People v. Briggs

The action was for the recovery of a penalty of $500 imposed by section 19 of chapter 183 of the Laws of 1885, for the violation of section 7 of the act as it was amended by section 2 of chapter 458 of the laws of the samo year. The evidence at the trial sufficiently proved tho allegations of the complaint to sustain the verdict of the jury finding a violation of these statutory provisions by the defendants. But no evidence was given to sustain the averment in the complaint that the article manufactured and kept for sale was not manufactured or in process of manufacture at the time when chapter 183 of the Laws of 1885, went into effect. But this proof was not required to sustain the plaintiff’s action, for the law, without the declaration contained in section 21 of chapter 183, would not apply to acts done prior to its enactment. And if the legislature had provided otherwise it would, to that extent, violate the provision of the constitution forbidding the enactment of ex post facto laws. The case was presumptively made out by proving that the defendants had the prohibited article on hand, designing and intending to sell it or offer it for sale in violation of the statute. It was found in this condition in their possession prior to the time of the commencement of the suit and after the enactment of the-statute, and it could be inferred from these facts, in the absence of any explanation on the part of the defendants, that the article was neither manufactured, nor in process of manufacture, at the time of the passage of the act.

If the fact were otherwise, the proof of it would be naturally within the power of the defendants and not accessible to the prosecution. They knew from what source it had been obtained, and where the proof could be procured to show its previous manufacture, or process of manufacture, and should have produced it if they could, in that manner, exonerate themselves from liability under the last section of the act. And they were apparently the only persons having the ability to prove the fact if it in truth existed. And where that is the nature of the case, the proof is required to be supplied by the defendants and not by the plaintiff. Harris v. White, 81 N. Y., 532 , 546-8; Schwab v. People, 4 Hun, 520 ; People v. Kibler, 8 N. Y. State Rep., 707.

The requirement of this degree of proof was made in Thurtell v. Beaumont (1 Bing., 339). In that action, which was for the recovery of moneys under an insurance, the defense rested upon the allegation of a wilful destruction of the property by fire by the plaintiff, and the court held that it could only succeed by proof establishing the fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The same ruling was followed in Willmett v. Harmer (8 Car. & Payne, 695), which was an action for a libel, where the crime of forgery was alleged by way of defense. The same disposition was made of the point in Chalmers v. Schackall (6 id., 475), where the offense-of bigamy was alleged in an answer to an action for a libel. ‘ But these and other similar cases dp not seem to have been followed in the more recent consideration of this subject in England. For in Cooper v. Slade (6 House of Lords, 746) the decision proceeded upon the theory that proof satisfactory to the jury was sufficient to establish the bribery there alleged, although it was made by statute a criminal offense. The point was not specially dwelt upon, it is true, but it was involved in the case. And so far as it was considered, the requirement of those earlier authorities was not followed. In the states of Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Vermont this measure of proof has been exacted where it became necessary to establish an indictable act either to support or defeat a civil action. McConnel v. Delaware Ins. Co., 18 Ill., 228 ; Lexington Ins. Co. v. Paver, 16 Ohio, 324 ; Strader v. Mullane, 17 Ohio St., 624 ; Wonderly v. Nokes, 8 Blackf., 589 ; Steinman v. Mc Williams, 6 Penn., 170 ; Gorman v. Sutton, 32 id., 247 ; Coulter v. Stuart, 2 Yerger, 225; White v. Comstock, 6 Vt., 405 .

And without either discussing or considering the point upon authority it has been followed in the same manner in;

But the application of the rule has been refused upon an information for the condemnation and forfeiture of tobacco in Lillienthal v. United States, 97 U. S., 237 , 266-8. While in the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, New Jersey and Iowa, the rule has been as distinctly asserted to be the other way, and that no more than a satisfactory preponderence of the evidence can be required to prove the fact when it has been put in issue only in a civil action, as an action for a penalty must be held to be. Hoyer v. Town of Mascoutah, 59 Ill., 137 ; State v. Hayden, 32 Wis,, 663 .

