Bidelman v. State

Every fact essential to a just cause of action for damages incurred through the negligence of another, was found to exist, but the claim for compensation denied upon the sole ground that “the bridges and culverts” in question were not the property of the town of Gaines; and hence that an action could not be maintained if the claim were against an individual or a corporation, and consequently could not be properly presented against the state. It is, among other things, provided by the Code (sec. 1926), that an action or special proceeding may be maintained by the supervisor of a town, to recover damages for an injury to the property or rights of that officer or the body represented by him. The supervisor represents the town. The section quoted is substantially a re-enactment of the provision of the Revised Statutes (2 R. S., 473, secs. 92, 93), and in like manner merely prescribes the mode of enforcing such

But the facts presented by the appellant bring the case within other statutes, devolving a duty on the town, which, being performed at an expense, entitles it to reimbursement at the hands of the wrong doer who occasioned it. The facts found are, that by a break in the Erie canal in the town of Gaines, caused by the negligence of the agents and officers of the state, “three public bridges and a culvert in that town were injured to the extent of $1,200.” By statute the primary responsibility for the maintenance and repair of highways and bridges is cast upon the several towns of the state. It is true that the duty of care and superintendence over them is imposed upon the commissioners of highways, and they are to cause highways and bridges over streams intersecting highways, to be kept in repair ( 1 R. 8 ., chap. XVI, title I, art. I). Their action, however, whether in ordinary (1 R. S., supra, secs. 8, 4), or extraordinary cases (Laws of 1832, chap. 274: Laws of 1857, chap. 615; Laws of 1858, chap. 103), is at the expense of the town, and to be met by assessment in the same manner as other town charges ( 1 R. 8 ., supra, secs. 3,4). So the statute (Laws of_ 1881, chap. 700), entitled “An act to provide for the liability of towns and commissioners of highways in certain cases,” lays upon the town a liability for all damages to persons or property by reason of “defective highways or bridges in such town.” Being charged with these various duties, and made subject to liability, it would seem to follow that the town had such an interest in the preservation of its bridges as would give a right of action and a remedy over against any person who intentionally, or by negligence, made repair or rebuilding necessary.

The statute last cited (Laws of 1881, supra) expressly gives an action to the town against its commissioner of highways, if the defect complained of occurred by his misconduct or neglect, thus extending to the officer a principle well settled in relation to others, viz., that where it appears that an obstruction or defect in a highway, which occasioned an injury, was caused by a third person, the corporation may have a remedy over against him. The same principle makes one causing injury to a bridge which it is the duty of the town to repair and keep in order, liable to the town for the necessary expense of reparation. In the case now before us the state occupies that position. The negligence of its agents caused injury to the bridges of the town, and the "damages claimed are such only as will restore money actually expended by it. We think, therefore, the claim should have been allowed as one prosecuted by a proper party. We are referred to no reported decision, nor indeed to the decision of any court, that there may not be in the town such property, or at least such incident of

The same remark applies to the People v. Auditors of Little Valley ( 75 N. Y., 316 ). The Town of Fishkill v. Plank-Road Co. ( 22 Barb., 647 ) and Town of Galen v. Plank-Road Co. (27 id., 543) were actions upon agreements to which the town was not a party The People v Pennock ( 60 N. Y., 421 ) involved nothing else than the destruction •of a bond- given by a supervision Hone of these cases, nor the principle on which they rest, touches the question presented upon this appeal. On the other hand, it is within the reason which led to the decision in Bridges v. The Supervisors ( 92 N. Y., 570 ). It should be answered in favor of the appellant and a remedy allowed to it, because the town was under an obligation to keep in repair its bridges and make them suitable for public travel, so that it .shall incur no liability from their defects, and it may have •compensation from one who wrongfully, by negligence or •otherwise, makés such repair necessary, and so exposes it to the expenditure of money. And since no other objection to the claim is made, we think the award should be reversed and the claimant allowed the sum demanded, with

All concur.