Ever since that time the plaintiffs have been in possession up to this line, stripping their bank, cutting and carrying away clay, building roads at large expense; their right, to such possession having been undisputed and assented to' by DeNoyelles.
In one instance last year the employees of plaintiffs cut a bunch of clay six to eight feet long about three feet north, of this line. DeNoyelles the next day complained that they were over the line and again indicated where the line was, fixing it at the same place as before, and the witness Rose, in DeNoyelles’ presence, rolled a stone on the place so pointed out where it has ever since remained.
The lessors were' owners of the land on both sides of the disputed line, and on January 29, 1887, demised to defendants certain premises, being part of the “Daniel DeNoyelles’ property” down to the line of the “Edward DeNoyelles’ property,” the latter being that which plaintiffs had leased and were in possession of and had been in possession of for several years.
The fine of the “Daniel De Noyelles property” has been uncertain and indefinite. The premises of which plaintiffs were in possession under their lease were necessary to them in the conduct of their manufacturing business, the materials upon such premises constituting their supply for manufacturing brick and were being actually used for such purpose. On May 16, 1887, plaintiffs had upon the premises, which they claim, a planked roadway upon which to haul their materials and which was necessary to run their carts on and get clay out, and defendants went upon these premises, tore up the planks and threw them out and continued and repeated these acts for some time. At the same time defendants claimed the right to take possession of plaintiffs’ premises and to remove the materials therefrom and they forbade plaintiffs taking such materials and threatened to get men there and maintain forcible and continued possession.
C. P. Hoffman, for app’lts; Irving Brown, for resp’ts.
The findings of fact are sustained by the testimony, and fully justify the judgment rendered.
The use of the land is important to the plaintiffs’ business and no adequate compensation in damages could be obtained. At law no other damages could be obtained tha'n could be clearly established. But from the nature of the case the damages could not be proved with precision. After the plaintiffs’ business had been destroyed they would not be able to prove with any accuracy the amount of damages sustained.
If a court of equity could not grant relief in such a case