The extreme rule of evidence insisted upon by the defendant’s counsel, was considered to be necessary in Berckmans v. Berckmans, 17 N. J. Eq., 453 , and Taylor v. Morris, 22 id., 606, 612. But it seems to have been reconsidered by the court of errors and appeals on a very thorough and elaborate examination of the authorities in Kane v. Hib. Ins. Co. ( 39 N. J. Law, 697 ), where it was finally held that this measure of proof could not be required for the establishment of a criminal act in a civil suit. The law passed through the same vicissitude in the state of Wisconsin where it was held in Freeman v. Freeman ( 31 Wis., 235 ), that proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be given before the jury could find the fact to be maintained. But Blaeser v. Milwaukee Ins. Co. ( 37 Wis., 31 ), this rule was departed from, and. a convincing prepondance of the evidence was considered to be all that could be exacted. In Lewis v. Garretson, 56 Iowa, 278 ; Welch v. Jugenheymer, id., 1; Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N. H., 97 ; Gordon v. Parmelee, 15 Gray, 413 , and Sperry v. Wilcox, 1 Met., 267 ; a satisfactory preponderance of proof was considered to be all that could be required of parties alleging and controverting a criminal act in a civil suit. And that would seem to be consonant to the nature and object of the proceeding. For it is not to punish the party for an offense committed by him, but to determine a private right in accordance with the existence of the fact, the evidence may be found to establish. The result imposes no punishment upon the party. It simply defeats his action in one class of cases, or subjects his property to seizure, or his person to arrest in the other. And where arrest may be made on execution, it is not to punish the party arrested, but to coerce by the arrest the payment of the amount recovered by the judgment. While in a prosecution by indictment, the entire end and object of the proceeding is punishment, either by way of fine or imprisonment, or both, as the law may provide. And there

Where the allegation of the comission of the crime of ^perjury has been relied upon, it must be maintained by the evidence either of two witnesses, or of one with the circumstances added equivalent to the evidence of another.. But it has not been held where this exaction has been complied with, that the proof must be convincing beyond all reasonable doubt. Woodbeck v. Keller, 6 Cow., 119 ; Roberts v. Champlin, 14 Wend., 120 . Clark v. Dibble (16 id., 601), which, from a remark made in the course of the opinion, lends some support to the rule insisted upon by the ■defendant’s counsel.

The cases of Com’rs of Pilots v. Clark ( 33 N. Y., 251 ), and Stearns v. Field ( 90 N. Y., 640 ) included no criminal charge whatever, and they are inapplicable to this controversy.

While in Johnson v. Agricultural Ins. Co. ( 25 Hun, 251 ) this precise point was presented for decision. And the court, after considering the authorities in this state, held that the position taken by the defendant’s counsel in the present action could not be sustained, but that a preponderance of evidence was sufficient for all the purposes of the action.

In N. Y. Guaranty, etc., Co. v. Gleason ( 78 N. Y., 503 ) the right alleged and considered .depended to a great extent upon the charge that the defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to forge bonds and put them upon the market to defraud persons advancing money on the faith of them. And at the close of the trial the court was asked to ■charge the jury that if they found from the evidence that there was any doubt about the fact that Rolston’s bank book, or the fact that the envelope with A. H. Palmer on it was found in Gleason’s safe, they should disregard Pinkerton’s evidence as to these facts. It was said in answer to the objection taken to the refusal to so charge that the judge ‘'had already fairly instructed the jury upon the matter of doubt, and had instructed them that if they had any doubt about any matter to give the benefit of the doubt to the defendants. This was more favorable than the defendants could legally require in a civil action. In such an action the plaintiff is not bound to establish any fact so clearly that it shall be free from doubt. All that is required of him is that he shall satisfy the jqry by a preponderance of evidence, and he is never called upon to free their minds of all doubt.” Id., 513 .

There was no deficiency in the statement of the case in the complaint, neither was there in the proof to establish the cause of action, and. no greater effect was given to the facts than they were entitled as evidence to receive. While the act declared certain facts to be conclusive evidence of a fraudulent intent, it was not designed by the use of that term to deprive the defendants of their right to overthrow it by proof on their part. The word was not well-selected, but it is not to be supposed that the legislature intended by the use of it to give more than a presumptive effect to the facts to which it relates.

There is no ground in the case on which the disposition of it at the circuit can be changed, and the judgment should be affirmed.

Van Brunt, Oh. J., and Brady, J., concur.