Majority
Headnote
1. Rape — Corroboration op Female — Instructions—Necessity.The indictment charges that the crime was committed on the 21st day of July, 1904. The trial was had on the 24th day of October thereafter. The complaining witness, Jennie Herzog, was only 9 years of age. She lived with her parents and three brothers and three sisters on the upper floor of a tenement building known as Nos. 57 and 59 Pitt street, in the city of New York. Two of the' brothers were aged 16 and 14 or 12 years, respectively, and the other brother and áll the sisters were younger than Jennie. The defendant was born in Russia, had been in this country 13 or 14 years, spoke English, was 28 years of age, had boarded with the Herzogs the year before 6 months and1 at this time 4 months, and was employed as-a
■ It is undisputed that a policeman was summoned by the eldest boy, and that on the arrival of the officer Jennie’s father charged defendant
The defendant testified that he came in that night at 3 o’clock and took pillows, a sheet, and a quilt, and slept on the roof until 5, when he arose and went to his room and lay down again and fell asleep; that he was awakened by people running and holloing, and went to the door to see what was the matter, just as “they opened it on me”; that Jennie’s father said, “What did you do to my girl?” to which he replied, “I didn’t done nothing to "the kind”; and then he testified that the father said nothing to him, but the mother asked, “What did you done to my child?” and that he made answer, “I didn’t done nothing,” but that he didn’t know what she meant, and had to say something. He testified on his direct examination that a week or ten days before he was arrested he saw Jennie’s brother, 13 years old, having intercourse-with her twice, and admitted on cross-examination that he knew it was not right, but that he neither remonstrated with the children nor informed their parents; that he considered it none of his business, and never spoke of it, even to his lawyer or anybody, until upon the witness stand, and then says the reason he did not tell it when charged by the parents and when before the police court was that he forgot it. Three witnesses testified that defendant’s reputation for “peace and quietness and orderliness” was good.
The court, in instructing the jury, spoke of the blood found on the child as being fresh; and counsel for defendant excepted. The court thereupon assured the jury that any expression of opinion by the court upon the facts was inadvertent and should be disregarded, and that they were the exclusive judges of the facts. No other exception to the charge was taken.
If the jury believed the testimony of Jennie, the defendant committed the crime of which he has been found guilty. It is claimed that her
The learned counsel for the appellant urges a reversal on account of the omission of the court to instruct the jury that they could not convict on the testimony of the complaining witness, unless corroborated. The defendant was represented by counsel, and no suggestion was made that the jury might disbelieve the corroborating witnesses and at the same time believe the complaining witness, which is the only thing on which there was necessity for such instructions. The statute does not require the court to instruct the jury on this point. It merely declares, as a rule of law, that “no conviction can be had * * * for rape * * * upon the testimony of the female * * * -unsupported by other evidence.” Pen. Code, § 283. While it would be well for the court in all such cases to fully instruct the jury on this point, ! yet failure to do so should not be considered reversible error, when no request for such instruction is presented and it is not clear that such failure w-as prejudicial. It is scarcely conceivable that the jury would have convicted the defendant on the little girl’s testimony, if they disbelieved the corroborating testimony of her parents. Any reasonable man of average intelligence would, I think, accept the testimony of the girl and her parents, or reject it all. The corroboration was complete. The parents saw the evidences of the recent assault by, some one. The .child accused the defendant. He was there and had the opportunity, and when confronted he admitted it.
Such a crime committed on a child is unnatural and most revolting under any circumstances. One hesitate's to believe that an industrious young man, while apparently sober, could be guilty of such a horrible crime. But, when we recall the testimony of this defendant that he dis
Dissent
It follows that the conviction should be affirmed.
O’BRIEN, P. J., and PATTERSON and CLARKE, JJ., concur.
In view of the testimony of the physician called for the prosecution, together with the unsatisfactory character of the testimony of the principal witness for the prosecution, and the fact that her testimony was uncorroborated, I do not think this judgment should be allowed to stand. The jury were not instructed that the testimony of the child must be corroborated before they were justified in convicting the defendant, and, while there seems to have been no request for such instruction, in view of the character of this evidence, taken in connection with the failure of the court- to instruct the jury as to the necessity of such corroboration, justice requires that there should be a new trial.
I therefore dissent.