Majority
Headnote
1. Stay of proceedings—Granting of discretionary.—The action is for alleged libel. The answer alleges matters in mitigation and in justification. The plaintiff obtained an order directing the defendant to furnish a bill of particulars. And, on the defendant’s application, an order was made for the examination of the plaintiff.
The purpose of the plaintiff’s motion was to require the defendant to furnish a bill of particulars before the examination of the plaintiff and to obtain a stay of such examination until then. This motion was one within the discretion of the court and was denied.
Our attention is called to no rule of law or practice that entitles a party to the precedence sought by the motion, and its denial does not appear to have been an improper exercise of the discretion of the court. It is, however, contended that the order of the special term was made on the ground that the defendant had the right to the examination to enable it to make and serve a bill ■ of particulars, and for that reason the court was in error.
The denial of the motion does not by the terms of the order seem to have been placed on that ground, and there is nothing elsewhere appearing which requires the conclusion that such was the ground upon which it was made. And, therefore, the question now here is essentially no different in that respect from that presented and determined on a former review of an order made in this action. 5 N. Y. State Rep., 229. The order merely states that the motion is denied “ upon the ground that the defendant may properly take the examination of the plaintiff, and use the information derived from such examination of the plaintiff to frame its bill of particulars,” to which certainly there can be no objection legitimately made. On the former review, the question, whether under the statute and within the rule of practice, an examination of an adverse party could properly be directed to enable the moving party to prepare a bill of particulars; did not seem to require consideration for the purpose of determining that appeal, and the court did not intend to express any opinion upon it. The remark then made, in the opinion delivered, that it might not be granted for such purpose, was designed only as an expression to the effect that the court did not mean to be understood as holding that such purpose came within the examination provided for by the statute, and that the question was treated as an open one. And it does not seem
A bill of particulars is not, in the strict sense of the term, a pleading, as it contains no allegations of cause of action or of defense.
The statute providing for it is embraced in the provisions applicable to pleadings, and is so broad in its scope that the court may in any case direct a bill of particulars of the claim of either party to be delivered to the adverse party.” Code Civ. Pro., § 531.
The word “claim,” in its application, is as extensive as the cause of . action alleged in the complaint, and as are the ' matters alleged by way of affirmative defense in the answer. Dwight v. Germania Life Insurance Co., 84 N. Y., 493 .
And while the purpose and effect of a bill of particulars is to limit the generalty of the complaint or answer and to make more specific the alleged cause of action or affirmative matter of defense, it is treated as an amplification of the pleading. Ryckman v. Haight, 15 John., 222 ; Gay v. Cary, 9 Cow., 45 ; Matthews v. Hubbard, 47 N. Y., 428 -9.
It, therefore, may properly be said to form a part of the pleading (Bowman v. Earle, 3 Duer, 694 ), and like it may be amended. Case v. Pharis, 106 N. Y., 114 ; 8 N. Y. State Rep., 548.
And so essential is compliance with the order directing a party to furnish it, to his right to avail himself of his cause of action or defense, that his failure to do so may result in depriving him of the benefit of his pleading by the force of an order striking it out. Gross v. Clark, 87 N. Y., 272 .
The fact that a bill of particulars is characterized as the amplification of a pleading and, in some sense, part of it, seems to bring it within that term so as to permit discovery in aid of its production.
And, in view of the power within the discretion of the court to order it made, and to direct the extent and particularity of the statement which it shall embrace, it is apparent that the requirement of an order .may be such as to impose upon the party a duty to supply the bill which, in some cases, might render such discovery necessary tb enable him to meet the demand so made upon him by the
Our attention is called to no case, and we are aware of none, presenting the ^question as relates to a bill of particulars. And, as the counsel for the plaintiff has treated the question as here, and may have made the motion in view of it, no costs of this appeal should be awarded.
The order should be affirmed. ,
Barker, P. J., and Dwight, J., concur.