Raynor v. Lyon

—The action is for the specific performance of a contract made by the plaintiff with the defendant, for sale and purchase of two lots of land on the southerly side of One Hundred and Forty-third street, in the city of New York. By the agreement which was executed, the plaintiff was bound for its performance, to deliver to the defendant a deed containing a general warranty and the usual full covenants for the conveying, and assuring to him of the fee simple of the premises, free from all incumbrances.

The defendant resisted the action upon the alleged ground that the deed which had been tendered would not convey the premises as it was agreed they should be in the contract, free from all encumbrance. To maintain this defense it was proved that Nathaniel Jarvis, Jr., on the 1st of June, 1852, was the owner of the block in which the lots are situated which the plaintiff had become bound to convey. Jarvis had laid the block out into lots, and conveyed such lots to different purchasers on or about the 1st of June, 1852. In each of the several deeds made and executed by him was a condition, covenant or stipulation against nuisances or other offensive erections upon the lots sold and conveyed. This was inserted in the following language:

‘6 And the said party of the second part, for herself, her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, doth hereby covenant to and with the said party of the first part, his heirs,_ executors, administrators, that she shall and will not permit upon the said above granted or described premises, or any part thereof, any slaughter-house, smith-shop, forge, furnace, steam engine, brass foundry, nail or other iron' factory, sugar bakery, cow stable, hog pen, or any soap, candle, oil, starch or lamp-black factory, or any manufactory of glue, varnish, vitrol, ink or turpentine, or for the tanning, dressing or preparing skins, hides or leather, or any brewery, distillery or any other noxious, unwholesome, offensive or dangerous establishment, calling, trade or business.”

And it was made a part of the conveyances by Nathaniel Jarvis, Jr., of the two lots in controversy in this action. It was held at the trial that these lots were still subject to that restriction placed upon their use, notwithstanding the

“ Subject to the covenant against nuisances as fully described and contained in a deed dated 1st of June, 1852, from Nathaniel Jarvis, Jr., of the first part, and Nary Faraly of the second part, and recorded in the office of the registrar of the city and county of New York in Liber, 605, of Conveyances, page 215.”

And the deed to her contained the covenant which has already been quoted.

It is probably not very important in the decision of the appeal to place much weight or effect upon this clause in the' deed, for by the original conveyance made in June, 1852, the deeds executed for the different lots had subjected their use to such restraints as to prevent either of the grantees from devoting his property to any of the purposes forbidden by the stipulation, covenant or condition in his deed.

While that was in form a covenant, or stipulation, with the grantor in the several deeds it was evidently hot designed to be made for his benefit farther than it might be applicable to any portion of the block he might retain; but it was for the benefit of the persons acquiring the title to the several lots in this block. It was a reciprocal inducement to each purchaser to take the title, for by the form given to the several deeds the respective grantees were so restricted in their use of the land as to prevent them from appropriating it to the purposes prohibited in the deed. While the covenant or agreement was made with the grantor it was manifestly for the benefit of whoever should become the owners of the other portions of the block. They had the right to purchase as they did, upon the understanding that neither of the lots conveyed could be used or devoted to either of these prohibited objects. So much of the deeds relating to these subjects was for the benefit of each of the other purchasers, and they had the right to insist upon the observance of these restrictions in the conveyances by Jarvis, as these restrictions were for their benefit as purchasers of the property. They acquired, by their deeds, the right to insist upon the observance of these .covenants or stipulations. To construe and carry them into effect it is necessary to stand in the position of the parties at the time when the deeds were executed and delivered, and' to carry on their mutual design in submitting to the accept

Cases quite similar in their effect to the present controversy have not unfrequently been before the courts. And deeds to property, made substantially in this manner, have been required to be observed in favor of the purchasers taking title in reliance upon the fact of such observance. Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige, 254; Barrow v. Richard, 8 id., 351; Curtiss v. Ayrault, 47 N. Y., 73 ; Cole v. Sims, 23 Eng. Law and Eq., 584; Whatman v. Gibson, 9 Simons, 196; Mann v. Stephens, 15 id., 377; Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips, 775 ; Brouwer v. Jones, 23 Barb., 153 ; Gibert v. Peteler ( 38 N. Y., 165 ), and Trustees, etc. v. Lynch, 70 id., 440), where it was held that “an easement in favor of, and for the benefit of lands owned by third persons, can be created by grant, and a covenant by the owner, upon a good consideration, to use, or refrain from using, his premises in a particular manner, for the benefit of premises owned by the covenantor, is, in effect, the grant of an easement, and the right to the enjoyment of it will pass as appurtenant to the premises in respect of which it was created. Reciprocal easements of this character may be created upon the division and. conveyances in severalty to different grantees of an entire tract, and they may be created by a reservation in a conveyance, by a condition annexed to a grant, or by a covenant, and even a paroi agreement of the grantees.” Id., 447. And this principle was followed in Lattimer v. Livermore ( 72 N. Y., 174 ), and is sanctioned by the decisions in Clark v. Martin ( 49 Penn., 289 ), and Thruston v. Minke 32 Md., 487 .

The reference in the deed from Jarvis to Brown, in 1869, exhibited the purpose of the parties to be to subject this deed to the covenants or reservation mentioned in the original deed of one of these two lots. And the conveyance from Brown to Reeves E. Selmes contained the same clause; and the fact that the mortgage was given back to Brown without mentioning or referring to it, and that the title was finally obtained by a foreclosure of that mortgage, did not change or modify the obligation to which tire premises had in this manner been subjected. The deeds containing the reservations as part of the record title of the property could not be changed or materially affected by the execution and delivery of the mortgage in the form in which it was made and its subsequent foreclosure.

Neither was it within the power or authority of Mr. Jarvis, after the contract had been entered into for the conveyance of the premises, to release the property from the effect of these restraints by the release executed by him on the 9th of July, 1886. He at that time had no

By the judgment dismissing the complaint the defendant has been permitted to recover the sum of $137 paid for counsel fees and disbursements in the examination of this title. And by way of supporting so much of the appeal as includes that sum the right of the court to award this compensation has been denied on the part of the plaintiff, and the case of Dey v. Nason ( 100 N. Y., 166 ) is cited as maintaining that position. But it certainly does not, for there the defendant had incurred no obligation in the contract subjecting him on any contingency whatever to the payment of the expenses which were there rejected while here he bound himself to convey the title to the lots in fee simple free from all incumbrances. That he was incapable of doing, and the defendant was entitled by way of indemnity to recover the expenses incurred m ascertaining that fact.

The judgment was right, and it should be affirmed, with the usual costs.

Van Brunt, P. J.. and Brady, J., concur.