p. 41avowed the act, and promised to put a stop to the cutting, and to pay for what had already been cut.” “To show that said Walter Phelps was the managing agent of the defendant in the purchase of its wood and coal, and was intrusted with the management of that entire department by the defendant.” “To show that it was solely for the purpose of obviating said difficulties and removing causes for complaint, and enabling defendant to have a longer time which to remove the wood, that it was authorized to cut and coal under the first contract; that the second contract was made and entered into between the parties on the 3d day of January, 18Y2, and offers to prove these facts by the declarations of defendant’s agent, Walter Phelps, made at the time.” “ To show that at the time the second contract was made the same reservations of timber for cord wood and lumber were made and intended between the parties in the second contract as in the first, and it was so understood and agreed; and plaintiff offers to show these facts by the declarations of the parties prior to and at the-time of making the contract ” To show that prior to the tune of making the second contract, the plaintiff’s assignor had made an agreement with Henry and Ephraim Alderman to saw the logs reserved in the first contract into timber, upon certain shares, and that defendant was aware of the existence of that contract at the time the second contract was made.”
All the evidence thus offered was objected to by the-defendant, mainly on the ground that all the oral negotiations between the parties were merged in the written contract, and that that could not be explained, contradicted or varied by parol. The referee sustained the objections, and excluded the evidence, and plaintiff excepted. Ho other proof being offered, upon motion of the defendant the referee dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed to the general term, and. from affirmance there, to this court.
James Lansing, for appellant.
JEsek Gowen, for respondent
The only question for our consideration is whether the evidence offered and excluded by the referee should have been received. We think the second contract, which fixes the rights of the parties, is perfectly cleat and unambiguous; and that, under it, the defendant acquired the right to all the hard wood upon the lands referred to therein. Under- the first contract the defendant was to cus sufficient wood for at least 100,00G bushels of coal in each
p. 42year, and was to pay therefor at the rate of $2.85 for each hundred bushels of coal, and the measurement of the coal was to be ascertained by the measurement of the cars, or by a coal-measuring box at the kilns; and Holcombe reserved the lumber and cord wood to be taken, under the circumstances and hr the manner particularly specified. The new contract was intended to accomplish the purchase outright • —that is, in bulk, at once and unconditionally—of all the wood described in the first contract. Now what wood was described in the first contract ? Clearly all the hard wood on the three parcels of land mentioned. Under the second contract it was optional with the defendant to take all the hard wood at the gross sum of $5,200, or at $1.25 per cord, the quantity to be estimated and thus ascertained by agreement.. Under the first contract it was optional with Holcombe to reserve or not the lumber mentioned. Was the defendant to pay the gross sum, $5,200, for the hard wood, leaving it still optional with Holcombe to make the reservation ? Was it to pay the gross sum. leaving Holcombe the right to reserve hard wood worth, in the tree, $2,500 ? Any reservation whatever of hard wood is clearly in conflict with the plain language of the last contract. That must be held to embody the agreement, as it speaks the language of the parties. There is neither patent nor latent ambiguity in the contract, and parol evidence was inadmissible to add to or take from the language used, and to give any other meaning to the contract than its language imports. There is no word or phrase therein which needs any explan ■ ation.
The language of the contract also includes in the sale the sprouts or young trees. They were not excepted, and it is neither impossible nor even highly improbable that they should be included, The defendant was bargaining for all the hard wood, and paying a gross sum therefor, and within the ten years the small trees would become much larger. It is not reasonable to suppose that parties making a contract to settle all doubts and to remove all difficulties would leave a chance for dispute over the size of growing small trees. We think there is no rule of law which would justify the reception of the evidence offered. If. by mistake or fraud, the written contract did not express the agreement of the parties, Holcombe should have had it reformed or corrected. As it is, it is a perfect answer to plaintiff’s claim.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. "
Ruger, Ch. J., Miller and Finch, JJ., concur; Rapallo, Andrews and Danforth, JJ., dissent.