In re the Estate of Arnett

The executors, respondents and one of the legatees under the will appear specially and move to dismiss the appeal on the ground that neither the district attorney nor the people has any standing to prosecute the same.

The testator died April 12, 1886. The proceeding before the surrogate was instituted by the petition of the executors, filed July 20, 1887, which alleged that all creditors had been paid, and set out the names of all persons interested in the estate as legatees, heirs-at-law and next of kin, all of whom were collateral relatives. The usual citation was issued, returnable September 19, 1887, and duly served on the persons so mentioned, to attend the judicial settlement of the executors’ account on a day named. The proceeding was adjourned from time to time until the eleventh day of ■October, when the executors filed their final account, and the same was on that day judicially settled and allowed as filed.

The record contains a notice, dated September 27, 1887, signed by one George P. Ostrander (who describes himself therein as an appraiser duly appointed by the surrogate of Niagara county), directed to the legatees, to the effect that he will, on the 8th day of October, 1887, proceed to make an appraisement of the legacies in the will of the deceased, subject to tax by virtue of the provision of chapter 183 of the Laws of 1885, and the amendments thereto. The notice is accompanied by proof of service thereof, by mail, on the several legatees named in the will, and the official oath of the appraiser. The notice, proof of service and oath were filed in the surrogate’s office October 8, 1887. The record contains no order for the appointment of such appraiser, nor evidence that an appraisal was made or any proceeding had under the notice above mentioned.

The minutes of the proceeding of the settlement of the ■account of the executors contained the following entry: * * * ££D. E. Brong, district attorney of Niagara county, appears in person for the people, the people being thereby made a party to this accounting, and asks for an order directing payment of inheritance tax on behalf of the people, and objects to the account as presented. The petitioners object. Objection of district attorney overruled and

The decree, made on the day last mentioned, adjudged that the account be settled and allowed as filed; that the executors were not liable to pay any “collateral tax ” upon any legacy or property under the will of the deceased; that no deduction should be made by them for any such tax, from any such legacy or property, but that all such legacies and property be delivered and distributed by them according to the provisions of the will, and as decreed, without the payment or deduction of any such tax. From that decree this appeal was taken by the district attorney in the name of the people of the state of New York.

We think the motion of the respondents to dismiss the appeal must be denied. Assuming, as we shall, for the purpose of the consideration of this motion, that the collateral inheritance tax act of 1885, as amended by the act of 1887, was applicable to the case, the people was a proper party to the proceeding, if not as a creditor, at least as interested in the estate. By section 1 of both the acts mentioned, the-taxes thereby imposed were payable to the treasurer of the-county “ for the use of the state;” by section 4 of both acts such taxes became “ due and payable at the death of the decedent;” and, by section 6, they were to be deducted by the executors from the several legacies before the payment of the latter to the several legatees. The people had not been cited to the proceeding, but by section 2731 of the Code of Civil Procedure, “A creditor or person interested in the estate, although not cited, is entitled to appear upon the hearing and thus make himself a party to the special proceeding.” We think it puts no strain upon these provisions to hold them applicable to the case of the people claiming payment of the collateral inheritance tax. That tax, although it is required to be assessed upon the particular legacies or estates given by the will, is yet, in a perfectly proper sense of the words, payable out of the estate-of the testator. We cannot doubt that the people was a party interested in the estate and therefore entitled to intervene as a party to the proceeding without having been cited thereto.

The authority of the district attorney to appear for the-people, on the accounting by the executors, is not to be derived from the statute under consideration; that statute makes no reference to such proceedings. In the proceedings prescribed by the statute the district attorney can move only as he is set in motion by written notice from the county treasurer. Section 17.. But we know of no reason why the authority of an attorney to appear for the people

The question presented, on the merits of the case, relates to the effect of the act of 1887 (Laws of 1887, chap. 713), amending the original act of 1885 (Laws of 1885, chap. 483). Of course the motion of the district attorney for an order for the payment of the tax was properly denied. The tax had not been assessed; the property had not been appraised. Section 13. There had been no citation to the persons interested in the property hable to the tax to appear and show cause why said tax should not be paid. Section 16. Several things were wanting to give the surrogate jurisdiction to order the payment of the tax. But the objection on the part of the people to the allowance of the executors’ account as filed, which showed payment of the several legacies without deduction of the tax, was overruled, we must suppose upon the ground of the effect of the act of 1887.

Upon that question it is the contention of the respondents that the act of 1885 was repealed by the act of 1887; that the taxes in question having accrued under the former act, the right of action therefor (not being saved by the repealing act) did not survive the repeal; and, consequently, that proceedings for the collection of such taxes cannot now be ¡maintained.

We think this contention cannot be supported. The act of 1887 does not purport to repeal the former act except so far as it is inconsistent with the provisions of the latter. In terms it amends the former act “so as to read as follows.” The reading of the new act is in great part identical with that of the old; several of the amendments are merely verbal; several of them relate to mere details of procedure; the only changes of substance are in the provisions for the exaction of interest on taxes unpaid after a certain time, and for the exemption of certain classes of persons from the operation of the law. The latter amendment merely extends the exemption to the class of adopted children.

We suppose there is nothing, either in the reason of the case or by way of authority, to prevent the application to this case of the rule of construction laid down by Denio, J., in the case of Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y., 595 . He said: ‘‘The theory of amendments made in the form adopted in the present instance, we take to be this: the portions of the sections which are repeated are to be considered as having been the law from the time they were first enacted; and the new portions are to be understood as having been enacted at the time the amended act took effect.” The form of amendment adopted in the instance then before the court was the same as in this case.

The two cases upon the authority of which the effect of repeal is claimed in this case, are those of Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y., 610 , and Nash v. White's Bank of Buffalo, 105 id., 243; 8 N. Y. State Rep., 31. Both of these actions arose under penal statutes. The first presented a clear case of repeal. It was brought under the act of 1848, and its amendments, to enforce the personal liability, by way of penalty, of a trustee of a manufacturing corporation, by reason of the failure to file a report within twenty days after the first day of January, 1869. The company was organized in March, 1868. The action was commenced in 1876. Meantime (by chap. 510 of the Code of 1875), section twelve of the act of 1848, had been so amended as to' require the filing of the first report only after the expiration of a year from the organization of the company. This amendment clearly repealed the provision of the act of 1848, which imposed a penalty for not filing a report within one year after the organization, and it was held that, the action having been commenced after the repealing act took effect, the plaintiffs were without remedy under the law as it stood in 1869.

The case of Nash v. White's Bank was an action brought under the act of 1870, which prescribed a penalty for taking interest at a greater rate than seven per cent. The action had not been prosecuted to judgment at the time of the-amendment of 1880, by which the legal rate of interest was. reduced to six per cent, the penalty was imposed for taking interest in excess of the new rate, and all acts and parts of'

But, whatever the grounds of that decision, we do not feel called upon to extend its application beyond the class of penal statutes, and, consequently, do not regard it as controlling in this case.

For the reasons stated we think the law of 1885 was not so far abrogated by the amendments of 1887 as to relieve estates from liability for taxes which accrued under the former act and were not collected before the passage of the latter; and this conclusion renders necessary a reversal of the decree appealed from.

The proceedings should be remitted to the surrogate with directions to continue the same until proceedings are had for the assessment and collection of the taxes in question, unless such taxes are sooner paid.

Decree reversed; proceedings remitted to surrogate of Niagara county, to proceed in accordance with the opinion; without costs of this appeal to either party.

Barker, P. J., Haight and Bradley, JJ., concur.