Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Insurance — 1 N.Y. St. Rep. 17

Majority

p. 17

Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co.^[1]

(Court of Appeals,

Filed February 9, 1886.)

Headnote

Fire insurance—Arbitration—Action—If arbitration fails through FAULT OF COMPANY, INSURED NEED NOT CONSENT TO SECOND ARBITRATION.

Where through the failure of defendant (the insurance company) to go on with an arbitration agreed upon it became ineffectual, and in the meantime, partly under orders of the city, the debris had been removed, and the defendant requested plaintiff to submit to a second arbitration, which he refused, and brought >his action: Held, that plaintiff having once consented to arbitrate, if the arbitration failed and came to an end from the fault of the defendants, the arbitration clause could not stand in the way of this action.

Albert G. McDonald, for appellant.

Patrick Ready, for respondent.

The plaintiff held a policy of insurance issued by the defendant' upon certain personal' property, and the property was destroyed by fire in July, 1882. The policy contained this clause:

“ The amount of sound value and of damage to the property may be determined by mutual agreement between the company and the assured; or, failing to agree, the same shall then, at the written request of either party, be ascertained by an appraisal of each article of personal property, or by an estimate in detail of a building, by competent and impartial appraisers, one to be selected by each party, and the two so chosen shall first select an umpire to act with them in case of their disagreement; and if the said appraisers fail to agree they shall refer the differences to such umpire; and the award of any two, in writing, under oath, shall be binding and conclusive as to the amount of such loss or damage, but shall not decide as to the validity of the contract, or any other question except the amount of such loss or damage.”

Among other things in its answer, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff and defendant failed to agree upon the damage occasioned by the fire, and that on or about the 11th day of August, 1882, it served upon plaintiff a written request that the amount of damages sustained by him from the fire should be ascertained and determined by appraisers, to be selected as required by the policy, and offered to select and appoint an appraiser for that purpose on its behalf, and

p. 18

that he wholly refused to submit to such appraisal, or appoint an appraiser for that purpose, and refused to comply with the terms and conditions of the policy in that respect. Upon the trial it appeared that the fire occurred on Sunday, the 30th of July; that on the next day the plaintiff notified the defendant of the fire and of the loss; and on the 2d day of August it requested an arbitration under the policy, and he assented; that thereupon he selected one De Andreau, and the defendant one Magnus, as arbitrators, and an agreement in writing was executed by the parties submitting the appraisal, of the damages to the arbitrators thus selected; and that the arbitrators failed to agree. The defendant gave evidence tending to show that it subsequently made plaintiff an offer to appoint a new arbitrator in the place of Magnus, and also that Magnus offered to unite with De Andreau in selecting an umpire, but that the plaintiff and De Andreau refused. The plaintiff, as a witness in his own behalf, gave evidence tending to show that, after the arbitrators failed to agree, he requested the defendant to appoint another arbitrator, and that he asked Magnus to agree with De Andreau in appointing an umpire, and they did not accede to his requests.

Under the arbitration clause it was the duty of each party to act in good faith to accomplish the appraisement in the way provided in the policy, and if either party acted in bad faith, so as to defeat the real object of the clause, it absolved the other party from compliance therewith; and if either party refused to go on with the arbitration, or to complete it, or to procure the appointment of an umpire, so that there could be an agreement upon an appraisal, the other party was absolved. A claimant under such a policy cannot be ■' tied up forever, without his fault and against his will, by an ineffectual arbitration. The evidence tended to show that the defendant failed and refused to go on with that arbitration. In the meantime, partly under the orders of the city authorities, the offensive debris and broken and injured articles about the plaintiff’s premises had, to a great extent, been removed, so that an appraisal had become to a large extent impracticable. There was some evidence tending to show, and from which a jury might have inferred, that the defendant was not acting in good faith to procure a speedy appraisal, and was interposing this clause in the policy for the purpose of forcing a compromise from the plaintiff. Upon all the evidence it was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether there was any breach of this clause in the policy on the part of the plaintiff, and the case should thus have been submitted to them.

After its refusal or neglect to go on with the first arbitration which had been agreed upon, on the 10th day of August

p. 19

thereafter, the defendant served upon the plaintiff another written request to arbitrate, and offered to select a person to appraise the damages on its part. To this offer plaintiff refused to accede, and there was evidence in the conduct of the defendant, in reference to the arbitration first agreed upon, and in the removal of the property damaged, tending to show that the refusal was justifiable. The defendant in its answer did not set up as a bar to the action the pending arbitration, or any conduct of the plaintiff in reference thereto, but simply alleged that the plaintiff, upon request, refused to enter into an arbitration as provided in the policy. This allegation was untrue. The plaintiff had entered into an arbitration, and was not bound to enter into a new one while that was pending, and, if that one failed from the fault of the defendant, he had discharged his whole duty under the arbitration clause, and was not bound to enter into a new arbitration agreement. The plantiff having once consented to arbitrate, if the arbitration failed and came to an end from the fault of the defendant, the arbitration clause could not stand in the way of this action.

The order should be affirmed, and judgment absolute entered against the defendant, with costs,

All concur.