thereof, the burden of showing in this action that he is the legitimate son and sole heir of said Benjamin F. S. Cramsey.

Assuming, but without deciding, however, that this burden rested upon him, we are of opinion that he sustained it, not as matter of law, but by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The only evidence tending to show the contrary is the testimony of the defendant’s father, who, according to the testimony of the defendant, represented him in the investigation, as,to the existence of an heir to Benjamin, and accepting the identification of the plaintiff as such, and for some reason not satisfactorily explained, suggested that the assignment and conveyance run to the defendant, upon the ground that defendant “had better buy it, because some one had to buy that interest, and it would not look just right for him to buy it.” The defendant further testified, when asked what his father meant by that statement: “A man can 'use his own judgment in a question of that kind.” An uncle of the plaintiff on his mother’s side testified unequivocally that plaintiff's

The testimony of the defendant’s father is to the effect that he never heard of the marriage of his brother-in-law with plaintiff’s mother, and that at the time when, according to the other evidence in the case, they were living together as husband and wife with her parents, Benjamin was living elsewhere. When Brown first came to him, however, and suggested the existence of an heir to Benjamin, the father of the plaintiff, according to the testimony of Brown, he said: “If ever there was such a person I do not believe he is in existence now.” Yet he said to Brown, in substance, that, if he found such heir, he would give $500 for his interest, and for the defendant he subsequently accepted the proof of the identity of plaintiff as such heir and paid the consideration for the transfer and also paid Brown for his services.

Plaintiff’s mother held a paper which she evidently regarded as a valid certificate of marriage, certifying that she was .married to said Benjamin F. Cramsey according to the laws of the state of New York at West Farms, which was just across the bridge over the Harlem from where they lived, on the 18th day of November, -1877, and she showed this to her brother within a week of that date and of the time she began to cohabit with said Benjamin. This certificate was not in the form required by the statute to make it competent evidence of the marriage; but she kept it with her private papers as religiously as. if it was a valid document, and with it was found on her death a certificate of baptism, purporting to have.been made.by. “S. S. Weed, Pastor Second Avenue and 119th Street M.

The age of legal consent, for females to marry at that time was 14 years; and, according to the undisputed evidence,, the plaintiff’s mother was then 16 or 17 years .of age. The testimony of defendant’s father, even if accepted,-does not necessarily show that there was no marriage between Benjamin arid plaintiff’s mother, but it is somewhat inconsistent therewith. His testimony, however, is not convincing. It does not bear the impress of frankness and is inconsistent with his acts. He does not concede that he had any knowledge of acquaintance or intimacy between his brother Benjamin and plaintiff’s mother, and he professes ignorance alike of their marriage and of the birth of plaintiff. He testifies that to his personal knowledge his brother resided and was elsewhere, and he specifies the places, than at the residence of plaintiff’s mother’s people during all the time it is claimed, upon the other evidence in the case, that they lived and cohabited together there as husband and wife. Clearly, according to his testimony, the plaintiff had no interest in the estate or premises. The plaintiff was not aware of his.interest and was asserting no claim. It is not probable that, in these circumstances, the defendant’s father would have encouraged Brown to find plaintiff and open negotiations for the purchase of his interest for $500, on the theory and direct recital contained in the assignment and deed that he was the sole heir of Benjamin. Defendant’s father is also flatly contradicted by the testimony of the attorney of record'for the plaintiff, who testifies-to an admission to him of the marriage, and of the birth of plaintiff, and the expression of opinion, as he did to Brown, that the boy was dead. The evidence very satisfactorily shows that Benjamin was the father of the plaintiff—the trial court has in effect so found by finding that plaintiff did not know how to' spell his own name, Cramsey—and that this was well known to the relatives and neighbors. The only question open to serious argument is the marriage of the plaintiff’s parents. The evidence shows that plairitiff’s father was addicted to the use of liquor, and had served a term of six months on Blackwell’s Island on conviction of some crime, the nature of which is not disclosed by the record. In' these circumstances, it is not surprising that his parents separated, and it is not strange that the fathfer took nO' further interest in' the mother and child.- Nor is the evidence of the marriage impeached by the fact that the mother, on moving into a new neighborhood in another state, resumed her maiden .name and let her son take her family name also, as if by adoption by .her father, which was admitted upon the trial and óf which there is some indication in the record.

It appears that plaintiff has .never attended school, and can read .and write" only a-little. He was .allowed by -his mother" apd her parents, with whom he lived,, to grow, up in. ignorance. -.These facts are relied upon by the respondent, as .indicating the illegitimacy pf .the. plaintiff. We do not regard--therii as. significant .evidence qn that .point. -There is not a word of. testirporiy in this-record,.to impeach,.the chastity or respectability, of the plaintiff’s mother. -She ..never Resided, .outside

The remaining question, which, as already intimated, it would seem should be the only question, is whether there has been sufficient proof of fraud or mistake to warrant the rescission of the deed and assignment. It has been seen that the consideration was utterly inadequate, so much so as to give rise to a suspicion, at least, that the contracts are oppressive. It clearly appears that this uneducated young man, who was without business experience, relied entirely on the representations of his real estate agent, Dean, whom Brown, representing the defendant, set in motion. These representations were made to Dean by Brown, and, although the defendant may not have authorized them all, yet, for the purposes of this action to rescind, he is chargeable therewith and cannot retain the property, the transfer of which was induced by either false or fraudulent representations. Bedell v. Bedell, 37 Hun, 419 ; Page v. Krekey, 137 N. Y. 312 , 33 N. E. 311 , 21 L. R. A. 409 , 33 Am. St. Rep. 731 ; Green v. Roworth, 113 N. Y. 462 , 21 N. E. 165 ; Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124 , 41 N. E. 414 , 29 L. R. A. 360 , 49 Am. St. Rep. 651 .

Prior to the trial, which was on November 7, 1904, the defendant had received by virtue of the assignment and deed $750.81, as his share of net rents from the premises. Material representations were made to plaintiff, on which he relied, which were erroneous, if not fraudulent, in several particulars. It was represented that the interest was in his father’s instead of his grandmother’s estate; that his interest was so small that he possibly would not get anything out of it; that it was perishable; that the property was mortgaged for $20,000, which was high, and the

Taking the most charitable view of the conduct of Brown and Dean, the plaintiff was deceived by misrepresentations of material facts, is entitled to rescind on returning the amount paid and interest, which he has duly tendered, and to have the deed and assignment procured thereby canceled. Moreover, it is to be remembered that this is an action to rescind, not to reform a contract, where proof of fraud or mutual mistake is essential. It does not.matter whether the information upon which the plaintiff acted was fraudulent or not. It is sufficient that, without negligence on his- part, he was led to believe, and did believe, that material facts were different; and that there is no element of estoppel in favor of the defendant to lead the court to refrain from granting a rescission.

It follows that the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event. All concur.