Paul v. Travelers Insurance

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered upon a decision of the justice upon an agreed state of facts, a jury having been waived. The action was upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant to the intestate indemnifying to the amount of fifteen dollars per week for loss of time from accidental injuries suffered and in the case of death occasioned by injuries of a certain character agreeing to pay his legal representatives $3,000. While said policy was in force, the intestate died accidentally at a hotel in Hew York city from breathing, in his sleep, illuminating gas, which in some way escaped in his room. He was found dead in his bed, and it was evident that his death was caused by his unconscious breathing of such gas in his sleep. To sustain this judgment dismissing the complaint with costs, the defendant relies upon two conditions of the

The policy provides as follows: The defendant indemnifies “ against loss of time * * * from the happening of such accident and injury as shall independently of all other causes, immediately and wholly disable and prevent him from the prosecution of any and every kind of business by reason of bodily injuries effected * * * through external, violent and accidental means; or in the event of death, occasioned by bodily injuries received as aforesaid,” etc. By such policy it is further provided, that the “ insurance shall not extend to any bodily injury of which there shall be no external and visible sign upon the body of the insured; * * * nor by the taking of poison, contact with poisonous substances, or inhaling of gas, or by any surgical operation- or medical treatment; .nor to any case except where the injury is the approximate and sole cause of the disability or death.”

Was the death of the intestate caused by or through “ external, violent and accidental means” within the language of the policy? That it was accidental is found by the judge. But for the case of Hill v. Hartford Accident Ins. Go., 22 Hun, 187 , we should say the death was due to external and violent means as clearly as drowning or poison introduced into the system. The cause of the death came from the outside as surely as would a fatal rifle ball or water in case of drowning. The escape of gas into the room was violent in the same sense that would be the flow of water into a wrecked vessel. In either case, the external means constitute the cause which produces death. It is a violent death, produced by an external power, not natural. Some poisons, such as opium and chloral, produce no violent action upon the human system. The man who descends into a well of carbonic acid gas is killed with no greater violence, perhaps, than was the intestate. Yet in all these cases the result would be called a violent death.

Was there no external and visible sign upon the body of the insured of any bodily injury, and if so is that language in' the policy applicable in case of death or only to injuries through which weekly allowances are asked?

It would seem as though the dead body was an external and visible sign of an injury which must have caused the death. The injury may have been due to accident or disease, but the visible and recognized' evidence is present in the corpse.

But waiving that view we think the external and visible signs of bodily injury need exist only in cases of injuries which do not result in death. Where the insured claims loss of time by reason of injuries there must be some external and visible sign upon his body for the purpose of avoiding the false and fraudulent claims which might otherwise readily be imposed on the company by dishonest men. But no such protection is required in case of death. That can

We also think the words “inhaling of gas,” among the various provisions exempting defendant from liability, were used to designate those common uses of gas in dentistry, surgery, etc. The connection in which the words are used gives the same impression. The insurance shall not extend to a death caused “by the taking of poison^ contact with poisonous substances, or inhaling of gas, or by any surgical operation or medical treatment, eic. Evidently an exemption from death caused by a surgical operation was not broad enough to include the use of anaesthetics preparatory to the operation. It contemplated a voluntary and intelligent act by the assured, not an involuntary and unconscious act.

It is difficult to distinguish the case under consideration from Hill v. Hartford Insurance Co., supra, But the interpretation there given was by a divided court, and was as it seems to us so literal as to lose sight of the purpose and intent of the parties. The language used is capable of the construction given, but it leads to consequences which we cannot think were within the meaning of the parties of the contract. It does not seem possible that a death, caused as was the present, was not intended to be covered by this policy. A death by choking would leave no external or visible sign upon the body, neither would suffocation by gases in a burning building, or drowning, or charcoal fumes, or poison feloniously administered or taken by accident. If deaths caused by such means were not covered by this policy, it was a delusion and a snare. If the language of the policy is capable of two constructions that most favorable to the insured should be adopted.

It will not do to sacrifice the substance of the contract to the letter if such a result can be reasonably avoided. “Conditions and provisos in policies of insurance are to be construed strictly against the underwriters, as they tend to narrow the range and limit the force of the principal obligation.” Hoffman v. Ætna Ins. Co., 32 N. Y., 405 . A provision of a policy of fire insurance, forfeiting it if the property becomes in any way incumbered without the con

Construed with reference to this rule of law and analogous decisions of courts, we conclude that the learned judge at circuit erred in holding that the policy did not extend to and cover a death by such an accident as the present. The case of Hill v. Hartford Ins. Co., might well have justified such conclusion, but after a careful examination we think the rule there laid down was too strict and should have been modified in accordance with the purposes and inten of the parties and the rules of interpretation of such contracts, to which attention has been called'. The opinion of Mr. Justice Follett in that case and the authorities by him cited, produce a conviction that an accidental death under the circumstances of the present case constituted a good cause of action under defendant’s policy.

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

Hardin, P. J., and Follett, J., concur.